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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the goals and means for reducing emissions. It consists of theo-
retical models that apply and extend the classical model that Martin L. Weitzman
introduced in 1974. The Weitzman model restricts the means of regulation to price
and quantity policies, which require setting either a price or a quota in the market
for emissions production. Weitzman ﬁnds that the instruments are not equivalent,
as asymmetric information induces societal costs that differ between price and quan-
tity policies. In the thesis, theWeitzmanmodel is extended by incorporating discrete
choices, subsidization, and cost inefﬁciencies. The augmented models demonstrate
that the new features change the classical instrument choice formula in signiﬁcant
ways.
A discrete choice is a major project that produces considerable emission reduc-
tions with a considerable monetary outﬂow; an investment in green technology is
an example of a discrete choice. A regulated ﬁrm is subsidized if it does not have to
pay for every emission unit it produces. Taken together, the thesis discusses how sub-
sidization manipulates emissions payments and discrete choices such that aggregate
emissions reduction becomes inefﬁciently organized. Importantly, the thesis studies
tradable permits (quantity policy) and environmental taxes (price policy) that both
contain emission payments, so the instruments are vulnerable to subsidization and
inefﬁciencies. The thesis traces instances of subsidization and subsequent cost inef-
ﬁciency in environmental policy and discusses two general sources of inefﬁciencies
in more detail: technical factors and political factors.
Political inefﬁciency is the result of conﬂict between the regulator and various
policy stakeholders. The regulator promotes the efﬁcient use of natural resources,
whereas the stakeholders often have other (usually narrower) goals—incumbent pol-
luting ﬁrms seek tax exemptions while environmentalists aim for generous support
for green technologies.
Technical inefﬁciency is amore subtle concept and refers to the conﬂict that arises
v
between the complexity of the regulated industries and the simplicity of the regula-
tory instruments. In the thesis, an important source of complexity is that techno-
logical externalities create agglomeration economies, so, as more companies invest
in green technology, additional investments become less expensive. Whenever tech-
nological externalities interact with asymmetric information, the thesis shows that
an efﬁcient solution involves subsidizing ﬁrms, but the policy requires very compli-
cated subsidization designs.
The extensions of the original Weitzman model produce novel insights into the
rules for the choice of instrument between price policy and quantity policy. The
thesis isolates three general effects that inﬂuence the classical instrument choice: the
base effect, cost effect, and volume effect. Combining these effects, the thesis shows
that the overall effect on instrument choice depends on the policy- and industry-
speciﬁc factors.
The base effect originates from changes in the regulated industries’ cost structures
in the absence of inefﬁciencies. The thesis discusses two particular sources of the
base effect: programs encouraging voluntary emissions reductions and the presence
of positive technological externalities. In both cases, the aggregate abatement costs
fall. The thesis argues that the regulator now pays more attention to the damages
caused by pollution, favoring the use of pollution quotas. Therefore, the base effect
is unilaterally biased toward quantity regulation.
The cost effect is primarily the result of inefﬁcient subsidization of polluting
ﬁrms. The thesis shows that the shape of the cost effect depends on the source of
the inefﬁciency. However, whether inefﬁciency is technical or political in the mod-
els of the thesis, the cost effect invariably favors price instrument—environmental
tax—in the instrument choice.
Traditionally, an emission quota is modeled as fully binding. The thesis presents
policy implementations in which ﬁrms’ discrete choices affect the size of the emis-
sions quota. The non-binding quota is labeled as the volume effect. As the emissions
follow the quota, the volume effect makes the aggregate damage of emissions un-
certain under the quantity regime. Interestingly, mainly because non-binding quota
reduces the cost of cutting emissions, the thesis shows that the volume effect may
also favor the quantity instrument. Notably, Marc J. Roberts and Michael Spence
produced the same ﬁnding in their classical study of instrument choice in 1976, so
the volume effect can be thought of as a new interpretation of their original idea.
vi
TIIVISTELMÄ
Väitöskirjassani tutkin päästövähennystavoitteita ja päästöjen sääntelykeinojen va-
lintaa. Väitöskirja koostuu teoreettisista tutkimuksista, joissa käytän ja laajennan
Martin Weitzmanin klassikkomallia vuodelta 1974. Weitzman jakaa tutkimukses-
saan sääntelykeinot hinta- ja määräkeinoihin; säätelijä määrittää joko saasteen yk-
sikköhinnan (hintainstrumentti) tai määräkiintiön suuruuden (määräinstrumentti).
Hän osoittaa, että valinta hinta- ja määräinstrumentin välillä on merkittävä. Epä-
symmetrinen informaatio säätelijän ja säädeltävien välillä luo kustannuksia, joiden
suuruus riippuu valitusta instrumentista. Väitöskirjassa Weitzmanin kehikkoa laa-
jennetaan ottamalla huomioon myös diskreetit valinnat, subventiot ja kustannuste-
hottomuus. Väitöskirjan tutkimukset osoittavat, että laajennukset vaikuttavat voi-
makkaasti valintaan hinta- ja määräinstrumentin välillä.
Diskreetillä valinnalla tarkoitetaan isoa investointihanketta, jossa yhdellä pää-
töksellä ja suurella rahallisella panostuksella saadaan aikaan huomattava päästövä-
hennys. Yritystä subventoidaan, jos sen ei tarvitse maksaa jokaisesta tuottamastaan
päästöyksiköstä. Väitöskirjassa osoitetaan, kuinka saastuttavien yritysten diskreetti-
en valintojen subventointi aiheuttaa päästöleikkausten kustannusten allokoitumisen
tehottomasti yritysten kesken. Huomionarvoista on, että työssä tutkitut sääntely-
menetelmät ovat tehottomuudenmahdollinen lähde. Sekä ympäristövero (hintainst-
rumentti) että kaupattavien päästölupien järjestelmä (määräinstrumentti) sisältävät
päästöihin sidottuja maksuja.
Väitöskirjassa päädytään tarkastelemaan kahta eri tukipolitiikkaa ja niistä kum-
puavaa kustannustehottomuutta. Sanotaan, että tehottomuus voi olla luonteeltaan
poliittista tai teknistä. Poliittinen tehottomuus liittyy erilaisten sidosryhmien vai-
kutusvaltaan. Toisin kuin säätelijällä, sidosryhmien tavoitteena ei ole taloudellisen
tehokkuuden edistäminen. Säädeltävien yritysten tavoitteena on ennemmin verovä-
hennysten tavoittelu, kun taas ympäristöliikkeet mieluusti edistävät vihreän tekno-
logian tukitoimia.
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Tekninen tehottomuus on edellistä hienovaraisempi käsite. Se liittyy ristiriitaan,
joka vallitsee saastuttavan tuotantoalan monimutkaisuuden ja sitä säätelevien inst-
rumenttien yksinkertaisuuden välillä. Väitöskirjassa kuvatussa monimutkaisuudes-
sa on kyse teknologisesta ulkoisvaikutuksesta eli kasaantumisvaikutuksesta: mitä
enemmän yritykset siirtyvät käyttämään vihreää teknologiaa, sitä edullisemmaksi
sen käyttö muodostuu. Väitöskirjan analyysin mukaan tehokkuus vaatii vihreän
teknologian subventointia, mutta epäsymmetrisen informaation vuoksi toteutus tar-
vitsee hyvin monimutkaisia instrumentteja.
Väitöskirja osoittaa, että mallilaajennukset kehittävät Weitzmanin alkuperäistä
näkemystä instrumenttien valinnasta. Mallilaajennusten vaikutukset voidaan tiivis-
tää kolmeen uuteen ilmiöön: lähtökohtailmiöön (base effect), kustannusilmiöön
(cost effect) ja määräilmiöön (volume effect). Väitöskirjassa myös osoitetaan, että
näiden ilmiöiden yhteisvaikutus riippuu politiikka- ja toimialakohtaisista tekijöistä.
Lähtökohtailmiö liittyy sellaisiin säädeltyjen toimialojen kokonaiskustannusten
muutoksiin, joihin ei liity tehottomuutta. Tutkimus osoittaa kaksi lähdettä ilmiölle:
vapaaehtoisten päästöleikkausten ohjelma ja positiivisten ulkoisvaikutusten olemas-
saolo. Näiden oletetaan alentavan päästöjen leikkaamisen kustannuksia. Väitöskir-
jassa esitetään, kuinka leikkauskustannusten laskiessa sääntelijä keskittyy enenevässä
määrin sääntelyn ympäristövaikutuksiin ja siten määräsääntelyyn päästöjen koko-
naiskiintiön kautta. Väitöskirjan lähtökohtailmiöt suosivatkin aina määräsääntelyä.
Kustannusilmiön taustalla on subventoinnin aiheuttama tehottomuus säädellyillä
toimialoilla. Väitöskirja osoittaa, että kustannusilmiön rakenne riippuu siitä, onko
tehottomuus luonteeltaan poliittista vai teknistä. Toisaalta väitöskirjassa tutkitut
tapaukset osoittavat, että kustannusilmiö suosii hintainstrumenttia (ympäristövero-
a) poikkeuksetta.
Päästökiintiö oletetaan teoreettisissa tutkimuksissa yleensä sitovaksi. Väitöskir-
jan malleissa esitetään ympäristöpolitiikan toteutuksia, joissa yritysten diskreetit va-
linnat aiheuttavat lupakiintiön vaihtelua. Tätä kutsutaan määräilmiöksi. Kun ko-
konaispäästöt seuraavat kiintiötä, määräilmiö muuttaa määräsääntelyssä päästöhai-
tat arvaamattomiksi. Väitöskirjani kuitenkin osoittaa, että tämä hallinnan menetys
ei välttämättä vahingoita määräsääntelyä, sillä menetyksen vastapainoksi yritysten
leikkauskustannukset laskevat. Ilmiö ei ole sinällään uusi, sillä jo Marc Roberts ja
Michael Spence vuonna 1976 hyödynsivät heiluvaa kokonaiskiintiötä omassa säänte-
lyehdotuksessaan. Väitöskirjassa tämä löydös saa uuden tulkinnan määräilmiössä.
viii
CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
0.1 The Research Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
0.1.1 Market Failures and Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
0.1.2 Payments and the Instrument Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
0.1.3 Two Dimensions of a Subsidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
0.1.4 Subsidized Instrument Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
0.2 Modeling Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
0.2.1 Regulation of an Externality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
0.2.2 The Polluting Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
0.2.3 Elements of the Regulatory Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
0.3 Discussion of the Modeling Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
0.3.1 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
0.3.2 Industry Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
0.3.3 Efﬁciency Ruined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
0.3.4 Efﬁciency Developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
0.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
0.4.1 Graphical Presentation of Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . 43
0.4.1.1 Efﬁcient Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
0.4.1.2 Inefﬁcient Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
0.4.2 Augmented Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
0.4.2.1 Cost Effect and Volume Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
0.4.2.2 Efﬁciency Ruined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
0.4.2.3 Efﬁciency Developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
ix
0.5 The Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1 Inefﬁcient Subsidization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.1 Some Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.2.1 Polluting Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.2.2 The Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.3 Social Welfare Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.3.1 Efﬁcient Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.3.2 Optimal Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.3.2.1 The Tax Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1.3.2.2 The Permit Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.3.3 Second-Best Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.3.4 Graphical Illustration of the Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1.4 Choosing Between the Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1.4.1 Prices and Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1.4.2 Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
1.4.3 The Volume Effect and Cost Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1.4.4 Prices Versus Quantities with Fixed Emissions . . . . . . . . . 82
1.4.4.1 The Disappearance of the Volume Effect . . . . . . . 82
1.4.4.2 Efﬁcient Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.4.4.3 Inefﬁcient Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1.4.5 Graphical Illustration of the Cost Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
1.4.6 Prices Versus Quantities with Volume Effect . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1.4.7 PricesVersusQuantities: VolumeEffect andCost EffectCom-
bined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
1.4.8 Quantities Versus Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
1.5 Instrument Choice under Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1.5.1 Comparison of Three Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1.5.2 Extension of the Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
x
1.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2 Imperfect Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.1 Some Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.2 Regulation without Voluntary Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.2.1 The Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.2.2 Perfect Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.2.3 Imperfect Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.3 Regulation with Voluntary Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.3.1 The Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.3.2 Efﬁcient Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.3.3 Restricted Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.3.4 Instrument Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.3.4.1 Second-Best Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.3.4.2 Differences Between Optimal Expected Prices and
Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.3.4.3 Comparison of the Regulatory Regimes . . . . . . . 129
2.3.5 Prices and Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
2.3.5.1 Permit Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
2.3.5.2 Notational Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.3.6 Prices Versus Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
2.3.6.1 Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
2.3.6.2 Combined Cost–Scope Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
2.3.6.3 Volume Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2.3.6.4 Discussion of the Comparative Advantage . . . . . . 138
2.3.7 Further Issues in Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
2.3.7.1 The Derivation of Comparative Advantage . . . . . 141
2.3.7.2 Quantities Versus Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
2.3.7.3 Perfect Participation: Instrument Choice . . . . . . 144
xi
2.3.7.4 Perfect Participation: To Subsidize or Not to Sub-
sidize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
2.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3 Multiple Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.1 Some Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.2.1 The Polluting Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.2.2 The Externality-Generating Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.2.3 The Externality-Receiving Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.2.4 Efﬁcient Allocation of Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.3 Social Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.3.1 Optimal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.3.2 Pegged Implementation of the Optimal Policy . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.4 Prices Versus Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.4.1 The Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.4.2 The Pegged Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.4.3 Second-Best Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.4.4 Pegged Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
3.4.5 Graphical Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.4.6 Second-Best Comparative Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Appendix A Inefﬁcient Subsidization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
A.1 Expected Welfare Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
A.2 Optimal Policies Yield Only Nominal Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
A.3 Optimal Permit Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
A.4 Characteristics of Optimal Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
xii
A.5 Various Differences in Prices and Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.5.1 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.5.2 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A.5.3 Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
A.6 Comparative Advantage in Terms of Variances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A.7 Uncertain Marginal Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A.8 Characteristics of the Cost and Volume Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A.9 Cost and Volume Effect Combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
A.10 Quantities versus Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
A.10.1 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
A.10.2 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Appendix B Imperfect Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
B.1 Social Welfares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
B.1.1 Perfect Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
B.1.2 Imperfect Participation without Voluntary Participation . . . 221
B.1.3 Voluntary Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
B.2 Characteristics of Optimal Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
B.2.1 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
B.2.2 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
B.2.3 Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
B.3 Combined Cost-Scale-Volume Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
B.3.1 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
B.3.2 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
B.4 A General Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
B.5 The Relation between Quantity and Price Variances . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Appendix C Multiple Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
C.1 Generalized Linear Externality Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
C.2 Augmented Abatement Cost Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
C.3 Efﬁcient Subsidy Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
xiii
C.4 Social Welfare Maximization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
C.4.1 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
C.4.2 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
C.5 The Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
C.5.1 Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
C.5.2 Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
C.5.3 Part III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
C.5.4 Part IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
C.6 Proof of Lemma 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
xiv
INTRODUCTION
“I got it wrong on climate change —it’s far, far worse.”
—Nicholas Stern in The Guardian on 26 January 2013
0.1 The Research Problem
0.1.1 Market Failures and Externalities
In economics, the birth of the pollution problem is often described by the concept
of market failure. For example, The Stern Review (Stern, Peters, Bakhshi, Bowen,
Cameron, Catovsky, ... , & Edmonson [76], p.xviii) calls climate change the greatest
market failure the world has ever seen.1 The core of the problem is seen to lie in pro-
duction and consumption decisions that are not coordinated by the market (or any
other institution). For example, the burning of coal produces both electricity and
carbon dioxide. There have been electricity markets for ages, but no corresponding
carbon dioxide markets and no price for carbon dioxide. As far as production of car-
bon dioxide has real effects in society, zero price implies too much production and
consumption of it.2 The question of general interest is then how much electricity
and carbon should we have, what type of institutions could or should be established
for coordination, and how do these institutions behave and compare in society.
We will focus on the pollution problem, where the damage results from the ac-
tivity of several independent polluting ﬁrms. The United States’ Acid Rain Program
and the EU Emissions Trading system (EU ETS) are two major attempts to create
emission markets and thus prices for them. The Acid Rain Program was initiated by
1See also Stern and Taylor [77] and Tol and Yohe [81].
2Tietenberg and Lewis ([80], Chapter 2) discuss the market failure in more detail. Agnar Sandmos’s
book “ Economics Evolving: A History of Economic Thought” [64] offers a broad perspective on the
subject.
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Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and the target was electric utility
emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), the major precursor of acid rain. The EU ETS,
created in 2005, is the EU’s key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Both
policy implementations work on the “cap and trade” principle. A cap is set on the
total amount of emissions that can be emitted by installations covered by the system.
Within the cap, companies receive or buy emission allowances that they can trade
with one another. Both implementations apply free allocation in the initial alloca-
tion of permits (also called allowances). That is, regulated units receive some part
of their total allowances for free. In the Acid Rain Program, the allocations were
based mainly on actual fuel use during the period 1985–1987. Within the EU ETS,
the transition to auctioning is taking place progressively. Some allowances will con-
tinue to be allocated for free until 2020 and beyond.3 (European Commission [17];
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [82]; Ellerman, Marcantonini, & Zaklan
[16]; Schmalensee & Stavins [66], [67].)
One permanent theme in this thesis is the presence of an environmental external-
ity. Externality is one type of market failure. According to Baumol and Oates [4],
p.17: “An externality is present whenever some individual’s (say A’s) utility or produc-
tion relationships include real (that is, nonmonetary) variables, whose values are chosen
by others (persons, corporations, governments) without particular attention to the ef-
fects on A’s welfare.” In the case of the environment, we may think that the different
parties utilize various environmental resources without particular attention to their
quality. In this context, the environmental externality is negative because the pres-
ence of an externality lowers the quality of the environmental resource. We further
assume that the externality has the following nature of a public bad: The downgrad-
ing of the environmental resource is reﬂected in the damages that depend on the sum
of the individual externalities, while the beneﬁts of production are purely private.4
We assume that the individual members of a society are unable to agree on the level
3The U.S. Acid Rain Program and the EU ETS demonstrate some features of our theoretical pol-
icy framework. Note that the currently pursued carbon policies also use carbon taxes. For example,
Carl and Fedor [6] recently calculated that governments around the world collect $28.3 billion carbon
revenues each year in 40 countries and 16 states or provinces. Out of this total revenue, $6.57 billion
is collected thorough cap-and-trade systems, while carbon tax systems account for $21.7 billion.
4Arthur C. Pigou [57] formalized the concept of an externality, while Paul A. Samuelson [63]
was the ﬁrst to develop the theory of public goods. Nowadays, these concepts are an integral part of
the introduction to environmental economics (see, for example, Tietenberg & Lewis [80]). A more
advanced introduction to environmental policy (that shares many topics with this thesis) is Baumol
and Oates [4].
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of the externality on a voluntary basis. Rather, the government has the power to
decide on it. Furthermore, in the hierarchal government, an environmental agency
exists to have the responsibility of protecting the environment.
We have two interpretations for the existence of a negative externality. First, the
producers and sufferers are separate units, so it follows that the producers have no
private incentives to reduce the externality generation. Second, the producer may be
a sufferer as well, but the private costs of reductions well exceed the beneﬁts. Take
as an example the individual car driver’s decision in a densely populated city. Her
single decision to use alternative modes of transportation has a negligible positive
effect on her city air quality, but leaving her car home may cause high private costs
in terms of extended travel time.
0.1.2 Payments and the Instrument Choice
This thesis aims to provide a theoretical framework for the study of instrument
choice by exploring how much and by what means societies should reduce pollution. We
assume that large-scale projects and discrete choices are the primary modes in the
implementation of these reductions. Discrete choices include concerns like whether
to close down an operation for good, whether to voluntarily participate in regu-
lation, whether to modify an existing production line, or whether to invest in a
new green factory. A unifying theme is the application of economic incentives in
environmental regulation (Stavins [74], [75]) . We will exclusively concentrate on
so-called market-based instruments in a market where a large number of ﬁrms pro-
duce and pollute. Tradable permits (known also as emissions trading) and pollution
taxes are the two major market-based instruments. Combining these two themes,
we show how the role of payments becomes seminal in the regulation process. In
particular, as choices are large-scale and discrete, environmental payments (e.g., tax
payments) have an allocative role. With small-scale and continuous choices instead,
the unit price of emissions (e.g., tax rate) would allocate aggregate emissions between
the regulated units. Mostly, we will study how the payments relate to the design of
market-based instruments. We ask how the size and nature of the payment burden
under various regulatory projects will affect the choice between tradable permits and
pollution taxes.
In searching for the preferred instrument, we base our choice on the theoretical
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literature that originates from Weitzman [84]. Accordingly, the two instruments are
fundamentally different as tradable permits ﬁx the quantity from the outset while
taxes ﬁx the price. Weitzman shows how this difference, together with the asymme-
try of information between the regulator and the polluting units, makes a difference
between the instruments. However, in comparing the different modes, Weitzman
does not explicitly pay attention to the monetary payment ﬂows from the regulated
units to the regulator. In this thesis, we complement the study of Weitzman [84] by
examining the extent to which these payments affect the instrument choice.
There exists a certain type of inertia in the Weitzman framework. The regulator
commits in advance not to reset the policy even though some new information may
arrive. It commits to a ﬁxed unit price in price policy or it commits to a certain
number of tradable permits in quantity policy. Clearly, the commitment is a restric-
tion in policy-making, so it will yield some costs as well. In price policy, costs arise
as emissions ﬂuctuate too much compared to the optimal level, while in quantity
policy (with a ﬁxed level of emissions), the emissions react too little. Similarly, in
price policy (with a ﬁxed price level), the emission price reacts too little, while in the
quantity policy, it overreacts. Overall, the commitment either to price or quantity
policy yields a simple and understandable policy framework, but the commitments
will result in too extreme outcomes in the market. To study the costs of the poli-
cies, Weitzman applies a linear-quadratic framework to social welfare. In particular,
uncertainty enters in a linear fashion into his model. As the quadratic framework
implies linear marginal costs and beneﬁt functions, the commitment costs (the re-
duction in social welfare as compared to optimal welfare) depend on these. Actually,
Weitzman shows that the instrument choice depends on the slopes of the marginal func-
tions alone. If the slope of the marginal damage function exceeds the slope of the
marginal beneﬁt function, the level of emissions should be ﬁxed. Conversely, if the
slope of the marginal damage function is smaller than the slope of the marginal ben-
eﬁt function, the price instrument with a ﬁxed unit price is the proper instrument
choice. Then, in a formal sense, this thesis aims to investigate how various payments
in the policy implementations will affect this simple rule in instrument choice.
As stressed above, we will primarily concentrate on the emission reductions that
the regulated units accomplish through discrete means. In other words, we study
regulation, where the aggregate reductions and the corresponding regulation depend
heavily on discrete choices. The distinction between continuous and discrete choices
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roughly corresponds to the distinction between short- and long-term choices. Over
the short term, ﬁrms in the polluting industry implement emission reductions by
merely adjusting the output downwards. In the long term, ﬁrms modify their pro-
duction technologies to integrate their production efﬁciently into the new regula-
tory framework. Firms may engage in small-scale projects by adjusting the existing
technology. In these projects, they may modify their product lines by switching to
less polluting inputs. Alternatively, they may install end-of-pipe puriﬁcation tech-
nologies, where detrimental contents are removed fromwaste discharges. Evenmore
decisively, ﬁrms may launch large-scale investments and may replace the old pollut-
ing factorieswith newones. Afterwholly accounting for the environmental impacts,
the new green technology may produce the output much more efﬁciently. Finally,
after every alternative has been considered, ﬁrms have the discrete mean of closing
down the operation altogether.
If the changes in the operating environment are large and permanent, ﬁrms will
probably question their current activity. We assume in the thesis that environmen-
tal regulation represents such a challenge par excellence. Inﬂuential and permanent
projects can fundamentally modify the old ways of producing. Consequently, ﬁrms
cannot halve aggregate emissions by halving the current production. Rather, they
can halve the emissions by employing discrete and major modiﬁcations of their oper-
ations. Furthermore, we assume substantial uncertainties. The choices are discrete
or large-scale projects with plenty of complexities, and the true costs and beneﬁts
become apparent only over time.
However, it is not about these discrete choices in itself but about the nature of
payments that matters. In our framework, the Weitzman analysis is not reﬁned by
the mere inclusion of discrete choices but by incorporating certain types of pay-
ments into the regulation. Certainly, payments and discrete choices are connected.
The payments are the main allocative mechanism in this work, and they exclusively
operate through discrete choices. Apparently, as the payment burden of the current
technology increases, a discrete switch into a less polluting alternativewill lookmore
attractive.5 However, the thesis argues that the most important thing is that differ-
ent payment burdens will affect the discrete choices differently, and some choice
patterns have important repercussions in environmental policy.
We say that payments are neutral if they implement an efﬁcient allocation of
5See the illustrative analysis in Amacher and Malik [2].
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emissions among the ﬁrms in the polluting industry. Consequently, the instru-
ment choice will follow the original Weitzman [84] rule. Alternatively, we say that
the payments are non-neutral if the corresponding allocation of emissions is not
efﬁciently distributed among polluting ﬁrms. With continuous choices, the thesis
shows that allocation is efﬁcient as long as marginal beneﬁts of emissions are equal
across the polluters, while with discrete choices, allocation is efﬁcient if average beneﬁts
of emissions are equal between the polluters. Mainly, this thesis investigates the conse-
quences of non-neutral payments that induce inefﬁcient allocation of emissions.
0.1.3 Two Dimensions of a Subsidy
It is important to note why the policy employs non-neutral payments. One general
answer is that neutral payments are infeasible to environmental agency. To under-
stand this, we ﬁrst need to concentrate on the nature of payments. In particular, we
discuss what kind of payment a subsidy payment actually is. Overall, the size and
the degree of conditionality are two major dimensions of a payment. The size of
the payment is a positive continuous variable, while the degree of conditionality is
dichotomous. A payment is conditional if the ﬁrm has to satisfy a certain condition
to be eligible for it. For example, the ﬁrm may have to be an active producer to get
the payment. Alternatively, the ﬁrm may have to use certain “green” technology
to be eligible for the payment. A payment is said to be non-conditional if the only
criteria for the payment is belonging to the current cohort of polluting ﬁrms.
According to the deﬁnition in Pezzey [54], we deﬁne the term “subsidy” as a
non-zero and conditional payment. Thus, if ﬁrms or instruments are subsidized, the
policy applies non-zero and conditional payments. Conversely, ﬁrms or instruments
are not subsidized if the policy applies zero or non-conditional payments.
The subsidization issue arises from the very basic implementations of the tax and
permit systems. In both cases, the aggregate payment scheme may be written as
s (e − l ), (1)
where e is the level of emissions. The scheme imposes the amount of money (the
payment burden) that a single polluter pays after polluting e . The symbol s is the
unit price of emissions, while l ≥ 0 stands for a threshold. The threshold level of
emissions is not charged at all. Depending on the implementation, s is either the
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permit price or the tax rate while l is either the level of free allowances or the level
of tax-free emissions. In the thesis, the amount s l represents a subsidy to a polluting
ﬁrm: i) if a polluting ﬁrm does not pay for every pollution unit that it produces (i.e.,
l > 0) or ii) it is a conditional payment. More generally, we use the concept payment
rule S(s ), so S(s ) = s l in Equation (1).6
A unifying theme in the thesis is that a payment rule always depends on the unit
price of emissions. Another theme concerns the relationship between payments and
instruments in so-called restricted regimes. In these regimes, the regulatory agency
cannot choose the sizes of the thresholds but rather can take them as exogenously
given. We cannot ﬁnd any reason why the given thresholds should differ between
the tax and permit systems. Thus, we assume that the emission thresholds are always
equal in different systems. However, the payments between the instruments will
differ as the tax and permit prices will usually differ.
The thesis concentrates entirely on subsidized instruments. Within non-subsi-
dized outcomes, we note that the celebrated “polluter pays” principle sets l = 0. For
example, regarding the distribution of initial permit allocation, the principle advises
to auction them off entirely. This may raise strong resistance among the inﬂuential
polluting industry and may ﬁnally become infeasible in practice. The main issue is
that it will dramatically increase the cost of polluting units overnight. It is likely that
an alternative, such as a negotiated solution, supports partial auctioning, so the pol-
icy ends up subsidizing the polluting industry. In fact, in reviewing theUnited States’
Acid Rain Program, Schmalensee and Stavins [67] write about substantial political
value of the free allowances. Free allocation built important support for the regula-
tion by addressing differential economic concerns (see also Joskow & Schmalensee
[27] and Ellerman, Joskow, Schmalensee, Bailey, & Montero [13], Chapter 3).
On the other hand, a non-conditional and positive payment represents a very
special type of payment proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, non-conditionality means that the en-
vironmental agency has to commit to positive payments for the current polluting
ﬁrms forever. This type of perpetual commitment sounds expensive and difﬁcult
to justify, so it may well become infeasible.7 Similarly, there may well exist needs
6We will encounter a speciﬁc payment rule in Chapter 3 that does not depend on threshold l at all.
7One may get the impression that the resource ownership should be distributed as well. Conse-
quently, if societies want to reduce emissions in the future, they cannot do that without hurting own-
ership rights. However, we think that there is no intrinsic reason to tie the payment to ownership.
That is, the payments can be paid as before even though the political process cuts emissions. About
this subject, see also footnote 28.
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to support the transition towards emerging green technology. However, as we later
show, the principle of non-conditionality rules that dirty technologies should also
be similarly supported. This last requirement, not least for budgetary reasons, may
become infeasible as well.
Non-subsidized instruments may be difﬁcult to implement in practice, but they
are theoretically interesting. This is because the payments of non-subsidized instru-
ments do not affect the choices of the polluting ﬁrms. More precisely, they do
not affect the choices between different discrete alternatives. To understand this
assertion, recall the opportunity cost calculations that determine ﬁrms’ choices. Be-
cause of non-conditionality, the payments S will totally vanish from the calcula-
tions.8 Intuitively, they disappear as the ﬁrms get the same payment independent
of their choices. Note that the zero payment rule represents just a special case of
non-conditionality.
0.1.4 Subsidized Instrument Choice
The unifying theme in the thesis is that environmental policy applies subsidies. Our
analysis rests on the general idea that, once the subsidization is allowed, then the
door is open for non-neutral outcomes. In the thesis, non-neutrality means inefﬁ-
ciency in emission allocation, and this will fundamentally inﬂuence the environmen-
tal policy. In particular, we show that it affects the instrument choice, in which the
environmental agency not only decides how much to reduce pollution by but also
decides the means of reduction. The choice is between environmental taxes (prices)
and tradable permits (quantities). We will capture the inﬂuences of subsidization
by augmenting the original concept of comparative advantage (Weitzman [84]). We
present and discuss the augmentation in Subsection 0.4.2.
We will develop this basic theme in three main chapters. All chapters represent
different types of approaches in subsidization. Our ﬁrst approach (Chapter 1) stud-
ies purely political motives behind the subsidization. The environmental agency sees
no welfare motives for subsidization. One inﬂuential motive to subsidize relates to
the increased cost burden that the ﬁrms in the regulated industry have to bear. These
ﬁrms are subsidized to mitigate the consequences of the change. Another politically
colored motive concerns the principle that green investments should be subsidized.
8These types of opportunity cost calculations are illustrated in Pezzey [54].
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In our second approach (Chapter 2), however, the subsidies are vital in correcting
the weaknesses of existing regulation. The speciﬁc concern is an imperfect partici-
pation, whereby themandatory regulation covers only part of the relevant polluters.
Voluntary participation provisions can facilitate the impacts of imperfect participa-
tion (as happened in the Acid Rain Program).9 We show that implementation of
such a provision means heavy subsidization of non-affected ﬁrms. In our third ap-
proach (Chapter 3), subsidization is required because of positive externalities. The
investments in green technology in the parent sector is assumed to enhance the pro-
ductivity of green technology in another sector. We argue that without proper subsi-
dization in the parent sector, ﬁrms do not properly invest in green technology. Note
that the positive and negative externalities interact. Clean investments have a central
role in alleviating the negative externality problem—the pollution.
In theory, separate polluting sectors achieve the most efﬁcient way of using emis-
sions if they are allowed to trade emissions among themselves (Stavins [74], [75]).
We will study real-life implementations in which the efﬁciency property of market-
based instruments is being disturbed. Our general goal is to study the question:
What does the efﬁciency loss mean in the Weitzman [84] framework.10 The Weitz-
man framework is essentially a second-best case of regulation under uncertainty. It
asks whether the environmental agency should commit to price instrument or quan-
tity instrument, when the agency is forced to make and keep the commitment. Conse-
quently, the agency cannot reset the policy parameters once new information arrives.
The second-best framework ignores distributional considerations. On the con-
trary, we are particularly focused on the distributional properties. Regarding the
various inﬂuences of instrument choice, we gather them under three broad concepts:
cost, volume, and base effects. Cost effect is a pure measure of inefﬁciency in instru-
ment choice. We identify two types of regulatory circumstances where cost effects
emerge. In Chapters 1 and 2, the efﬁciency is disturbed. That is, the environmen-
tal agency monitors how efﬁciency is being ruined by subsidization. In Chapter 3,
instead, the agency intentionally aims for efﬁciency by using subsidies. However,
the agency cannot retain efﬁciency by the simple linear instruments of the regula-
tory toolbox. To retain efﬁciency, we show how the positive spillover among the
9Title IV’s Voluntary Compliance Program is reviewed in Ellerman et al. ([13], Chapter 8).
10Other factors than subsidization may inﬂuence efﬁciency. For instance, in the implementations
of market-based instruments, various administrative and transaction costs (Polinsky & Shavell [58];
Stavins [72]) emerge that drive the allocation away from efﬁciency. Alternatively, the monitoring and
enforcement of market-based regulation may well distort the efﬁciency property (Malik [37]).
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polluting industry calls for more complex state-contingent payment rules or active
updating of the original payments. Inefﬁciency follows as we assume these are infea-
sible. Overall, we always end up studying inefﬁcient outcomes. Whatever the reason
is behind inefﬁciency we ﬁnd a qualitative similarity between the implementations.
That is, the cost effect will always favor the price instrument.
The volume effect relates to emission quotas. Traditionally, the quota is a ﬁxed
level of emissions that equals the aggregate number of permits in the market. In the
thesis, the possibility that the quota (and emissions) ﬂuctuates relates fundamentally
to quantity implementations that will apply emission thresholds (see Equation (1)
above). These thresholds are inﬂuential as they efﬁciently account for some part of
the total emission quota. We show how the agency may control either the aggre-
gate number of permits or aggregate number of auctioned permits in the threshold
implementations. In the last of these cases, the quota and the corresponding aggre-
gate emission level will ﬂuctuate. However, we show that a ﬂuctuating quota is not
automatically detrimental to quantity implementation. It may be beneﬁcial as well.
After all, the absolute strictness of the emission quota induces costs in the origi-
nal Weitzman instrument choice. Especially in Chapter 1, we study circumstances,
where the volume effect does beneﬁt the quantity instrument. We also learn that the
volume effect will ﬂourish only when the implementation uses inefﬁcient thresh-
olds.11
A base effect reﬂects the effect on instrument choice that the switch from one
efﬁcient implementation to another creates. This concept records the consequences
on the beneﬁt side. In Chapter 2, the base effect follows as the scope of the regulation
increases. Speciﬁcally, if the number of cost-beneﬁcial projects is increasing along-
side the increasing scope, the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function will decrease.
On the other hand, in Chapter 3, the base effect arises as the knowledge spillover re-
duces the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function. Overall, we show that a base effect
inﬂuences instrument choice in a traditional way. The decrease in the slope of the
marginal beneﬁt function will favor the quantity regulation. This principle reﬂects
the view that a decrease in the costs of regulation allows the regulation to emphasize
the emission damages, and consequently, to emphasize the stability of emissions.
In summary, we study how different payments control discrete choices in a reg-
ulated industry. Referring to our discussion above, the payment consists of two
11However, the converse is not true. We discuss how the policy can eliminate the volume effect but
it cannot eliminate the cost effect.
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parts: s e and S(s ). The ﬁrst of these, s e , is the price of emissions times the amount
of emissions, and this part of the payment can be loosely interpreted as a factor
payment.12 The second part, S(s ), is a subsidy that offers ﬂexibility in setting the
payments. We then assume that environmental policy is implemented with market-
based instruments and that the subsidy depends on the unit price. A key feature
in environmental taxation is the ﬁxed unit price of emissions. Then, even though
there are uncertainties in the polluting industry that will shift the marginal beneﬁt
functions, the payment remains intact. Alternatively, the regulation is implemented
by tradable permits. In this case, uncertainties are transformed into permit price,
so the payments become variable as well. Most importantly, there are subsidies that
import inefﬁciencies into the permit markets. The inefﬁciencies are reﬂected in the
relation between taxes and tradable permits. We then say that inefﬁciencies affect
instrument choice.
0.2 Modeling Choices
0.2.1 Regulation of an Externality
There are similarities as well as differences between taxes and tradable permits (Keo-
hane [31]; Keohane, Revesz, & Stavins [32]; Ellerman [14]; Carl&Fedor [6]; Pezzey
[54]). To a certain extent, they are equal instruments, but in reality, differences ex-
ists, so comparative study is needed. The major similarity between instruments is
that, in reducing the overall pollution, both instruments set a price for pollution.
The idea is that costly pollution will induce ﬁrms to reduce pollution. Presumably,
when ﬁrms learn that a ton of carbon has a price, they will try to cut back on pro-
ducing pollution, convert the product line to a less polluting one, or build a new
factory. Some ﬁrms will cease to operate altogether. One major difference between
the instruments is that they implement the price differently. Environmental taxa-
tion is a price instrument that sets the price directly, while a tradable permits system
is a quantity instrument that sets the price indirectly. As far as the ultimate target of
society lies in a certain pollution reduction, we can say that the instruments achieve
this target differently. A quantity instrument achieves it directly by setting a binding
cap on the emissions, while the tax instrument achieves it indirectly by making the
12For such an interpretation, see Spulber [71].
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pollution costly. Weitzman [84], in particular, emphasizes this difference. He bases
his comparative study on the idea that uncertainty gives rise to a speciﬁc choice prob-
lem. The regulator has to choose whether it will lose control of the permit price or
of the taxed emissions. Weitzman is able to derive a very concise and intuitive result
for the proper societal instrument choice.
The commitment of the environmental agency is the core of the Weitzman [84]
analysis. Even though the amendments in the regulated industry give reasons to re-
evaluate the policy in the future, the agency will not do that. This may reﬂect the
nature of regulatory services. If the regulatory agency can react cheaply and quickly
to changes in the regulatory environment, then the incentives for the commitment
are low and the Weitzman analysis is not helpful. On the contrary, if investments “...
that will be made in any pollution control program will take several years to plan and
complete and will be largely irreversible once in place” (Roberts & Spence [62], p. 193),
then the Weitzman approach is appropriate. In what follows, we will concentrate
on the Weitzman type “once-and-for-all” policies, in which the policy is set and not
revised for a sufﬁciently long period.
We assume that the polluting units emit the same type of pollution, speciﬁcally,
that emissions are homogenous in nature. We then require that pollution damages
depend entirely on the level of aggregate emissions, not on the distribution of emis-
sions between the ﬁrms. In their ownway, theUnited States’ Acid Rain Program and
the EU ETS satisfy this condition. For example, the atmospheric lifetime of carbon
dioxide (CO2) is long compared to the timescales of global atmospheric mixing (Eu-
ropean Environmental Agency [12]). Over time, CO2 emissions spread evenly into
the atmosphere. On the other hand, even though sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions do
not mix perfectly, the Acid Rain Program treats them as if they do. There were some
concerns about “hot spots” (i.e., signiﬁcant local extreme concentrations), but these
concerns did not materialize. (Schmalensee & Stavins [66]; Ellerman et al. [13].)
Externalities are not always negative; they may be positive as well. In fact, in
Chapter 3, regulation is studied in a situation in which both negative and positive
externalities exist simultaneously. Even though this is a topic of general interest,
we treat the positive externality explicitly as a knowledge spillover.13 Knowledge
spillover is a special kind of externality that exists whenever an additional applica-
13Within this context, the diffusion of technology (as examined by Griliches [21], [22]) provides an
appropriate background. Regarding the simultaneous presence of knowledge spillover and an environ-
mental externality, see Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins [25].
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tion of a certain technology becomes easier as the number of applications increases.
This process qualiﬁes as an externality, as the beneﬁcial side effects are external to
the intended private proﬁt-maximizing choices. Furthermore, there is an additional
link between the different types of externalities in Chapter 3, as the transition to-
wards green production in a leading sector beneﬁts the follower sectors. We use the
term “green production” (as opposed to “brown production”) throughout the the-
sis to refer to a type of technology that has a relatively low negative impact on the
environment.
0.2.2 The Polluting Industry
We have two polluting sectors that together form the polluting industry. The indi-
vidual polluters are called ﬁrms or (polluting) units. We use the words interchange-
ably to refer to the subjects of regulation. The polluting units may use different pro-
duction technologies.14 The choices of the polluting units are taken as discrete in
this thesis. A unit decides whether to produce, whether to update the existing tech-
nology, whether to use brown (polluting) technology or green (clean) technology,
or whether to participate voluntarily in an environmental program. Furthermore,
if a unit produces, it will use its entire capacity. Within a polluting sector, there may
exist at most two technologies. Given unit λ that uses technology j within sector i ,
its proﬁt is
Π ji (λ) = B
j
i (λ)− s (α ji − l ji ) (2)
with
B ji (λ) = b
j
i +θ
j
i − c ji λ, (3)
where i = 0,1 and j = b , g . We denote the beneﬁts as B ji (λ), where b
j
i and c
j
i are pos-
itive constants and θ ji is a random variable. We assume additive uncertainty, where
E(θ ji ) = 0 and every covariance between the uncertainty variables equals zero. Fur-
thermore, in the proﬁt equation, the emission factors are assumed constant within
sectors and technologies and are denoted by α ji . Thus, the production in sector i
by technology j produces emissions α ji . We have α
b
i > α
g
i , so there exists a green
14For example, a power company may consist of several power plants. It is the plant, not the com-
pany, that is the ultimate regulatory subject.
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Figure 1 A Polluting Industry
alternative to brown production. The unit price of emissions is denoted by s and l ji
is the subsidy threshold. This notation allows both sector- and technology-speciﬁc
thresholds. Whenever there exists only one technology in sector i , we just skip the
superscript j .
Figure 1 illustrates polluting sector i when j = 2. The proﬁt lines (Π ji ) are drawn
by non-solid lines and the beneﬁts (B ji ) by solid lines. We assume (without loss of
generality) that b gi > b
b
i and c
g
i > c
b
i . In Figure 1, this assumption means that units
at the low end of the distribution use green technology while units at the high end
use brown technology. In particular, there are two cut-off units within an industry.
First, unit λbi satisﬁes
Πbi (λ
b
i ) = 0
in industry i . The unit is indifferent between producing and exiting the market.
Second, there is unit λgi in industry i that satisﬁes
Πgi (λ
g
i ) =Π
b
i (λ
g
i ).
This particular unit absolutely produces, but it is indifferent between green and
brown technology.
We consider the units as negligible (McKitrick & Collinge [41]; Spulber [71]).
By deﬁnition, an entry of an additional unit has negligible effects on marginal social
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damages. From a purely practical point of view, the units are small enough so that
differentiation and integration are plausible methods. Furthermore, without loss of
generality, we may take the unit λ as an integer. Thus, λbi is the number of polluting
units in sector i . As λgi is the number of units that use green technology, then λ
b
i −λgi
is the number of units that use brown technology in sector i . Note also in Figure 1
how the proﬁt is a piecewise linear function of λ, where the size of the kink is equal
to the number of green units.
The proﬁt function is generalized in Chapter 3, where we assume the presence
of both positive and negative externalities. As for the positive one, we assume the
presence of knowledge spillovers. This means that an additional application of a cer-
tain technology becomes easier in a particular sector, as the number of applications
increase in another sector. More formally, sector i ’s beneﬁts read as
B ji (λ) = b
j
i +θ
j
i − c ji λ+φ jλ jk , (4)
where i = k. We say that sector i is the externality-receiving sector while sector
k is the externality-generating sector. We see how the number of units in sector k
that apply technology j (λ j
k
) affects the beneﬁts in sector i that are derived from
technology j . As we assume that the externality is positive, the parameter φ j is
strictly positive. If φ j = 0, then we are back in the basic formula of Equation (3).
The externality is assumed to ﬂow only in one direction, so the choices in sector i do
not affect proﬁts in sector k. Furthermore, we will assume φb = 0 and φg =φ> 0,
so the positive spillover operates only within green technology.
These assumptions together allow the simultaneous determination of four choice
variables. However, in the discrete choicemodels to come, wewill somewhat restrict
the generality of the analysis as we restrict the number of choices to two. We do that
to keep our analysis tractable. We also want to emphasize that factor s l ji is a sum
of money (a payment), not a unit price (euros per ton of emissions). This makes
a difference, as one could argue that our model depicts a short-run model with two
ﬁrms in a polluting industry. In a short-run ﬁrm interpretation, factor s l ji disappears
from the proﬁt calculations (Equation (2)). This happens as payments do not matter
in the short-run. We conclude that the presence of payments is a key element in our
analysis.
29
0.2.3 Elements of the Regulatory Design
Throughout the thesis, an environmental externality exists and is calling for inter-
nalization. This task has been assigned to the environmental agency.15 The agency is
welfaristic because its sole objective is maximization of social welfare, the difference
between the beneﬁts and damages of emissions.16 We assume that informational and
distributional issues constrain the working of the agency.
We will follow Weitzman [84] by assuming a particular type of asymmetrical
information between the regulatory agency and the regulated units. In the imple-
mentation stage, the regulatory agency knows the values of b ji and c
j
i in the beneﬁt
function (Equation (3) above). It also knows that E(θ ji ) = 0 and that it can with
certainty identify the sector in which each unit is located. In contrast, every unit
knows the values of θ ji with certainty. Furthermore, we will make an additional as-
sumption that the agency ﬁnds some information too costly to acquire. In practice,
the regulatory agency learns the values of b ji and c
j
i for free, but it cannot link a unit
to the correct type within a sector. It then follows that the agency knows the type
distribution but it does not know the proﬁt of any particular ﬁrm.
We also assume that the regulatory agency will apply so-called market-based in-
struments. Market-based instruments “encourage behavior through market signals
rather than through explicit directives regarding pollution control levels or methods”
(Stavins [75], p. 9). In this context, “the explicit directives” refer to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
regulations or to uniform regulation. For example, if the regulated choice concerns
the choice of the applied technology, ﬁrm-speciﬁc regulation means that the agency
determines the sufﬁcient technology on a case-by-case basis. Under uniform regu-
lation, instead, every operating ﬁrm must apply the same technology. On the con-
trary, if market-based instruments are applied, each regulated unit can decide what
technology to use. The units comply as long as they pay the tax or have a sufﬁcient
number of emission permits.
In the absence of regulation, there are toomany polluting units in operation. The
use of a market-based instrument is an attempt to solve this problem. Consequently,
15Occasionally, we use the term “the regulator” or “the regulatory agency”.
16Throughout the thesis, we will mainly operate in terms of emissions, not in terms of emission
reductions. However, these two approaches are fully equivalent (see the textbook presentation in Ti-
etenberg and Lewis ([80], Chapter 14)). Occasionally, we talk about emission reductions and costs of
emission reductions. For example, the term “cost inefﬁciency" means that aggregate emissions reduc-
tion is inefﬁciently organized between polluting ﬁrms.
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as the policy set an environmental payment (equal to s (α ji − l ji ) in Equation (2)) to
polluting units, it will eliminate themost unproductive units from themarket. These
units may switch toward greener production or shut down the entire production.
In general, factor s l ji in the proﬁt function (Equation (2)) is called a payment rule.
The rule is either a subsidy or a property rights payment. According to Pezzey
[54], a payment rule is a subsidy payment when a ﬁrm gets it only if it produces
output. The payment rule is a property rights payment when a ﬁrm gets it whether
or not it produces.17 We assume that property rights payments are infeasible and
concentrate on the subsidy implementation. Furthermore, thresholds can be either
inframarginal (l ji < α
j
i ) or supramarginal (l
j
i > α
j
i ) (Pezzey [54]). If thresholds are
inframarginal (supramarginal) in sector i among the units that apply technology j ,
then these units are demanders (suppliers) in the permit markets.
We further assume that the agency can apply technology- and sector-speciﬁc sub-
sidies. In a sense, we broaden the deﬁnition of Pezzey [54] as we include conditions
beyond the production of output. For instance, policy l bi = 0 and l
g
i > 0 mean that
only green technology is subsidized in sector i . Payment s l gi is a subsidy, so it is paid
to a unit only if it produces by using green technology. Note also that all the rules
so far explicitly depend on the thresholds. In Chapter 3, we will study another type
of regime. In particular, we will apply scheme
s e − S(s ), (5)
where
S(s ) = Γ + Γs s . (6)
In the payment rule, Γ > 0 and Γs > 0 are ﬁxed parameters and s is the unit price
of emissions. The values of Γ and Γs are determined as part of the policy optimiza-
tion, and they do not depend on the thresholds. Subsidy payment S(s ) is needed in
Chapter 3 to internalize the positive externality. Overall, an important part of our
analysis is the assumption that the subsidy depends on the unit price of emissions.18
We say that the policy is efﬁcient if the distribution of total emissions is efﬁcient
among the regulated units. An efﬁcient allocation then maximizes the aggregate
17The property rights payment is given only to existing ﬁrms. Pezzey [54] also requires that the
property rights have have “good characteristics in all six dimensions” as presented by Devlin and
Grafton [11].
18Yet, we present a case in Chapter 1 in which a ﬁxed subsidy (the same subsidy under prices and
quantities) affects the policy strictness but does not affect the instrument choice.
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proﬁts given a ﬁxed level of emissions. An optimal policy instead maximizes over-
all social welfare, so the policy deliberately accounts for the damages of emissions.
While optimal policy is always efﬁcient, the reverse is not true. If some level of emis-
sions is not efﬁcient, the social welfare will not decrease, if the emissions distribution
becomes efﬁcient. On the other hand, the emissions may be efﬁciently distributed,
but the policy is not optimal. In Chapter 2, we study voluntary participation, where
the industry is divided into affected and non-affected ﬁrms. We assume that the emis-
sion distribution among the affected ﬁrms is efﬁcient. However, the social welfare
may increase if the agency can successfully incorporate non-affected ﬁrms into reg-
ulation.
Regarding the damages of emissions, we assume that
D(e) = e +
d
2
e2,
where d > 0,  is a random variable (with E() = 0) and e is the aggregate level of
emissions. The individual emissions are homogenous in nature, so only the aggregate
level of emissions matters. Furthermore, we assume that
E

θ ji 

= 0,
where i = 0,1 and j = b , g . Like in the original Weitzman analysis, this assumption
means that the damage uncertainty does not affect the instrument choice.19 Thus,
without loss of generality, we will set ≡ 0 from the outset.
0.3 Discussion of the Modeling Choices
0.3.1 Information
Our approach expands the study of instrument choice under uncertainty (Weitz-
man [84]) towards cases of subsidization.20 The subject is important because there
is a growing interest in market-based instruments and because subsidization of ﬁrms
is widely applied in real-life policy implementations. Furthermore, even though in-
19We will show in Chapter 1 more closely how this result holds in our analyses.
20Weitzman’s classical study was published about 45 years ago. Martin L. Weitzman continued
his research in this speciﬁc ﬁeld of environmental economics throughout his long career (Mideksa &
Weitzman [44]; Wagner & Weitzman [83]; Weitzman [85], [86], [87], [88], [89]).
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strument choice under uncertainty has a relatively long history and is still under
intense research, our particular subject has not received much attention.
Throughout the thesis, we apply a framework that includes asymmetric informa-
tion. First, information is asymmetric because information is costly. If information
is costly, then the agency does not know the proﬁts of any particular unit. Rather,
it has only general information about the sectors. In particular, the applications of
unit-speciﬁc policies become non-feasible mainly because the information is costly
(for example, seeMontero [47]). This feature has consequences on the choices of pol-
icy instruments. Speciﬁcally, the “command and control” type of policies become
difﬁcult to implement. As an example, assume that the units have access to two types
of technologies: brown and green. Assume further (like we do in Chapters 2 and 3)
that the regulatory outcome is a partial technological replacement, where both types
of technologies should produce side by side within the sector. As the information
is too costly to acquire, the agency cannot implement unit-speciﬁc technology stan-
dards in a straightforward manner. With limited information about the unit-speciﬁc
proﬁtabilities, it cannot pick out the relevant units from the mass of polluters. In-
stead, if the implementation of the policy target is based on market-based policies,
the regulation works differently. Importantly, there is no unit-speciﬁcity in the pay-
ment rule.21 As another example, we may think of a targeted subsidy program in
which the policy should target the subsidies to some speciﬁc ﬁrms. There may ex-
ists political pressure to support some ﬁrms against the threat of the closure. Thus,
costly information most certainly complicates the implementation of targeted poli-
cies.22
We deliberately apply the term “costly information” as we reckon that there is
another source of asymmetric information: uncertainty.23 We follow Weitzman
[84] as we assume that uncertainty operates in a leader–follower relationship. At the
time the agency initiates the regulation, there exists commonly shared uncertainty
about the proﬁtabilities of the regulated units. Weitzman assumes that the polluting
21In our framework, the proﬁt function in Equation (2) shows how the payments may depend on
sector i and on technology j through threshold l ji , but the payments do not depend on the type of
unit λ ji .
22In the literature of instrument choice, the superiority of market-based instruments over non-
tradable quotas has been questioned (Malueg [39]; Sartzetakis [65]; Kato [28], [29]). However, this
thesis does not supplement this line of research as it compares only differentmarket-based instruments.
23In practice, asymmetric information allows the regulator to derive the aggregate abatement cost
function almost perfectly. She only lacks the value of one parameter. For reference, asymmetric infor-
mation is the same as in Montero [49].
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units may ﬂexibly react to changes in the proﬁtabilities while the regulatory agency
is stuck to its original policy.24 We will follow this interpretation closely. Note also
that we could have incorporated uncertainty into decision-making of the regulated
units as well. We will review such an approach below as we discuss the sequential
decision-making in Shinkuma and Sugeta [68]. In sequential decision-making, regu-
lated units reconsider their initial choice after the original information has become
more accurate. Furthermore, in a world of discrete choices with sequential decision-
making, another complexity will arise if the choices are irreversible. For example,
Baldursson and von der Fehr [3] study instrument choice in such a framework.
Furthermore, we will follow Weitzman [84] by concentrating on simple instru-
ments. Weitzman ([84], p.481) writes: “The reason we specialize to price and quantity
signals is that these are two simplemessages, easily comprehended, traditionally employed,
and frequently contrasted.”.25 Under our simple policy, every polluter in industry i
using technology j faces a payment denoted by S ji (s ). Even though payment rule
S ji (s ) is missing in Weitzman, it can well be considered as a simple message. In par-
ticular, the payment rule is always a linear rule. The parameters are ﬁxed in advance
and, as far as the commitment of the environmental agency is concerned, they truly
stay unchanged over the course of regulation.
However, concerning the threshold implementation of rule S ji (s ), there emerges
a further question of commitment. It arises as the thresholds efﬁciently account for
part of the total emission quota. In an extreme implementation, the entire permit
endowment is grandfathered in as emission thresholds. We do not follow this type
of grandfathering policy in the thesis, but rather preserve a number of permits as an
additional regulatory tool in the permit policy. As for the application of the tool,
we present two alternatives: The agency can commit to the number of aggregate
permits or to the number of aggregate auctioned permits. We discuss the choice
between these alternatives below as we deal with sterilized and non-sterilized permit
systems. This choice is not covered in Weitzman [84] but rather emerges because of
the subsidization issue.
Admittedly, the instrument study is somewhat restricted, as the theory provides
more sophisticated instruments than the simple instruments studied here. Brieﬂy,
the fact is that the sophisticated instruments promise higher expected welfare than
24Strictly speaking, the analysis is static in nature. A truly dynamic analysis would consider the
regulation in a multi-period framework.
25The term “signal” is replaced by the term “instrument” in the thesis.
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the simple instruments alone. Montero [50] reviews the literature on sophisticated
instruments and then proposes “a simple auction mechanism” for efﬁcient imple-
mentation.26
0.3.2 Industry Structure
Our ultimate goal is to study the role of subsidization in environmental policy. We
will accomplish this by assuming that the units in a polluting industry make only
discrete choices. Furthermore, we assume that units within the same polluting sec-
tor i and technology j have the same capacity size (and have identical emissions)
but they differ in their effectiveness in applying their capacity. Naturally, the ﬁrm
characteristics may also affect the size of the capacity that ﬁrms will build and affect
the level of pollution that they will emit. However, even if we include endogenous
emissions into the model, the inﬂuence of subsidization within discrete choices re-
mains a topical issue (see, for example, Amacher & Malik [2]). The endogeneity will
rather bring new elements into the analysis and will certainly complicate it. Under
current assumptions, we can solve our models analytically, so the analysis provides
opportunities for building intuition. Second, regarding our concentration only on
discrete choices, we note how subsidization has an important inﬂuence on them.
Discrete choices determine the number of units in any sector with a certain type
of technology. Consequently, our assumption offers a novel opportunity to study
ex-post changes in the numbers of polluting units and the inﬂuence of the changes
on instrument choice. To our knowledge, nobody has previously studied the instru-
ment choices and discrete choices together in a similar way. Third, uncertainty is
a central ingredient in our thesis. We claim that the uncertainties will most likely
ﬂourish in discrete choices. These are major choices with plenty of complexities
between different alternatives.
We divide the polluting units into two polluting sectors that together form a pol-
luting industry. In permit implementations, we assume that the agency auctions off
some amount of the permit’s endowment. As we noted above, permit auctions are
taking place progressively in the European Trading System. In the United States,
Title IV mandates the EPA to administer annual allowance auctions. The initial role
of these auctions was to provide liquidity and stimulus for the market, but the size
26See also Lee [36] and the review of Lewis [38].
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of the activity was kept relatively low (Ellerman et al. [13], Chapter 7).
A branch of literature has already studied the determination of polluting indus-
tries undermarket-based instruments. Even though it applies the framework of com-
petitive long-run equilibrium, the subject is relevant in this thesis as well. Pezzey’s
[54] review of the literature ﬁnds three competitive views and suggests a uniﬁed
view.27 He shows how property rights payments help to preserve the long-run ef-
ﬁciency of the market-based instruments (see also Åhman, Burtraw, Kruger, and
Zetterberg [93]). Perhaps surprisingly, the reason is that they do not affect the entry-
exit choices of polluting ﬁrms. They do not affect choices because ﬁrms receive the
property rights payment independent of their observed choices. The use of prop-
erty rights payments increases the ﬂexibility of the regulatory design because it can
separate distributional and efﬁciency issues from each other. In particular, property
rights payments can implement the allocation of emissions efﬁciently for a variety
of distributional objectives. In this sense, the subsidy is a poor substitute because the
payments inherently depend on the choices of the ﬁrms.
Since our focus lies on the subsidized outcomes, we only brieﬂy comment on
property rights payments outcomes.28 The basic relation between a subsidy and a
property rights payment (as presented by Pezzey [54]) can be found in the thesis
as well. However, as our frameworks are not always standard, the working of the
property rights payments will be affected. This becomes evident at least in two cases:
In Chapter 2, we will operate in a non-standard regulation, where the payments are
27There is “a conventional view” introduced by Baumol and Oates [4] in their textbook (Chapter
14) that ﬁnds tax thresholds problematic but the free allocation of permits non-problematic in terms
of long-run efﬁciency. Kling and Zhao [30] represent the second view, “a less common view” that
ﬁnds the free allocation of permits problematic. The third view, “a minority view” by Pezzey [55]
and Farrow [18], states that both instruments achieve long-run efﬁciency irrespective of the applied
threshold. Pezzey [54] explains the different views by the different assumptions. Differences will
arise as the various approaches implement the payment rule either as a subsidy or as a property rights
payment.
28It seems that the nature of the payments differ between the two major permit implementations:
Acid Rain Program and EU ETS. Joskow and Scmamalansee [27] (p.39, footnote 4) write that “Techni-
cally, the SO2 allowances are not property rights, since Congress can change the number of allowances issued
or do away with them altogether without raising a constitutional claim for compensation.... In all other
respects, however, allowances are treated as property rights." In these other respects, the authors remark
how the authority provides easiness in transferability and conﬁdence in durability for the allocated
allowances. As a matter of fact, Ellerman [15] writes that closing facilities are able to retain the initial
SO2 endowments. In these respects, the free allocation of SO2 allowances qualiﬁes as a property rights
payment. Ellerman [15] further notes that a closing facility forfeits future EU ETS allowances. The
treatment of closures in the National Allocation Plan (NAP) is further discussed in Åhman et al. [93]
and more recently in Woerdman [91].
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directed to non-regulated ﬁrms. Second, the polluting industry in Chapter 3 is not
standard, as there exists a positive externality between the two polluting sectors.
Interestingly, it can be shown that in these two cases, the property rights payments
do not provide correct incentives for efﬁcient allocation.29
Overall, the division of the industry into polluting sectors is an important factor.
Chávez and Stranlund [7] study the determination of market-based policy between
exogenously given polluting industries under uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, they allow
the unit price of emissions to be different in the two industries. They ﬁnd a strictly
positive margin between the rates, which can be chieﬂy explained by their assump-
tion about the nature of the uncertainty. Instead of additive type of uncertainty, they
assume that the slopes of the marginal beneﬁts are uncertain. Chávez and Stranlund
further assume a ﬁxed industry size, so the subsidy payments are not an issue.
The decision to enter to a regulated market is another discrete choice. However,
once in the market, the incumbents and new entrants may be treated differently. It
is a rather plausible course of action that incumbent ﬁrms enjoy subsidies while new
entrants do not.30 Thinking politically, this follows as the incumbent ﬁrms are rep-
resented in the negotiations while the new ﬁrms are not. Differences in treatment
are not a problem in our framework, as we can treat the incumbent and new entrants
as two separate sectors with different types of subsidization. However, the presence
of corner solutions (Goodkind & Wiggins [20]; Nikula [53]) may complicate the
policy. The solution is in the corner, if under some realizations of uncertainty, the
socially optimal number of new ﬁrms equals zero.31 Goodkind and Wiggins [20]
study prices versus quantities under the presence of the corner, while Nikula [53]
ﬁnds in a two-sector model that the unit price of emissions should be different be-
tween the sectors. In this thesis, we assume that uncertainty is small in the sense that
29In voluntary participation, the trouble with the property rights payments is that theymust be paid
to every non-affected ﬁrm, whether participating or not. The question is then, why bother to partic-
ipate if a unit gets a higher payment without participating. On the contrary, the subsidy approach
speciﬁcally insists that a payment is conditional on the participation, so subsidies have the potential
to induce participation. With knowledge spillovers, the trouble with the property rights payments is
that they affect the ﬁrms’ choices exactly the same way as a zero subsidy policy does. We will learn in
Chapter 3 that a zero subsidy policy does not represents an efﬁcient policy rule.
30New entrants in the Acid Rain Program do not receive allowances for free (Ellerman [15]). How-
ever, according to Åhman et al. [93], the policies among the member states in the EU differ. The
common factor in the policies is that some amount of allowances will be available to new entrants at
no cost.
31Naturally, corner solutions may emerge with other discrete choices. For instance, under some
realizations of the uncertainty, the socially optimal use of green technology may well equal zero.
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corner solutions are absent. In practice, the number of active units in the sectors
strictly exceeds one under every outcome of the uncertainty.
Recall that the number of technologies in a sector is either one or two. If the
number is two, we model the transition from brown towards greener technology.
Requate [61] discusses the link between environmental policy instruments and ad-
vanced environmental technology. Among other things, he draws a distinction be-
tween the adoption, diffusion, and innovation of technology. The term “adoption”
refers to investment decisions where ﬁrms decide whether to install new existing
technology. Speciﬁcally, the rate of diffusion is the percentage of ﬁrms that adopt
the new technology. Models of innovation, in turn, consider the fact that someone
must participate in costly R&D so that the adoption can happen in the ﬁrst place.
However, as Requate [61] discusses, the distinction between adoption and innova-
tion is not always clear. For example, in a model of zero R&D, one may argue (like
Requate) that the presence of spillovers turns the model toward innovation.
D’Amato and Dijkstra [10], Krysiak [34], and Mendelsohn [42] study environ-
mental investment in a Weitzman [84] framework. Out of these, the model of
D’Amato and Dijkstra [10] can be considered as a pure model of adoption. We re-
mark that we deliberately keep our basic structure of adoption extremely simple so
that we can model phenomena, such as inefﬁcient substitution, voluntary participa-
tion, and spillover effects, in a meaningful way. As the above models include many
important details about investments, the instrument choices reﬂect these details.32
Our framework extends to issues beyond the scope of industrial production and
regulation in the production markets. For example, one may analyze regulation in
the car markets, where both the number of cars and the distribution between clean
and polluting cars are simultaneously determined. In this market, a purchase of a
green car or the use of public transportation (or both) are being subsidized. Even
though it is not a standard idea that car owners are regulated by licenses whose price
varies, it is certainly worth investigating.33 More generally, the framework of the
thesis is not only suitable to study discrete investment choices among ﬁrms, but also
suitable for the study of various household investments (i.e., household technology
adoptions) under regulation.
32For further references, see Requate [60], Montero [51], and Wirl [90].
33One example is the Certiﬁcate of Entitlement system in Singapore (Land Transport Authority
[35]).
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0.3.3 Efﬁciency Ruined
Meunier [43] reviews the literature of instrument choice where the environmental
agency faces more than one restriction.34 The bulk of the models we analyze in the
thesis fall into this category: In Chapters 1 and 2, there is a continuum of subsidy
policies that will yield an inefﬁcient allocation of emissions. In Chapter 3, the pres-
ence of positive externality calls for subsidies, but it may happen that the regulatory
agency is restricted to handling only the negative externality.
Quiron [59] (like Shöb [69]) incorporates public funds raising into his model
of instrument choice. Quiron [59] applies a general equilibrium model, where the
public budget constraint is explicitly controlled for. The constraint generates a price
called a shadow value of public funds that should be part of the environmental reg-
ulation. Quiron places a further constraint as he studies non-revenue-raising regula-
tory instruments. In this regime, the environmental agency is not able to resist the
industry pressure and it ends up delivering freely the initial allocations of permits.
This happens even when the agency operates under the revenue-raising constraint.
The objective of Quirion is more or less the same as ours in Chapter 1, namely, to
compare the price and quantity instruments that yield identical expected payment
and emission proﬁles. Our approach omits the public budget constraint. Instead, in
our partial approach, inefﬁcient interplay between polluting sectors plays a central
role.
Montero [49] studies instrument choice under incomplete enforcement. The en-
vironmental agency cannot implement perfect participation, where every regulated
unit would report its compliance status honestly. Rather, the agency can sustain only
random monitoring, where some ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to understate their emission
levels. This work is signiﬁcant from our point of view as it studies instrument choice
in a discrete framework. Even though the enforcement is complete in the thesis, the
analysis in Montero and our analyses in Chapters 1 and 2 shares many topics and
outcomes.35 In particular, the regulation in Montero’s model effectively induces the
units in a polluting industry to divide into two separate sectors that together end up
34Phaneuf and Requate [56], for example, call the original Weitzman analysis a second-best analysis.
The reason for this is the regulator’s inability to implement the ex-post optimum. In this respect, the
restrictions we study in the thesis do not turn the analysis into a second best but merely adds the
number of constraints into the model.
35Strandlund andDhanda [78] and Stranlund, Chavez, andVillena [79] examine the implementation
of a market-based instrument under inefﬁcient enforcement and continuous choices.
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polluting inefﬁciently. Regarding the volume effect, it evolves as emissions ﬂuctu-
ate under quantity implementation. As some ﬁrms in Montero [49] are cheating,
the realized aggregate level of emissions will ﬂuctuate away from the steady level of
complete regulation.
Recently, Meunier [43] considers instrument choice in a setting where partici-
pation can again be interpreted as imperfect. In this setting, unregulated ﬁrms pol-
lute alongside regulated ﬁrms. The approach is different in our version of imperfect
participation in Chapter 2 primarily due to our speciﬁc focus on voluntary partic-
ipation. First, we study implementations where the market will became “less im-
perfect". In Meunier, the unregulated ﬁrms remain outside the regulation all of the
time. As a matter of fact, the study of voluntary participation in the Meunier [43]
framework is extremely difﬁcult. Second, in the speciﬁcation of the model, Meunier
assumes non-zero cross products in the beneﬁts and damages of emissions, and these
cross products create the central effects in the comparative advantage (see also Stavins
[73]). Although possible in our framework, we ignore cross products in Chapters
1 and 2. Our effects arise solely from the use of subsidies that enables voluntary
participation.36
How does our model of voluntary participation compare to other relevant stud-
ies? Speciﬁcally, how does it compare to the model of Montero [47], which is a
pioneering work in this ﬁeld?37 The major challenges in Montero’s policy imple-
mentation are the excessive allocation and the limited transfers. Excessive alloca-
tion accumulates as voluntary provision provides permit allocations greater than the
counterfactual emissions. This means that the excessive allocation will cover reduc-
tions that would have occurred in the absence of the voluntary provision.38 The
limited transfers, in turn, restrict the policy choices of the environmental agency. In
practice, the ﬁrst-best solution is not feasible, as the required allocation of permits is
not politically feasible. Note that the permit allocations are akin to the thresholds
36Meunier [43] motivates his study in terms of carbon leakages. The term “carbon leakage" refers
to global CO2 policy-making: “Carbon leakage is deﬁned as the increase in CO2 emissions outside the
countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries"
(IPCC [24]). We illustrate in Chapter 2 (in a model of imperfect participation without voluntary
participation) that our basic framework includes no leakages from affected sector towards non-affected
sector. Meunier [43] reviews the literature of carbon leakage for an interested reader.
37Bento, Kanbur and Leard [5] provide a recent literature review of opt-in environmental programs.
Their review reﬂects general interest in the CO2 markets for carbon offsets. To our knowledge, there
is not much discussion of an opt-in carbon tax program, not to mention that it is compared to an opt-in
carbon offset market.
38Bento et al. [5] talk about the problems of non-additionality and cap integrity.
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in our study.
Our study shares some similaritywithMontero [47] but ends up emphasizing dif-
ferent implementation issues. That is, our work is a study of the instrument choice
under uncertainty, while Montero studies the design of augmented permit markets.
In Montero, the agency takes the threshold of the affected sector (lA) as given and
seeks the second-best level of opt-in ﬁrms (lNA). In our approach both thresholds
lA and lNA are taken as given and the choice of the instrument becomes the major
task. However, limited transfers cause inefﬁciency in Montero in the same way in-
efﬁcient subsidization does in our model. In both works, there exists an ideal means
for the efﬁcient implementation of the voluntary provision, but the agency cannot
always use those means.39 Note further that if we replicate Montero’s model here
(with varying capacities in production), our instrument choice becomes most likely
intractable. Consequently, we cannot track the excessive allocation asMontero does.
We also emphasize that the volume effect in our framework does not correspond to
excessive allocation. Volume effect is entirely an issue in instrument choice. It af-
fects the choice between the price and the quantity instruments but does not affect
the design of a single instrument.
Meunier [43] further suggests that the cross products in the aggregate beneﬁt
function can be applied in the study of knowledge spillovers. Actually, in Chap-
ter 3, we will apply a certain type of cross product. However, again, our analysis has
a different focus than that of Meunier. The important difference is that we concen-
trate on perfect, rather than imperfect, participation. This means that both sectors
remain as affected sectors throughout Chapter 3. Furthermore, the subsidization
issue is central to us but it is totally absent in Meunier. Note also the difference be-
tween restricted instrument choices in these different approaches. In Meunier [43],
the constraint is imperfect participation, while in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the regu-
latory agency is constrained to ignore the subsidization of positive externalities in
production.
39Efﬁciency requires that participation in voluntary program is perfect in Montero [47]. In our
model, instead, implementation can be efﬁcient, even though participation is not perfect. Further-
more, participation can be perfect in our model, but the implementation is inefﬁcient.
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0.3.4 Efﬁciency Developed
In addition to the restricted instrument choice, there is another type of choice prob-
lem present in the thesis. We say that the environmental agency develops efﬁciency.
More speciﬁcally, it develops efﬁciency by subsidization. This set-up arises in Chap-
ter 3, where multiple externalities are regulated under perfect participation. A cen-
tral ingredient is that the agency is not restricted, so it is free to pursue efﬁciency
(and even optimality) ex-ante.40 Surprisingly, the implemented policy is unable to
retain efﬁciency. Thus, efﬁciency is developed and being ruined in Chapter 3. In
summary, we study inefﬁcient emission allocations in every chapter of the thesis.
We apply rule S(s ) (Equation (6)) in this particular context. The rule depends
on the unit price of emissions. We show three points about this choice in Chap-
ter 3. First, the speciﬁc linear form of S(s ) in Equation (6) is a rule that develops
efﬁciency. Second, in principle, the mere traditional payment rule s l (in Equation
(1)) can be adjusted to do the same. Third, the agency can implement only the ex-
ante efﬁciency, not the ex-post efﬁciency by the linear payment scheme we suggest.
Recall the second-best nature of the Weitzman analysis: The agency is restricted to
use only simple instruments; it cannot reset the policy by new information or it
cannot publish complicated stage-contingent contracts. However, these means are
especially needed in Chapter 3 as the efﬁciency rule is a stochastic rule. Moreover,
the assumed positive spillover causes this phenomenon.
Shinkuma and Sugeta [68] (S&S) is an earlier study of instrument choice under
optimal subsidization and multiple externalities. They study instrument choice in
the long run when the entry itself creates a positive externality. Importantly, ﬁrms
face uncertainty at decision time, while positive externality arises from these uncer-
tainties. The model in Chapter 3 shares features with S&S, including that both pos-
itive and negative externalities exist in the regulation and that positive externalities
call for subsidization. However, the approaches differ in many important ways.
In S&S, the polluting industry consists of ex-ante identical ﬁrms. They become
heterogeneous only after they enter the market and learn their productivity pa-
rameter. Our model assumes division to separate polluting industries. Second, the
decision-making is sequential in S&S, while in our approach it is not. The sequential
decision-making means that a polluting ﬁrm ﬁrst decides to enter, learns its produc-
40Terms “ex-ante” and “ex-post” refer to the moment when uncertainty reveals itself.
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tivity, and then chooses the level of production. Speciﬁcally, in S&S, not only the
environmental agency but also regulated ﬁrms face uncertainty and because of that,
the assumed entry costs play an integral role in the results. Third, and most impor-
tantly, even though both the size of the ﬁrms’ activities and the number of ﬁrms are
competitively determined in S&S, the ﬁrms’ emissions levels are determined ex-post,
while the number of ﬁrms is determined ex-ante. Consequently, the number of ﬁrms
does not react to the outcomes of uncertainty. This is in strict contrast to our analy-
sis, where the number of ﬁrms is the sole ﬂuctuating variable. Furthermore, in S&S,
uncertainty creates the positive externality, while in our framework (in Chapter 3),
it exists in the absence of uncertainty as well. Overall, given these differences, we
are unable to track the various effects from S&S that we track from our model in
Chapter 3.
0.4 Results
0.4.1 Graphical Presentation of Comparative Advantage
0.4.1.1 Efﬁcient Implementation
The conventional result of instrument choice (Weitzman[84]) says that, even though
different instruments yield identical expected prices and quantities, the instruments
will most likely differ in terms of expected welfare that they create. The same princi-
ple holds in this thesis as well. Next, we review how the instruments differ in terms
of expected welfare.
In the original study of instrument choice (Weitzman [84]), the difference be-
tween expected welfares, presented as
= (expected welfare by taxes) - (expected welfare by tradable permits),
boils down to a simple formula. The choice between instruments is determined by
the comparative advantage
= Var (e)
2
(γ − d ), (7)
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where γ is the slope of the marginal beneﬁts of emissions, d is the slope of the
marginal damages of emissions, and Var (e) is the variance of emissions in the price
regime.
We have a few comments about the measure. First, the marginal curves are lin-
ear. Weitzman utilizes linear approximations, but literature typically assumes the
linearity from the outset (Adar & Grifﬁn [1]). Second, the uncertainty itself, as
incorporated in Var (e), affects the size of  but does not determine the sign of
it. Third, Weitzman assumes uncertainty in both the marginal beneﬁts and in the
marginal damages of emissions, but the damage uncertainty is totally absent in .
However, if the two uncertainties are correlated, the comparative advantage must be
modiﬁed to account for the size of the correlation (Stavins [73]).
The instrument choice is determined by the difference γ−d . A positive value im-
plies that the agency should ﬁx the price in the regulation. In otherwords, the agency
should choose environmental tax as the policy instrument. If the value of γ − d is
negative, the agency should choose the ﬁxed quantity (tradable permits). For an in-
terpretation, take the case of extremely ﬂat marginal damages (d ≈ 0). Accordingly,
the regulator prefers taxes to the quota. By ﬁxing the opportunity unit cost for pol-
luting, the agency allows the level of pollution to be privately determined. Because
of d ≈ 0, the ex-post change in damages is only modest compared to the ﬂexibility
that the tax provides on the beneﬁts side. Correspondingly, a very steep marginal
damage function favors tradable permits. In this case, the trouble in beneﬁts that
a ﬁxed level of pollution induces is only modest in comparison to the potential in-
crease in damages that a ﬂuctuating level of pollution would create. Finally, if γ = d ,
the environmental agency is indifferent between prices and quantities.
We provide a graphical illustration for the comparative advantage.41 The illus-
tration employs welfare triangles that grow up, as the agency is not able to imple-
ment ex-post efﬁciency. In Figure 2(a), we have drawn the marginal damage function
(md ), the expected marginal beneﬁt function (Emb ), and one speciﬁc outcome of
themarginal beneﬁt function (mbd ). The price instrument is a unit tax set at τ, while
the use of quantity instrument means ﬁxing the emissions at level L. Note that the
(expected) stringencies of these policies are based on rule τ = Emb (L) = Emd (L).
However, as compared to ex-post efﬁciency, the chosen instrument will inevitably
produce a certain welfare loss. The black spot denotes the ex-post efﬁciency in the
41Baumol and Oates ([4], Chapter 5) provide a very careful graphical interpretation of the compar-
ative advantage.
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Figure 2 The Instrument Choice under Uncertainty (a); The Subsidized Instrument Choice (b)
ﬁgure. It is the price—quantity pair that satisﬁes condition mbd = md . With taxes
instead, the price is ﬁxed to τ, but the ex-post quantity response is ed . With tradable
permits, the quantity is ﬁxed to L, but the ex-post price response satisﬁes p = mbd (L).
The small circle in the ﬁgure represents this price. Overall, areaAq is a typical welfare
loss that the commitment to a quantity instrument produces. Alternatively, area Ap
is a typical welfare loss that the commitment to a price instrument produces. Clearly,
Ap > Aq in Figure 2(a), so the agency should choose the quantity instruments. Note
that we have d > γ in Figure 2(a), so that wewould have reached the same conclusion
by using the rule in Equation (7).
0.4.1.2 Inefﬁcient Implementation
We have drawn Figure 2(b) to illustrate the determination of the subsidized compar-
ative advantage. It explains graphically the principal difference to the more standard
approach of Figure 2(a). In doing that, it utilizes the difference between the marginal
beneﬁt function and the so called price function.
We repeat ﬁrst a property that underlies Figure 2(a): themarginal beneﬁt function
also operates as a reaction function of the polluting industry. This means that we can
read both the price and the quantity responses and the changes in welfare by tracking
the movement of the curve mbd . The reason for this is that the implementation
is efﬁcient. We will follow the literature as we label the curve mbd as a marginal
45
abatement curve. In Figure 2(b), we depict an inefﬁcient implementation. Now, i)
the marginal beneﬁt function no longer equals the marginal abatement function and
ii) the reaction function no longer equals the marginal beneﬁt function. We label
the reaction function as the price function. We derive and explain the price function
s (e ;θ) in Section 1.3.4 (see Equation (1.40)).
In Figure 2(b), we do not specify the policy regime but merely assume the pres-
ence of inefﬁcient subsidization. In particular, the ﬁgure displays the stringencies
of the policies by parameters τ and L, but does not explain how these values are
determined.42 Figure 2(b) also includes speciﬁc outcomes of the marginal beneﬁt
function (mbd s ) and the price function (sd ). The inefﬁciency causes mbd s = sd .
Consequently, the price and quantity responses are no longer determined by the
shifts in mbd s but rather by the shifts in sd . In terms of Figure 2(b), the quantity
response in the tax regime is ed s not ed . Areas Aqs and Aps are welfare losses for the
quantity and price instruments, respectively.43
We have a few brief comments here and save more complete discussions for the
main text. First, we have not applied mbd s and sd only for the sake of presenta-
tion. Rather, the dual representation is needed so that the graphical analysis can be
performed in the standard quantity-price-plane. Second, we called areas Ap and Aq
“typical" in Figure 2(a). By this, we mean that a single pair of welfare loss triangles
truthfully reﬂects the comparative advantage. In Figure 2(b), we can call areas Aqs
and Aps typical as well. The reason is that the deviation ed s is typically smaller than
ed under inefﬁciency. Third, the welfare losses Aqs and Aps are determined by the
same logic as they are in Figure 2(a). The ex-post efﬁciency is denoted by a black dot
in Figure 2(b), where it holds that mbd s = md . This would have been the policy
choice had the agency learned the uncertainty and revised the policy. Moreover, as
compared to the efﬁcient implementation, an area denoted by A is missing in Fig-
ure 2(b). By graphical reasoning, this area illustrates the price advantage that the
inefﬁcient subsidization induces.
We review this topic more closely in the next section. We discuss how the inefﬁ-
ciency alone favors the price instrument, how there are different types of inefﬁcien-
cies, and how factors other than inefﬁciency affect instrument choice. We will learn
that the outcome in Figure 2(b) is a speciﬁc one, as it displays only the pure inﬂuence
42We will explain the policy choices at length in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
43To keep the ﬁgure simple, we have not marked the price response in the quantity regime. It is
determined by the intersection of lines sd and L.
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of inefﬁciency. In particular, it dismisses the possibility that emissions may ﬂuctuate
under quantity implementation as well. In Figure 2(b), the emissions are constant
and equal to L under quantity implementation.
0.4.2 Augmented Comparative Advantage
Figures 2(a) and (b) together illustrate how the determination of comparative ad-
vantage differs between the efﬁcient and inefﬁcient subsidizations. Next, we ex-
plain more formally how the switch from an efﬁcient to an inefﬁcient subsidization
changes the comparative advantage. We write the so-called augmented comparative
advantage as
= R(γ − r1d )+ r2, (8)
where R, r1, and r2 are ﬁxed parameters. Again, γ is the slope of the marginal ben-
eﬁt function and d is the slope of the marginal damage function. The augmented
measure in Equation (8) allows us to write every comparative advantage in this work
by merely changing the values of R, r1, and r2. Speciﬁcally, R=
Var (e)
2 , r1 = 1, and
r2 = 0 in the originalWeitzman presentation. In ourmodels to come, we have R> 0,
but the signs of the factors r1 and r2 will vary between different speciﬁcations.
0.4.2.1 Cost Effect and Volume Effect
Throughout the thesis, we use the terms “cost effect" and “volume effect" to explain
the inﬂuence of inefﬁcient subsidization on the comparative advantage. We can use
these terms to explain the values of r1 and r2 in Equation (8) as well. The cost ef-
fect gives the pure effect of inefﬁcient subsidization in the sense that emissions are
kept ﬁxed in the calculation. Actually, Figure 2(b) above is all about the cost effect,
as the policy keeps the amount of emissions ﬁxed at the level L. The volume effect
takes into account the fact that the quantity implementation does not always ﬁx the
emission quota. The volume effect relates fundamentally to the ﬂuctuating num-
ber of ﬁrms in the implementations that apply emission thresholds. In the thesis,
the number of ﬁrms ﬂuctuates within the sectors and within the technologies. The
commitment target of the environmental agency in part determines the existence
of the volume effect. Speciﬁcally, the agency may or may not let the volume effect
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happen.
To explain the volume effect, it generally holds that
λ0 l0+λ1 l1+ l = L,
where l is the number of auctioned permits, L is the number of aggregate permits,
and λ0 l0 and λ1 l1 are the number of subsidized permits in sectors zero and one,
respectively. Furthermore, if the policy regulates every polluter in the industry,
then L equals the aggregate level of emissions. As far as the number of ﬁrms (λ0
and λ1) will ﬂuctuate, the realized level of emissions strongly depends on the fact of
whether L or l is ﬁxed in the policy. In particular, by ﬁxing L, the agency allows l
to adapt to keep the emissions at the predetermined level. Alternatively, by ﬁxing l ,
the agency will deliberately let the quota (and the emissions) ﬂuctuate. The volume
effect is present in the second design and absent in the ﬁrst one.44
In this context, we will apply the terms “sterilized" and “non-sterilized". The
permit market outcome is sterilized whenever the agency changes the number of
auctioned permits l in response to ﬂuctuations in the market. The agency practi-
cally sterilizes inﬂuences that the changing number of polluting units create on the
total permit quota. Instead, in a non-sterilized outcome, no such amendments oc-
cur.45 If we were to follow the original Weitzman [84] description literally, then we
should study only non-sterilized permit implementations. In this interpretation, the
authority is reluctant to reset its policy, so sterilization is not applied. However, we
can think of the policy in terms of commitments as well. In Weitzman [84], the spe-
ciﬁc question of commitment does not arise. That is, whether the agency commits
to the number of auctioned permits or to the number of total permits, the level of
emissions remains ﬁxed. Here, the commitment to the ﬁxed number of auctioned
permits means that the agency is not committed to the ﬁxed levels of emissions. We
think that we cannot justify any commitment at the outset. Rather, institutional
44The hybrid instrument by Roberts and Spence [62] implements a special kind of volume effect.
The instrument itself is a mixed implementation, whereby a non-linear tax scheme complements the
tradable permit markets. The scheme sets a ﬂoor and a ceiling to a permit price. Consequently, it
allows strictly lower and higher aggregate emissions than the ﬁxed quota does. Recent contributions
in this area have been made by Krysiak and Oberauner [33] and Mandell [40].
45There are earlier studies of instrument choice under uncertainty that include comparisons between
different quantity instruments. For example, Yates and Cronshaw [92] study whether permit trading
between different compliance periods should be allowed or not. Montero [48] in turn asks whether
different pollution markets should be integrated or not.
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issues will determine it or it may be a choice variable. That is, the environmental
agency may have the power to pick the commitment that will yield the highest social
welfare.46
0.4.2.2 Efﬁciency Ruined
In the models of restricted instrument choice (Chapters 1 and 2), inefﬁciency arises
from the fact that the view of the regulatory agency does not determine the subsi-
dization policy. We show that values r1 ≶ 0 and r2 = 0 are plausible in this particular
context. As far as r2 = 0, factor r1 includes both the cost effect and the volume ef-
fect. If r1 < 1, we say that the cost effect dominates, and if r1 > 1, the volume effect
dominates. Speciﬁcally, if r1 > 1, we say that the relative position of the tax instru-
ment has increased. We will further show that the volume effect requires inefﬁcient
subsidization to work. In other words, the absence of the cost effect implies the ab-
sence of the volume effect. However, the reverse is not true, as the cost effect may
well arise even if the volume effect remains absent. Finally, efﬁcient implementation
means that the cost effect is absent and that r1 = 1 and r2 = 0.
We discussed earlier the restricted instrument choices of Quirion [59] and Mon-
tero [49]. In terms of the comparative advantage in Equation (8), there is certain
similarity between our studies of restricted instrument choice and these two studies.
In particular, in every three cases, r2 = 0.
If we denote by SH the shadow value of the public funds, then r1 =
1
SH in
Quirion [59]. As far as SH > 1, then r1 < 0, so the presence of public budget con-
straint improves the relative position of taxes. A special feature in Quirion is that
r1 =
1
SH whether revenue-raising or non-revenue-raising instruments are applied.
A revenue-raising instrument refers to wholly auctioned permits. On the contrary,
we will show in Chapter 1 that a revenue-raising instrument is always efﬁcient, so
r1 = 1. These differences arise from the difference between partial (our study) and
general equilibrium analysis (Quirion’s study). Speciﬁcally, if lump-sum taxes are
available, then SH = 1 and the difference between revenue-raising and non-revenue-
raising instruments disappears in both studies. In our partial analysis, the value of
46One may wonder how the agency implements the sterilized systems. In Chapter 1, we propose
and present a system called a discount coupon system, inwhich every freely allocated permit represents
a coupon that can be exchanged for the actual license in the permits auctions. Note also that the non-
sterilized system does not require any coupons. The endowment of permits can be auctioned off in a
straightforward manner.
49
r1 is shown to be a function of the subsidy policy (l0, l1) while r1 is exogenously
determined in Quirion [59]. Furthermore, Quirion’s general equilibrium analysis
precludes the presence of volume effects.
Montero’s study [49] shares the partial equilibrium nature with our study. If we
denote by π the probability of being randomly monitored, then r1 = 2−π in Mon-
tero [49]. As 0 > π > 1, then r1 > 0, so the incomplete enforcement improves the
relative position of tradable permits. Using the terminology of our thesis, both cost
and volume effects are in place but the volume effect is seen to invariably dominate in
Montero [49]. We say that the cost effect is in place as emission allocation between
sectors is inefﬁcient in Montero. The volume effect exists because the emissions are
not quoted with probability one.
In our models to come, we will track both cost and volume effects but, in general,
neither effect will dominate. Rather, as the total effect r1 is a function of the subsidy
policy (l0, l1), the various thresholds will pull r1 to values that are both greater and
smaller than one.
0.4.2.3 Efﬁciency Developed
The above examples considered restricted instrument choice. We also study another
type of instrument choice where efﬁciency is developed rather than ruined. Our spe-
ciﬁc question concerns the instrument choice under multiple externalities. In ana-
lyzing this issue, we note ﬁrst the fundamental difference from the previous analysis.
In Chapters 1 and 2, if the allocation rule is efﬁcient, it is invariably deterministic
and the instrument choice follows the standard Weitzman [84] analysis. In Chapter
3, the allocation is efﬁcient, which can make us think that the instrument choice
always follows Weitzman. However, this is not the case. This is mainly because the
spillover effect turns the efﬁciency rule stochastic.
We review two designs in Chapter 3. The ﬁrst policy is an optimal policy that
internalizes the knowledge spillover by setting a proper subsidy in the externality-
generating sector. The second policy is suboptimal as the social welfare is maximized
under the constraint that the externality-generating sector cannot be subsidized. We
consider brieﬂy the ﬁrst policy design here. Regarding the comparative advantage
in Equation (8), we show that r1 > 1 and r2 > 0. Furthermore, we call factor r1
the slope effect while r2 is the cost effect. The slope effect is seen to favor quantities
while the cost effect favors prices.
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The parameter r2 represents cost effect. This follows as the quota in Chapter 3
remains ﬁxed by assumption. The slope effect belongs to a group that we denote
as base effects. In addition to cost and volume effects, we identify base effects as
separate types of effects in instrument choice. A base effect in practice allows us
to switch from one efﬁcient representation to another.47 It covers effects on the
beneﬁt side that are missing in the traditional Weitzman analysis and that are not
the result of inefﬁciency. In the current case, the slope effect arises as the assumed
knowledge spillover reduces the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function. As we write
our augmented comparative advantage in terms of γ (the traditional slope parameter
without the spillover effect), r1 > 1 records the speciﬁc effect of knowledge spillover.
By the basic principles of instrument choice, as the marginal beneﬁt curve becomes
less steep, more weight will be given to the (constant) slope of marginal damage d . In
other words, as the relative importance of pollution damages increases, the relative
importance of quantity control increases.
We can further illustrate our approach with a reference to the study of Mendel-
sohn [42]. The Mendelsohn study can be regarded as an early milestone in this ﬁeld.
It studies how endogenous technical change affects the instrument choice between a
price and quantity instrument. In terms of our augmented comparative advantage,
Mendelsohn ﬁnds that r1 > 1 and r2 = 0. In his model, R&D in clean technology
makes the abatement cost curve less steep, that is, less responsive to the changes in
price. This is reﬂected in the value of r1 > 1, which means that R&D in clean tech-
nology improves the relative position of the quantity instrument. Consequently, in
both studies, r1 reﬂects the inﬂuence in the instrument choice that the transition
towards green technology generates. In Mendelsohn, the change is from zero to pos-
itive R&D,while in our study, the change is from zero to positive spillovers. Second,
factor r2 equals zero in Mendelsohn [42]. This implies that inefﬁcient subsidization
is not an issue in his study.
0.5 The Outline
Chapter 1 presents the fundamental model of instrument choice under inefﬁcient
subsidization. There is a polluting industry with two polluting sectors. The envi-
47Another base effect is the scope effect that we discuss brieﬂy in the next section and more broadly
in Chapter 2.
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ronmental agency does not have total control over the policy. In particular, there are
cases in which the agency strongly disagrees with the proposed distribution of subsi-
dies. In general, the goal of the analysis is not to focus on the causes but rather to look
at the consequences. We explore the properties of a feasible policy in a framework
in which the agency sees the subsidies as a constraint on its policy. As in Weitzman
[84], the main policy object is the instrument choice in the event of uncertainty.
The analysis in Chapter 1 isolates two effects: the cost effect and volume effect.
The cost effect depicts the pure inﬂuence that the inefﬁciency induces on permit
trading. The analysis shows that this effect invariably favors stable prices, so the tax
system with a ﬁxed price has an unambiguous advantage. The volume effect takes
into account the fact that the quantity instrument does not ﬁx the emissions. In
fact, in implementing the quantity instrument, the agency has the power to decide
whether to stabilize the emissions. We say that the agency may either commit to the
number of total permits or to the number of auctioned permits. In the latter imple-
mentation, the volume effect rises, but after being born, it is shown to favor either
the price or the quantity instrument. The analysis also reveals that the volume effect
requires inefﬁcient subsidization to work. In other words, the efﬁcient subsidization
automatically produces a zero volume effect.
Our identiﬁcation of the volume effect will divide the quantity instrument into
two separate instruments, namely into sterilized and non-sterilized permit systems.
We say that the agency sterilized the volume effect away. As the price instrument
remains an option, it is now possible that the choice is between three instruments.
Naturally, the agency will sterilize as long as the comparative advantage between the
quantity instruments shows that it is useful. Overall, we will construct and review
at length the new type of choice problem between three distinct instruments, both
analytically and graphically.
Chapter 2 applies the framework presented in Chapter 1. It studies inefﬁcient
subsidization in the implementation of a particular environmental policy. The dis-
cussion concerns imperfect participation of the regulation, and, speciﬁcally, a vol-
untary provision that is capable of alleviating problems of imperfectness. Imperfect
participation means that not every unit that contributes to the (negative) externality
is involved in the regulation. The imperfectness can be seen as another constraint in
the regulation. This means that the environmental agency prefers regulation where
everyone is involved (perfect participation), but the distributional and political real-
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ities block the achievement of this goal (Montero [47]). We show that implementa-
tion of voluntary participation requires subsidies, and in accordance with the theme
of the thesis, the presence of subsidies immediately raises potential inefﬁciencies.
The use of heavy subsidization does not automatically ruin efﬁciency, but the re-
quirements for efﬁciency are speciﬁc in nature.
The instrument choice is again exposed to the cost and volume effects. In this
particular context with imperfect participation, some speciﬁc phenomena will arise.
First, we will introduce the concept of scope effect.48 This effect refers directly to
values of γ and r1 in the augmented comparative advantage (Equation (8)) above.
Remember that γ is the slope of the (efﬁcient) marginal beneﬁt function, while r1
generally includes the combined cost and volume effects. Generally speaking, the
scope effect in voluntary participation concerns the choice of γ , or equivalently,
the choice of a representative efﬁcient market. We will base parameter γ on the
imperfect market chieﬂy to set a proper point of reference. Then, our results have a
natural interpretation that they represent changes toward perfect participation, that
is to say, represent changes when the market will become “less imperfect". As for the
scope effect itself, note that the increased participation will make the beneﬁt curve
less steep. Naturally, this requires that the policy successfully attracts cost-effective
projects to participate. From the basic principles of instrument choice, more weight
will be given to the (constant) slope of marginal damage d as the marginal beneﬁt
curve becomes less steep. In the comparative advantage, the value of r1 increases as
the relative importance of pollution damages increases.
In the absence of volume effect, we may call r1 as “the combined cost-scope-
effect." The analysis in Chapter 2 shows that two forces will pull this measure into
opposite directions. The inefﬁcient subsidization increases the scope of the regula-
tion but causes a cost effect. Consequently, the value of r1 decreases. However, the
increase in the scope of the regulation (the scope effect) increases the value of r1, and
it may actually increase it so much that eventually r1 > 1.
Another speciﬁc phenomenon relates to the nature of the volume effect. In gen-
eral, the volume effect will disappear if the agency will and is able to stabilize the
aggregate emissions. In Chapter 2, an important detail in the policy concerns the
coverage of the voluntary provision. In particular, it matters whether the voluntary
provision covers the entire non-affected sector or whether it does not. In the ﬁrst of
48Scope effect is another base effect. We discussed the concept of base effect in the previous section.
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these cases, a commitment to keep the aggregate quota at a predetermined level stabi-
lizes the emissions. If the entire non-affected sector is not covered, then a ﬁxed quota
does not yield ﬁxed emissions. A policy target that deliberately ﬁxes the number of
permits but does not ﬁx the level of emissions sounds like a weird policy target. We
will ignore this type of implementation in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, ﬁrm subsidization and instrument choice remain the main subjects
of the study, but the perspective changes a bit. Speciﬁcally, the focus is on instru-
ment choice in a situation where subsidization is particularly required as part of an
efﬁcient environmental policy. We show that the reason for this is the presence of
a positive externality—the knowledge spillover. If the policy does not subsidize the
externality-generating sector at all, it will not adequately produce the externality.
On the other hand, we assume that both sectors in the economy produce the same
negative externality. Consequently, if the policy does not ration the aggregate pro-
duction of it at all, the polluting industry overproduces the externality. The policy
is then implemented under multiple externalities.
Overall, the agency will again face the standard Weitzman [84] constraint that it
cannot totally revise the policy to reﬂect the changing regulatory regime. However,
as compared to earlier chapters, this constraint has a new meaning in Chapter 3. The
knowledge spillover inside the polluting industry is shown to create new needs for
policies that cannot be solved under the Weitzman assumption. Traditionally, if the
policy design yields efﬁciency ex-ante, it will yield efﬁciency ex-post even though the
regulation operates under the Weitzman constraint. Now, this principle no longer
holds. Emission allocation will turn inevitably inefﬁcient ex-post, and whenever al-
location is inefﬁcient, it will affect the choice between prices and quantities. It is
further shown that the inefﬁciency is transformed into pure cost effect, and like in
every chapter of the thesis, the cost effect will favor the price instrument, that is,
environmental taxation.
In practice, the optimal expected policy in Chapter 3 promotes subsidization but
it does not explicitly state the form of subsidization. However, by closer inspection,
the expected welfare under uncertainty depends heavily on the chosen instrument.
Indeed, this is the same type of case that Weitzman [84] presented almost 50 years
ago. Weitzman shows how the optimal policy promotes the pricing of emissions
but does not explicitly state whether prices or quantities should be applied. In our
case, we argue for a linear subsidy rule that explicitly depends on the unit price of
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emissions. Thus, in comparing prices and quantities, we compare implementations,
where one implementation applies tradable permits with a stochastic subsidy rule
while the other applies environmental taxation with a ﬁxed subsidy. We admit that
other implementations will emerge (we even discuss them) that will affect the com-
parative advantage in different fashions. However, we remark that a zero subsidy
implementation does not reduce the instrument choice back to the original choice.
Rather, it only creates a new type of choice.
We explained above how another base effect, a slope effect, will affect the in-
strument choice in Chapter 3. The slope effect complements the instrument choice
because knowledge spillover will reduce the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function.
This will favor the quantity instrument, so the slope effect and the cost effect will
eventually pull into different directions.
We will provide a summary of the main results of this thesis in the Conclusions
section. We also discuss the meaning of our key assumptions along with possible fu-
ture research topics motivated by this work. The appendices provide various proofs
with somewhat tedious calculations.
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1 INEFFICIENT SUBSIDIZATION
1.1 Some Background
In the ﬁeld of environmental regulation, the study of the choice of policy instru-
ments dates back to 1974 when Martin Weitzman [84] published his inﬂuential pa-
per, “Prices vs. Quantities.” He shows that not only the goal but also the means are
important in environmental regulation. Weitzman postulates that regulatory deci-
sions are most often made in a situation in which both the beneﬁts and damages are
uncertain. With respect to policy implementation in this situation, Weitzman pro-
motes simplicity as a viable criterion. In fact, he limits the available administrative
instruments, that is, the control modes, to ﬁxed price and ﬁxed quantity. Further-
more, Weitzman ([84], p.482) states that “... the consequences of an order given in
a particular control mode have to be lived with for at least the time until revisions are
made.” In practice, this view sets up a certain kind of leader–follower game, in which
the regulatory agency (the leader) sets the control mode for a signiﬁcant length of
time while the regulated units (the followers) adapt to the control and to the changes
in their business opportunities.
In comparing the two control modes, Weitzman disregards monetary payments
between the regulator and the regulated.1 However, the instruments in his study—
pollution tax and pollution quota—yield very different payments. By the very na-
ture of the tax instrument, the magnitude of the emission determines the polluter’s
payment. Conversely, the emission quota induces a zero environmental payment
regardless of the size of the quota. Of course, ignoring the payments can be justi-
ﬁed by the fact that the streams do not affect the choices of the parties of regulation.
Speciﬁcally, they do not necessarily affect the choices of the regulated. Rather, the
payment may only reduce the existing producers’ surpluses.
1The environmental payment is the unit price of emission multiplied by the emitted quantity.
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We study instrument choice in a model, where the total payment is an integral
factor of the problem. Instead of studying the regulation of a single polluter, we
will concentrate on the regulation of numerous polluters. The model includes two
polluting sectors that are heterogeneous but that have at least one thing in common:
the polluting units within the sectors emit exactly the same type of pollution. In
fact, we assume that the two sectors together cover all emissions, so they are said to
constitute a polluting industry. The differences between sectors follow from the pro-
duction of different types of commodities, while the differences within a sector are
due to differences in efﬁciency. An additional difference between the sectors is that
the intensities of emission generation differ between them. Furthermore, a sector
can be viewed either as an existing or as a prospective sector. In every case, the regu-
latory agency faces a choice between twomarket-based instruments: Piqouvian taxes
and tradable permits. Most importantly, the instruments trigger payment ﬂows be-
tween the regulator and the regulated sectors, and these ﬂows affect the production
decisions of the ﬁrms. Furthermore, we base our model on the (reasoned) view that
the two instruments are ex-ante identical in terms of their monetary payments.
To better understand our approach, we draw a distinction between market-based
(or economic-incentive) policy instruments and “command-and-control” regulations
at the outset (see also Stavins [75]). Market-based instruments are regulations that
“encourage behavior through market signals rather than through explicit directives re-
garding pollution control levels or methods” (Stavins [75], p. 9). The use of market-
based regulation is particularly powerful when the number of regulated ﬁrms is large
and the ﬁrms have private information that is not costlessly available to the environ-
mental agency. The basic argument is then similar to that for traditional commodi-
ties: The market solution is the most efﬁcient way to distribute an allocation of
goods. Thus, market-based emission allocation between the polluters is the most
efﬁcient way to distribute any amount of total emissions.
In practice, market-based instruments create a price for emissions. Ideally, this
price will guide polluting units toward efﬁcient allocation. However, based on the
nature of trading, market-based instruments also induce payment ﬂows between the
regulator and the regulated. The question is whether the payment ﬂows signiﬁcantly
affect the allocation process. We construct a simple model of discrete choices to
study this question. The advantage of our model is its ability to focus on elaborate
questions. Speciﬁcally, we are able to focus on the number of polluting units in the
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industry.
The term “subsidy" is a central one. The regulated ﬁrm enjoys a subsidy if it does
not pay for each pollution unit that it generates and the subsidy is paid only to ﬁrms
that produce output (Pezzey [54]). With taxes, the subsidy begins at a certain thresh-
old, so that the unit tax is paid only for the emissions that will exceed the threshold.
Conversely, with tradable permits, a subsidy is a free allocation of permits. In ev-
ery case, if the subsidy is zero, the environmental payment ﬂow is maximal. Pezzey
[54] summarizes the discussion about the long-run properties of the different in-
struments, noting that, in general, “the polluter pays” principle provides the correct
long-run incentives.
In our analysis, we concentrate on inefﬁcient subsidies that are exogenous to the
environmental agency. We incorporate this view into social welfare maximization.
In particular, we will study the inﬂuence of the different subsidies on the instrument
choice. In our interpretation, the decision-making unit (the agency) is a public in-
stitution, where partial optimization is an integral part of the decision-making pro-
cess. Within this type of organization, the agencies choose some parts of the policies,
while they take some parts of them as given.2 In our case, the policy as a whole in-
cludes decisions about the proper level of subsidies, the strictness of the policy, and
the instrument applied in the regulation. We then assume the ﬁrst part as given and
allow the second and third decisions to be endogenous. In this respect, the status
of the regulatory agency is quite special in the original Weitzman study. It is best
described by the term “omnipotent benevolence." Clearly, this type of agency does
not face the challenges of partial optimization.3
We label our regulator (or the regulatory agency) as restricted. In the literature on
instrument choice, the idea of a restricted regulator is not entirely new. For exam-
ple, Montero [49] applies it in his Weitzman framework when studying instrument
choice under incomplete enforcement. Even though he does not call the regulator
restricted, the similarity to our regulator is obvious. In his model, the regulatory
agency can determine the strictness of the policy and the instrument used in the im-
plementation, but it takes the details of the enforcement policy as given. Speciﬁcally,
the maximum ﬁne remains beyond the control of the regulator. The maximum ﬁne
2The enforcement of the policies based on hierarchical decision-making is studied, for example, in
Jones and Scotchmer [26].
3Miyamoto [45] models the political process explicitly in his study of instrument choice. In par-
ticular, he focuses on the lobbying activity of the polluting ﬁrms.
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is assumed to be low enough that the enforcement is incomplete. Our agency decides
on the strictness of the policy and the instrument in the implementation but takes
the details of the distributional issues as given.
In both studies, inefﬁcient allocations of emissions between the polluters reﬂect
the lost omnipotence of the agency. Furthermore, in both studies, inefﬁciency af-
fects the decision rules between the instruments so that the original Weitzman rule
no longer applies. InMontero [49], a parameter in the enforcement policy affects the
decision rule. In our study, the rule depends on sector-speciﬁc subsidy thresholds.
We show that the original Weitzman analysis remains valid only when the subsi-
dization is efﬁcient. For example, we show that the celebrated polluter pays principle
represents a case inwhich both efﬁciency and the originalWeitzman rule hold. How-
ever, we do not take for granted that this principle (justiﬁed on efﬁciency grounds)
is typically implemented. Our question then concerns the content of Weitzman’s
decision rule in numerous cases where the efﬁciency criteria do not hold. In this
sense, our study complements the literature on instrument choice.
Our analysis ﬁnds that inefﬁcient subsidization has two novel effects on the in-
strument choice: the cost effect and volume effect. The cost effect depicts the inﬂu-
ence that inefﬁciency induces on permit trading. This effect invariably favors stable
prices, so the tax system with a ﬁxed price has an unambiguous advantage. The vol-
ume effect takes into account the fact that quantity regulation no longer ﬁxes the
emissions. Actually, in implementing the quantity instrument, the agency has to be
more speciﬁc about the emission quota. In our particular context, the agency may
either commit to the number of total permits or to the number of auctioned permits.
In the latter implementation, we show how the volume effect arises, but it may fa-
vor either the price or the quantity instrument. We also show that the volume effect
requires inefﬁcient subsidization to work. In other words, efﬁcient subsidization
automatically produces a zero volume effect.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Polluting Industry
The polluting industry consists of two distinct sectors labeled 0 and 1. The beneﬁt
for unit λ after producing one commodity in sector i becomes
Bi (λ) = bi +θ− ciλ, (1.1)
where bi and ci are positive constants and i = 0,1. The variable θ is a random
variable with E(θ) = 0 and Var (θ) = σ2 > 0. The net beneﬁt is
Πi (λ) = Bi (λ)− s (αi − li ), (1.2)
where αi is the level of emissions that the production of one commodity in sector
i generates and s (αi − li ) is the monetary payment. In the payment function, li is
a sector-speciﬁc threshold level and s is a unit price of emissions common to both
sectors. The monetary payment allows the use of both tradable permits and envi-
ronmental taxes. We let s = p,τ with permits and taxes, respectively. In case of
permits, threshold li is the initial allocation of permits to a production unit, while
with taxes, li is the tax-free level of emissions. In both cases, s li is a subsidy payment,
so it is paid only to an active unit.
We denote the number of active units in sector i by λi . It holds that
Πi (λi ) = 0, (1.3)
so
λi (θ) =
bi +θ− s (αi − li )
ci
, (1.4)
where i = 0,1. We denote the level of emissions in sector i by ei , then
ei =
∫ λi
0
αi dλ= αiλi , (1.5)
where i = 0,1. We assume that the pollution is homogenous in nature. Then, the
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total level of pollution as
e = e1+ e2 = λ0α0+λ1α1 (1.6)
will be of interest.
We will derive our results by using the condition αi − li ≥ 0, i = 0,1. These con-
ditions can be seen as setting upper limits for the subsidization policy. By Equation
(1.4), the policy will reduce polluting units (and the pollution) in both sectors. How-
ever, these conditions also imply that both sectors have permit deﬁcits at the equi-
librium, so they have positive demands for permits in permit auctions. We note that
this type of market structure is not the only plausible one. In particular, some ﬁrms
may modify their processes in such a way that they end up having permit surpluses
at the regulatory equilibrium. They may modify their product lines by switching to
less polluting inputs or they may install end-of-pipe puriﬁcation technologies. We
will discuss this issue towards the end of this chapter. Until then, our assumption
provides a simple framework for building a basic intuition.
1.2.2 The Regulation
The regulation implements the environmental policy with a market-based instru-
ment. In practice, the environmental agency chooses between tax and permit in-
struments. Both instruments operate by setting a unit price s on emissions. The tax
instrument sets directly s = τ. The permit policy, instead, ﬁxes a number of permits,
and price s = p is determined in the permit markets. In both cases, the regulation is
implemented under an additional assumption that the units are subsidized by sector
speciﬁc emission thresholds.
Let us discuss the permit implementation in more detail. We write a general
relation between aggregate and auctioned permits as
L= λ0 l0+λ1 l1+ l , (1.7)
where L is the number of aggregate permits, l is the number of auctioned permits,
and λ0 and λ1 are the number of units in sectors 0 and 1, respectively. The formula
depicts a mixed permit handout, where a part of the total allocation (λ0 l0+ λ1 l1) is
given out for free while a part of the allocation (l ) is fully charged for during permit
auctions.
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We make a distinction between two commitments. The environmental agency
may commit either to the number of aggregate permits or to the number of auc-
tioned permits. The question of commitment becomes particularly important when
we allow for the presence of uncertainty. In dealing with uncertainty, we assume a
particular order of moves between the agency and the regulated industry. This as-
sumption is due to Weitzman [84], and it sets up a certain kind of leader–follower
game. We assume that the agency set the regulatory parameters before everyone
learns of the uncertainty, and after that, the agency is unable to re-optimize. The
chosen regulatory parameter is either the number of permits or the tax rate. Firms
make all their choices only after the regulation is ﬁxed and after uncertainty presents
itself.
If the policy ﬁxes the number of the auctioned permits at level l , the number of
total permits becomes
L(θ) = λ0(θ)l0+λ1(θ)l1+ l , (1.8)
where the variables λ0(θ) and λ1(θ) are deﬁned in Equations (1.4). Since λ0(θ) and
λ1(θ) are not constants, the total number of permits becomes variable. Alterna-
tively, the policy may ﬁx the total number of permits at level L. Then the number
of auctioned permits is
l (θ) = L− (λ0(θ)l0+λ1(θ)l1) , (1.9)
so that this time the number of permits to be auctioned off becomes variable. We feel
that there is no good a priori reason to favor one deﬁnition over the other, so we will
handle both cases. However, if the total number of permits is ﬁxed, Equation (1.9)
shows how the agency must sterilize the consequences that the entry-exit decisions
create, and the solution is, therefore, a sterilized solution. Note also that there is no
intrinsic need to re-deﬁne the tax policy because the regulatory parameter of interest
(the tax rate) is truly ﬁxed, and, as such, is entirely independent of the tax exemptions.
Let us solve the equilibrium prices under the various commitments. In the steril-
ized system, the (ﬁxed) supply of permits equals L, the number of aggregate permits.
The market equilibrium equates supply and demand of permits, so it satisﬁes
λ0(θ)α0+λ1(θ)α1 = L.
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We insert the variables λ0(θ) and λ1(θ) (Equation (1.4)) into the equilibrium condi-
tion, so
b0+θ− pL(α0− l0)
c1
α0+
b1+θ− pL(α1− l1)
c1
α1 = L. (1.10)
After arranging terms, the price becomes
pL = γ L

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

+ γ L

α0
c0
θ+
α1
c1
θ

, (1.11)
where
γ L =
c0c1
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1 . (1.12)
We further write
pL(θ) = pL+ γ L

α0
c0
θ+
α1
c1
θ

, (1.13)
where
pL = E

pL(θ)

= γ L

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

. (1.14)
In the non-sterilized system, the (ﬁxed) supply of permits equals l , the number
of auctioned permits. The market equilibrium satisﬁes
λ0(θ)(α0− l0)+λ1(θ)(α1− l1) = l . (1.15)
After inserting the variables λ0(θ) and λ1(θ) into the equilibrium condition, we can
write the equilibrium price as
p l = γ l

b0(α0− l0)
c0
+
b1 (α1− l1)
c1
− l

+ γ l

θ(α0− l0)
c0
+
θ (α1− l1)
c1

, (1.16)
where
γ l =
c0c1
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2 . (1.17)
We further write
p l (θ) = p l + γ l

θ(α0− l0)
c0
+
θ (α1− l1)
c1

, (1.18)
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where
p l = E
	
p l (θ)


= γ l

b0(α0− l0)
c0
+
b1 (α1− l1)
c1
− l

. (1.19)
The operation of the non-sterilized system is straightforward; just ﬁx the number
of auctioned permits to a predetermined level. As for the sterilized system, we sug-
gest that the agency operates the market with the help of so-called discount coupons.
A discount coupon is not a permit, but the holder of a coupon can exchange it for
a permit. Within that system, a polluting unit receives the emission threshold as
coupons upon registering as an active ﬁrm. Later on, the unit uses coupons in the
permits auctions. That is, after the unit has bid an amount of permits in the auc-
tions, the discount coupons will be deducted from the total bill. As far as the price
of permits is positive, every participating ﬁrm will use every coupon in the auction.
At the same time, the agency is effectively auctioning the endowment of aggregate
permits, so it controls the aggregate level of emissions.4
1.3 Social Welfare Optimization
1.3.1 Efﬁcient Policy
We start our study of efﬁciency by setting θ = 0. Based on the discussion of the
polluting industry above, the total beneﬁts are
B =
∫ λ0
0
B0dλ+
∫ λ1
0
B1dλ, (1.20)
where B0 and B1 are deﬁned in Equation (1.1). A question of particular interest is
the emission allocation between the sectors. Among various allocations, the efﬁ-
cient allocation yields maximum total beneﬁts for a given level of emissions. We
then maximize beneﬁts (Equation (1.20)) given the emissions (Equation (1.6)). If we
denote the Lagrange multiplier by μ, the efﬁcient allocation satisﬁes the conditions
Bi (λi )−μαi = 0,
4There are other examples in the literature, where the operation of the permit system is reﬁned
to account for some extra needs. These reﬁnements include the system of rental emission permits by
Collinge and Oates [8] and the hybrid system by Roberts and Spence [62].
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or, accordingly, the conditions
Bi (λi )
αi
=μ, (1.21)
where i = 0,1. The right-hand sides of Equations (1.21) are independent of i , so we
have
B0(λ
e
0)
α0
=
Bi (λ
e
1)
α1
.
Since the Bi (λi ) is the beneﬁt of the cut-off unit in sector i , this condition says that
the average beneﬁts of emissions should be the same upon efﬁcient allocation.
The choices in the polluting sectors are driven by the proﬁts. By Equation (1.2),
the sector i response satisﬁes
Bi (λi ) = s (αi − li ). (1.22)
In particular, if
B0(λ0)
α0
=
B1(λ1)
α1
,
then we have λei = λi . To satisfy this condition, we set
s (α0− l0)
α0
=
s (α1− l1)
α1
, (1.23)
or
α0− l0
α0
≡ α1− l1
α1
≡ω. (1.24)
The relationship between the thresholds l0 and l1 ought to be satisﬁed upon efﬁcient
allocation.
The efﬁciency is clearly satisﬁed, if l0 = l1 = 0. This is a standard result in the
entry-exit literature, and it states that the “polluter pays." Accordingly, the agency
should not distribute free allocations. Papers like the one by Pezzey [54] discuss this
result further. However, note that the efﬁcient rule in Equation (1.24) allows for
strictly positive values of l0 and l1 as well. In every case, it holds that 0≤ω ≤ 1.
Every allocation, whether efﬁcient or inefﬁcient, implies a certain beneﬁt func-
tion. It is a relation between aggregate beneﬁts and aggregate emissions. By con-
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struction, the beneﬁts in efﬁcient policy should be as high as possible for every level
of e . If we denote these beneﬁts by B(e), then a corollary for our late efﬁciency
maximization provides us with the condition
dB(e)
d e
=μ.
By Equations (1.1), (1.6), and (1.21), we can write
e =
b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
−μ b0α
2
0
c0
+μ
b1α
2
1
c1
,
so
μ= γ

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− e

,
where
γ =
c0c1
c1(α0)2+ c0(α1)2
. (1.25)
Consequently, the abatement cost function is
B(e) =
∫
μ(e)d e .
In our case, it is a quadratic function of emissions, so marginal beneﬁt function is
linear. The literature calls μ the marginal abatement function, so γ is the slope of
the marginal abatement function.
Our model is similar to Weitzman since marginal beneﬁts depend linearly on
emissions. At the same time, we are interested in inefﬁcient allocations. We should
then clarify how the inefﬁciency affects the beneﬁt function.
1.3.2 Optimal Policies
1.3.2.1 The Tax Implementations
Let us bring the uncertainty and emission damages into our analysis. The damages of
emissions depend on the aggregate amount of emissions and there is no uncertainty
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in the quadratic damage function. That is, the damages are
D(e) =
d
2
e2,
where d > 0. We will next derive optimal policies and start with the ﬁrst-best policy.
In the ﬁrst-best policy, the environmental agency can choose every policy variable
τ, l0, and l1, so the optimization amounts to the following exercise:
Max
τ,l0,l1
EW = E
∫ λ0(τ,l0,θ)
0
B0dλ+
∫ λ1(τ,l1,θ)
0
B1dλ

− ED(e(λ0(τ, l0,θ),λ1(τ, l1,θ))
such that
e = λ0(τ, l0,θ)α0+λ1(τ, l1,θ)α1. (1.26)
The ﬁrst order conditions (see Appendix A.1) are
τ− γ
l
γ L
dE [e] = 0, (1.27)
τ− α0
(α0− l0)dE [e] = 0, (1.28)
and
τ− α1
(α1− l1)dE [e] = 0. (1.29)
Clearly, the last two conditions imply that
α0− l0
α0
=
α1− l1
α1
at the optimum, so (see Equation (1.24)) the optimal allocation should be efﬁcient as
well. As for the optimal tax rate, we note that (by Equations (1.12) and (1.17)),
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γ l
γ L
=
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2 =
c1

α0−l0
α0

α20+ c0

α1−l1
α1

α21
c1

α0−l0
α0
2
α20+ c0

α1−l1
α1
2
α21
and after incorporating the efﬁciency rule (Equation (1.24)),
γ l
γ L
=
1
ω
. (1.30)
Thus, the ﬁrst-best policy is a tax rate that satisﬁes
τ =
dE [e]
ω
. (1.31)
In summary, we do not have one but two optimal rates. In the ﬁrst case, l0 = l1 =
0, soω = 1, and
τ0 = dE [e] .
This is a standard policy rule that recommends setting the tax equal to the expected
marginal damages. Alternatively, 0< ω < 1, so
τe =
τ0
ω
. (1.32)
Clearly, τe > τ0.
It should be intuitively clear that all the differences between optimal implementa-
tions are only nominal. Formally, we show in Appendix A.2 that e(τ0,θ) = e(τe ,θ).
In other words, every optimal implementation will yield the same level of emissions
ex-post. Furthermore, as far as
E [e(τ,θ)] = α0

b0
c0

+α1

b1
c1

−ωτ
γ
,
the optimal level of expected emissions (in terms of the parameters of the model)
satisﬁes
E [e(τ,θ)] = α0

b0
c0

+α1

b1
c1

− d
γ
E [e(τ,θ)] .
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If we denote the optimal level by e∗, it satisﬁes
e∗ = γ
γ + d

α0

b0
c0

+α1

b1
c1

. (1.33)
1.3.2.2 The Permit Implementations
In an efﬁcient permit implementation, the agency auctions all or only part of the
permits off. In the latter case, the agency has to make sure that the relation l0l1 =
α0
α1
between the thresholds holds (see Equation (1.24)). In calculating the optimal policy,
we will follow Montero [46] by applying the expected price as the choice variable.
Otherwise, we optimize in the same manner as we did above in the tax policy. We
choose the optimal expected price in the sterilized system (pL in Equation (1.14))
and in the non-sterilized system (p l in Equation (1.19)). In practice, the regulator
does not choose the prices directly but supplies an appropriate number of permits
to the market. Note further that we have two cases to study within sterilized and
non-sterilized systems. These follow since both zero and positive thresholds can
implement the optimality in both systems.
We present the derivations in Appendix A.3. We denote the optimal prices under
zero and positive thresholds by p0 and pe , respectively. Accordingly, if every permit
is auctioned off, then
pL = p l = p0.
Alternatively, if a part of the endowment is given for free, then
pL = p l = pe .
It also holds that
pe =
p0
ω
. (1.34)
Moreover, the aggregate number of permits in every system equals L = e∗. The
supply of auctioned permits in the non-sterilized system is l =ωL< L.
The optimal permit policies restate our earlier ﬁndings with the optimal tax poli-
cies. The prices reﬂect nominal differences, not real ones. In particular, as imple-
mentations are optimal, the aggregate permit endowment is always chosen to sat-
isfy L = e∗, where e∗ is the optimal level of emissions in the tax system (Equation
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(1.33)). As for the nominal effects, the introduction of free permits becomes trans-
formed into the permit price. As 0 < ω < 1, then pe > p0, so the subsidization of
ﬁrms will increase the permit price. The rise in the permit price is a sort of a wealth
effect. Every ﬁrm in themarket becomesmore proﬁtable after the thresholds are dis-
tributed among the units in the polluting industry. The rise in proﬁtability will shift
demand and, consequently, the permit price upwards. Note also how the amount
of auctioned permits is smaller than the number of aggregate permits (l < L). This
simply reﬂects the fact that part of the permits is given out for free.
1.3.3 Second-Best Policy
We assume next that the choices of thresholds (l0 and l1) lie outside the authority
of the environmental agency. However, the strictness of an environmental policy
is still under the control of it. In choosing the strictness, the agency maximizes the
expected social welfare given the values of l0 and l1. In other words, it uses only one
of the ﬁrst-order conditions, namely, the condition written in Equation (1.27). Then
− τ
γ l
+
d
γ L
E [e] = 0.
We insert λ0(τ, l0,θ) and λ1(τ, l1,θ) into Equation (1.26), so
E [e] =
α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1
− τ
γ L
, (1.35)
and we have the (restricted, second-best) optimum rate as
τ s =
dγ Lγ l
[γ L]2+ dγ l

α0

b0
c0

+α1

b1
c1

. (1.36)
Inserting the second-best tax rate back to Equation (1.35) gives us the expected sec-
ond-best level of emissions as
e s =
 
γ L
2
[γ L]2+ dγ l

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

. (1.37)
It is interesting to know how the second-best policy compares to the ﬁrst-best.
Toward that end, we induce efﬁciency into the maximization by setting l0 = l1 = 0.
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By Equations (1.31) and (1.33), the optimal tax rate5 (denoted by τ0) becomes
τ0 =
dγ
γ + d

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

. (1.38)
We have:
i. By assuming efﬁciency, the second-best price and quantity become ﬁrst-best.
ii. τ s > τ0.
ii. e s > e∗.
We prove and discuss these claims in Appendix A.4.
We can derive the second-best permit policy along the same basic guidelines as
we derive the ﬁrst-best policy. However, as far as the implementation is always sub-
sidized, only one expected unit price is needed in the sterilized and non-sterilized
systems. The sterilized system should ﬁx the total permit endowment in such a way
that the condition
pL = τ s
holds. Alternatively, the non-sterilized system should ﬁx the auctioned permit en-
dowment in such a way that the condition
p l = τ s
holds. In every case, the aggregate number of permits should be equal to e s .
1.3.4 Graphical Illustration of the Policies
Let us illustrate the policies just derived with the help of a ﬁgure. Up to this point,
we have developed our model in terms of the price variable. However, graphical
illustrations of the calculations are far more illustrative if they include the quantity
variable, that is, the emissions as well. Intuitively, this approach allows the simulta-
neous incorporation of the marginal beneﬁts, marginal damages, and the two policy
parameters into the ﬁgure—the tax rate and the permit endowment.
5We hope that our choice to use the same notation to symbolize both efﬁcient and optimal out-
comes does not bother the reader too much. After all, every optimal outcome is an efﬁcient outcome
as well.
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Consider then Figure 1.1, where the vertical axis displays the price and the hor-
izontal axis represents emissions. In general, the following rule governs the switch
between quantities and prices:
e −

α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1
c0c1
s

≡ 0. (1.39)
This follows, as we expand the equation e = λ0(θ)α0+ λ1(θ)α1. By using Equation
(1.39) (together with the deﬁnition of γ L in Equation (1.12)), we write
s (e ;θ) = γ L

α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− γ Le (1.40)
and call it the price function. Next, the beneﬁts (Equation (1.20)) expanded yield
B =
∫ λ0(θ)
0
B0dλ+
∫ λ1(θ)
0
B1dλ
=
(b0+θ)
2
2c0
+
(b1+θ)
2
2c1
−

1
2c0
(α0− l0)2+ 12c1 (α0− l0)
2

s2,
or, by Equation (1.17),
B =
(b0+θ)
2
2c0
+
(b1+θ)
2
2c1
− s
2
2γ l
.
Insert the price function s (e ;θ) into this, arrange the terms, and write
B(e ;θ) = B0(θ)+B1(θ)e −

γ L
2
2γ l
e2,
where
B1(θ) =

γ L
2
γ l

α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

.
Thus, the marginal beneﬁts are
dB(e ;θ)
d e
= B1(θ)−

γ L
2
γ l
e = B1(θ)− γρe .
73
Figure 1.1 Implementation of the First-Best Policy (a); Implementation of the Second-Best Policy (b)
In particular, we will show below (see Equation (1.58)) that
ρ> 1
as long as allocation is inefﬁcient. In case of efﬁciency, we have ρ= 1.
In Figure 1.1, we employ three distinct lines to describe the determination of the
various optimal policies. We have lines
E p = E s (e ;θ) = γ L

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− e

, (1.41)
Emb = E

dB(e ;θ)
d e

= γρ

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− e

, (1.42)
and
Emd = d e .
The lines correspond to expected price function, expected marginal beneﬁt func-
tion, and expected marginal damage function, respectively. In every policy, we can
determine the optimal quantity by the following rule:
Emb = Emd . (1.43)
However, further policy details are case-speciﬁc.
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Consider ﬁrst the determination of the ﬁrst-best policy. A conspicuous feature in
the policy is that the agency can implement it using zero or strictly positive thresh-
olds. As far as implementations are efﬁcient in both cases, we have ρ= 1. We denote
the curves by Emb 0 (zero thresholds) and Emb e (positive thresholds), so with the
reference to Equation (1.42), it holds that
Emb 0 = Emb e = γ

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− e

.
On the other hand, by Equation (A.4 in Appendix A.2), we write Equation (1.41) as
E p =
γ
ω

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− e

.
Thus, if thresholds are equal to zero, ω = 1 and E p0 = Emb 0. In this case, the
price and the marginal beneﬁt functions will overlap. This means that the optimal
price–quantity pair is determined by the marginal beneﬁt function. Alternatively,
the thresholds are strictly positive. Then, 0 < ω < 1, so E pe = Emb e . In this last
case, we say that the price is separately determined.
We can demonstrate these policies in Figure 1.1(a). As for the optimal expected
emissions, it is determined by the rules that
Emb 0 = Emb e = Emd .
We denote the corresponding optimal expected level by L0 in the ﬁgure. As for
the optimal prices, if l0 = l1 = 0, then the optimal price satisﬁes τ
0 = E p0(L0) =
Emb 0(L0). Alternatively, if either l0 > 0 or l1 > 0 or both, then the optimal price
satisﬁes τe = E pe (L0)> Emb e (L0). We discussed above that τe > τ0.
Consider next the determination of the second-best policy. First, as the policy
uses subsidization, then
E p s = Emb s ,
so the price is separately determined. Second, as the policy is inefﬁcient, then ρ> 1
and
Emb s = Emb 0.
Thus, the marginal beneﬁt function (Emb s ) does not overlap with either the price
function or the efﬁcient marginal function.
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The second-best optimal price–quantity pair (τ s ,Ls ) is illustrated in Figure 1.1(b).
The second-best expected emission is determined by the rule
Emb s = Emd .
The corresponding second-best price satisﬁes
τ s = E p s (Ls ).
In particular, as we discussed above (see also the results in Appendix A.4), we have
Ls > L0 and τ s > τ0.
1.4 Choosing Between the Instruments
1.4.1 Prices and Quantities
We will start our analysis of instrument choice by writing some new helpful nota-
tion. In particular, we like to rewrite the price process in a general form as
s = E s + γ L

R0(s )

α0
c0

θ+R1(s )

α1
c1

θ

(1.44)
for various R0(s ) and R1(s ). The unit price inside the parentheses indicates that the
factor is speciﬁc to the type of implementation. The two price processes in Equations
(1.13) and (1.18) can now be written as
pL(θ) = pL+ γ L

α0
c0
θ+
α1
c1
θ

(1.45)
and
p l (θ) = p l + γ L

R0(p
l )

α0
c0

θ+R1(p
l )

α1
c1

θ

, (1.46)
respectively, where
Ri (p
l ) =
γ l
γ L
(αi − li )
αi
,
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and i = 0,1. Thus, we have R0(p
L) = R1(p
L) = 1. The price in Equation (1.45) is
sterilized, while in Equation (1.46) it is not. We also ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne
k ≡ (α1− l1)
(α0− l0) , u ≡
c0
c1
, and a ≡ α1
α0
, (1.47)
so we will switch to relative parameters.
Using these deﬁnitions, and after some manipulation, we may further write
R0(p
l ) =
1+ uka
1+ uk2
and R1(p
l ) =
k
a
R0(p
l ). (1.48)
We state (without giving any formal proof) that the following characteristics for per-
mit price p l (θ) (Equation (1.46)) hold:
i. R0 ≥ 0,R1 ≥ 0, and R0+R1 > 0
ii. If k −→∞, then R0 = 0, R1 = 1
iii. If k = 0, then R0 = 1, R1 = 0
iv. If k = a, then R0 = R1 = 1
v. If k < a, then R0 > 1, R1 < 1
vi. If k > a, then R0 < 1, R1 > 1.
Note in particular that the value k = a refers to an efﬁcient allocation. Table 1.1
summarizes the various values of R0(s ) and R1(s ) under different implementations.
Table 1.1 The R-Factors for the Various Instruments
R0(s ) R1(s )
τ 0 0
pL 1 1
p l ≥ 0 ≥ 0
It is also a straightforward task to write the aggregate level of emissions as
e(s ) = e + (1−R0(s ))α0c0 θ+ (1−R1(s ))
α1
c1
θ, (1.49)
where e is again independent of θ. Finally, we consider the various differences in
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prices and quantities in Table 1.2.6 We calculate the price differences in Appendix
A.5, Part I, while we calculate the various quantity differences in Appendix A.5, Part
II.
Table 1.2 Various Differences in Prices and Quantities Between Different Instruments
pL(θ)− p l (θ) = 1(α0−l0)
u(a−k)(1−k)
(1+uka)(1+uk2)θ
e(p l (θ))− e(τ(θ)) =− 1γ L 1(α0−l0)
1+uk
1+uk2θ
e(pL(θ))− e(τ(θ)) =− c1α0+c0α1c1c0 θ
e(pL(θ))− e(p l (θ)) = 1γ L (a−k)(k−1)(α0−l0)
u
(1+uk2)(1+uak)θ
A prominent feature concerns the path of the aggregate non-sterilized emissions,
e(p l ). By Equation (1.49), as long as either R0(p
l ) or R1(p
l ) is different from one,
the emissions are not ﬁxed but differ from the expected level of emissions e . How-
ever, as far as efﬁciency implies that R0(p
l ) = R1(p
l ) = 1, the efﬁcient implemen-
tation of the quantity policy inevitably yields a ﬁxed level of emissions. Regarding
the sterilized emissions, e(pL), Equation (1.49) merely conﬁrms that the aggregate
emissions do not ﬂuctuate under the sterilized system. Another important obser-
vation concerns the behavior of taxed emissions. By construction, the inﬂuence of
the threshold allocation (l0, l1) is channeled entirely through factors R0(s ) and R1(s ).
We then see from Equation (1.49) that the aggregate emission variation under taxes
is totally independent of the allocation (l0, l1).
If R0(p
l ) = 1 and R1(p l ) = 1, then the non-sterilized permit system creates a new
type of aggregate variation among the instruments. Interestingly, when compared
to the studies employing efﬁcient instruments, there is presumably a new kind of
trade-off present between the quantity and the price instruments. The non-sterilized
permits may gain a new advantage, as the aggregate quota is no longer ﬁxed. At the
same time, there arises some (most likely harmful) effects as the permits are traded us-
ing inefﬁcient trading ratios. This last observation is partly conﬁrmed in Appendix
A.5, Part III, where we concentrate on sector-speciﬁc allocations. Whether a steril-
ized or non-sterilized permit system, the sector-speciﬁc emissions allocations clearly
6A minor technical note: The various differences in the table depend on the multiplier 1(α0−l0) > 0.
We could have derived the formulas in terms of 1(α1−l1) instead, and the results would have remained
the same.
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differ from efﬁcient patterns. This observation also means that the more traditional
quantity instrument—the sterilized system—undergoes changes. In particular, we
may conclude that the allocation (e0(p
L), e1(p
L)) is not an efﬁcient way to distribute
the totality of e . Instead, the sector-speciﬁc allocation under taxation, conﬁrms our
earlier conclusion: the emission variation is totally independent of the allocation
(l0, l1).
Regarding the permit prices, the equality p l (θ) = pL(θ) holds under two separate
subsidy proﬁles. First, it holds whenever k = a. This means that the two prices are
identical under efﬁcient subsidization. Second, the equality between the prices also
holds when k = 1. This occurs if an absolute subsidization rule (α1− l1) = (α0− l0)
holds. However, this rule does not yield efﬁciency.7 Looking at the lower part of the
table, if k = a or k = 1, we have e(p l (θ)) = e(pL(θ))) = e . Thus, the system of non-
sterilized permits is able to stabilize the emissions by utilizing two distinct permit
thresholds. However, at the same time, the ﬁxed level of emissions differs between
subsidy proﬁles. If we let e∗ denote the efﬁcient emissions, then e = e∗ whenever
k = a. Instead, if k = 1, we have e = e∗. As for the difference e(p l (θ))−e(τ(θ)), it can
be shown that the non-sterilized system cannot induce the same regulated emissions
as the tax system does. Consequently, as taxed emissions (by deﬁnition) correspond
to a ﬁxed price level, the system of non-sterilized permits is not able to stabilize the
permit price.
The content of Table 1.2 provides some preliminary intuition for the forthcom-
ing studies of instrument choice. One observation concerns the nature of the critical
points k = a and k = 1. We just saw how the price level and the emission level re-
main ﬁxed at these particular policies. Referring to our upcoming deﬁnitions, we
say that the so-called volume effect vanishes there. On the other hand, at k = a, the
implementation is efﬁcient, while at k = 1, it is not. Interestingly, from an efﬁciency
point of view, the system of non-sterilized permits produces both fake (k = 1) and
bona ﬁde (k = a) critical points. In future discussion, we claim that the so-called cost
effect vanishes at k = a, while it does not vanish at k = 1.
7More speciﬁcally, let pe (θ) denote the permit price under efﬁcient subsidization. Then, if k = a,
we have p l (θ) = pL(θ) = pe (θ). Instead, if k = 1, we have p l (θ) = pL(θ) = pe (θ).
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1.4.2 Comparative Advantage
Weitzman [84] deﬁnes the comparative advantage between instrument I and J as
Δ(I , J ) = E [(B(I )−D(e(I )))− (B(J )−D(e(J )))] .
Under our framework (use cut-off units λi in Equations (1.4)),
B(s ) =
∫ λ0
0
B0dλ+
∫ λ1
0
B1dλ=

(b0+θ)
2
2c0
+
(b1+θ)
2
2c1

−

(s (θ))2
2γ l

(1.50)
and
D(e(s )) =
d
2
(e(s ))2 =
d
2
(
∫ λ0
0
α0dλ0+
∫ λ1
0
α1dλ1)
2 (1.51)
=
d
2

α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− s (θ)
γ L
2
.
In what follows, we ﬁnd it helpful to operate in terms of variances. We refer to
Appendix A.6 as we rewrite the comparative advantage between instruments I and
J as
Δ(I , J ) =
Var (J )−Var (I )
2

1
γ l
− d

Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I )

. (1.52)
Let us ﬁx the order of instruments for a moment, so that Var (J ) > Var (I ). If
instrument J has a higher variance in quantities as well, then Δ(I , J ) > 0, and the
agency will always choose instrument I . Thus, in a meaningful comparison, we
must then have Var (e(I )) > Var (e(J )). Note also that the conditions Var (I ) =
Var (e(J )) = 0 simultaneously hold in the traditional Weitzman comparison so they
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automatically ensure a proper analysis of comparative advantage.8 We further denote
v ≡ v(I , J ) = Var (I )
Var (J )
, (1.53)
so
Δ(I , J ) =Var (J )
1− v
2

1
γ l
− d

Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I )

. (1.54)
1.4.3 The Volume Effect and Cost Effect
We denote
Θ ≡Θ(I , J ) = γ L2 Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I ) (1.55)
and rewrite Equation (1.54) as
Δ(I , J ) =Var (J )
1− v
2

1
γ l
−Θ d
(γ L)2

. (1.56)
Let us call factor Θ the volume effect. In principle, the volume effect can take any
values. The negative values in particular imply that agency should always choose
instrument I .9 We also say that if Θ > 1 (Θ < 1), then the volume effect will favor
instrument J (instrument I ). IfΘ = 1, then we say that the volume effect disappears.
We would like to studyΔ(I , J ) in terms of the fundamentals γ and d . To do this,
we write the Equation (1.56) as
Δ(I , J ) =Var (J )
1− v
2
ρ
(γ L)2

γ − Θ
ρ
d

, (1.57)
where
ρ≡

γ L
2
γγ l
.
8In addition to beneﬁt uncertainty, Weitzman [84] assumes an uncertainty variable that shifts the
marginal damages. However, he further assumes that different uncertainties are independent. This as-
sumptionmeans that the comparative advantagemeasure becomes independent of damage uncertainty.
In our study, had we assumed additive damage uncertainty and independent uncertainties, our results
would have remained the same. In this important respect, certain damages induce no loss of generality.
We brieﬂy illustrate this issue in Appendix A.7.
9In this case, it holds that 0< v < 1.
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We call factor ρ the cost effect. The cost effect arises in the instrument choice when-
ever regulation becomes inefﬁcient. In terms of the auxiliary variables k, a, and u
(see Equations (1.47)), we can write the cost effect as
ρ= 1+
u (k − a)2
(1+ uak)2
. (1.58)
As u > 0, and if we let k = a, then
ρ> 1.
Clearly, if k = a, then ρ= 1. Recall that the condition k = a implies efﬁciency.
In Equation (1.57), the term ρ lies both inside and outside of the parenthesis.
Since ρ ≥ 1, the term ρ outside only magniﬁes the size of the measure Δ, so it
does not affect the choice of the instrument. If subsidization is inefﬁcient, it holds
that 0 < 1ρ < 1. We then say that the cost effect favors instrument I . Note also
that (by Equation (1.58)) the size of ρ increases, as k moves away from a. Since
k = a implies efﬁciency, then the cost effect monotonically increases (that is, favors
more and more instrument I ) as we move further away from the efﬁcient solution.10
Finally, if k = a, then ρ= 1, and we say that the cost effect disappears.
Above, we have a particular order between instruments in the advantage formu-
las. More generally, we may state that
i. Θ(I , J ) =Θ(J , I ).
ii. The cost effect favors the instrument with the lowest variance in price.
iii. Let Θ > 1 (Θ < 1). The volume effect favors the instrument with the highest
(lowest) variance in price.
We discuss these properties in Appendix A.8.
1.4.4 Prices Versus Quantities with Fixed Emissions
1.4.4.1 The Disappearance of the Volume Effect
In this section, we start our review of instrument choice by assuming that I = τ.
Thus, the price instrument—the environmental tax—is a candidate in the policy im-
10 We do not develop the measurement of inefﬁciency beyond this notion.
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plementation. We write the various variances in terms of R0 and R1 as
Var (s ) =

γ L
2
σ2

R0(s )

α0
c0

+R1(s )

α1
c1
2
(1.59)
and
Var (e(s )) = σ2

(1−R0(s ))α0c0 + (1−R1(s ))
α1
c1
2
(1.60)
for instrument s . Speciﬁcally, (by Table 1.1) we have R0(τ) = R1(τ) = 0, so the
volume effect (Equation (1.55)) between the tax and quantity instrument J becomes
Θ(τ, J ) =

γ L
2 [Var (e(τ)−Var (e(J )]
Var (J )−Var (τ) (1.61)
=
	
α0
c0
+ α1c1

2− 	(1−R0(J ))α0c0 + (1−R1(J ))α1c1 
2	
R0(I )

α0
c0

+R1(I )

α1
c1

2 .
By closer inspection, whenever R0(J ) = R1(J ) = 1, then Θ(τ, J ) = 1 and the volume
effect disappears. This occurs under the sterilized permit system, namely, under the
system that ﬁxes the level of emissions.
1.4.4.2 Efﬁcient Implementations
In prices versus quantities, assume ﬁrst that the regulation utilizes efﬁcient instru-
ments. Referring to our discussion above, it now holds that ρ= 1 and Θ = 1. Both
cost and volume effects will disappear (and v = 0 by Equation (1.53)), so the com-
parative advantage (Equation (1.57)) becomes
Δ(τ i , pi ) =Var (pi )
ω2
2γ 2
(γ − d ), (1.62)
where i = 0, e . If i = 0, the thresholds are equal to zero, and if i = e , the thresholds
are strictly positive.
Whenever i = 0, then (by Equation (1.24))ω = 1. Thus,
Δ(τ0, p0) =
Var (p0(θ))
2γ 2
(γ − d ).
Alternatively, we have i = e . By Equation (1.34), pe (θ) = p
0(θ)
ω . Insert this informa-
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tion into Equation (1.62), so it follows that
Δ(τe , pe ) =
Var (p0(θ))
2γ 2
(γ − d ) =Δ(τ0, p0). (1.63)
This is the original Weitzman [84] result calculated in an augmented framework.
Prices are preferred over quantities if the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function (γ )
exceeds the slope of the marginal damage function (d ). We regard this as a funda-
mental result. The choice depends on the slope parameters γ and d that belong to
the social welfare function. This result also shows that the size of the measure Δ
does not depend on the type of efﬁcient implementation. That is, whether zero or
strictly positive thresholds are applied, the measureΔ remains the same.
1.4.4.3 Inefﬁcient Implementation
We assume next that the thresholds l0 and l1 do not satisfy efﬁciency. However,
we assume a fully binding aggregate permit supply, which implies a ﬁxed level of
emissions. We have11
Θ(τ, pL) = 1, (1.64)
so, by Equation (1.57), we may write
Δ(τ, pL(θ)) =
ρ
2
Var (pL(θ))
(γ L)2
(γ − 1
ρ
d ).
If we apply the speciﬁc relation between Var (pL(θ)) and Var (p0(θ)), we may also
write
Δ(τ, pL(θ)) = ρ
Var (p0(θ))
2γ 2
(γ − 1
ρ
d ). (1.65)
In general, the overall effect that inefﬁcient subsidization induces is Θρ . Here, the
volume effect disappears, so the total effect consists only of the cost effect. The cost
effect will favor the tax instrument. This is as expected. We discuss above that the
cost effect favors the instrument with the lowest variance. In fact, asVar (τ) = 0, the
cost effect is very favorable to taxes. We may also say that inefﬁcient subsidization
11Note that the instrument from now on is chosen in a second-best framework. We apply subscript
s in the policy variables above to differentiate them from their ﬁrst-best counterparts. However, to
minimize symbolization, we no longer apply subscript s below.
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hurts the socially favorable trading ratios in permit markets.
1.4.5 Graphical Illustration of the Cost Effect
We illustrate the previous comparative advantage graphically in Figure 1.2. We em-
ploy a presentation, where we write the beneﬁts and damages in terms of the quan-
tity, that is, in terms of the emissions. In Figure 1.2, the marginal beneﬁts are
mb (e ;θ) = γρ

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
+

c0α1+ c1α0
c1c0

θ− e

, (1.66)
while the price is determined according to the price function
s = s (e ;θ) = γ L

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
+

c0α1+ c1α0
c1c0

θ− e

. (1.67)
We refer the reader back to an earlier section where we explain the meanings of these
expressions.12 Both the marginal beneﬁt and the price functions display the cost
effect. As far as ρ = 1 and γ L = 1ω under efﬁciency, we have ρ = 1 and γ L = 1ω
under inefﬁciency. Furthermore, after rearranging the price–quantity relation in
Equation (1.67), the emission response in the tax regime is
e (τ;θ) =
b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
+

c0α1+ c1α0
c1c0

θ− τ
γ L
. (1.68)
We denote the marginal damage curve by md . By assumption, it remains stable.
We illustrate the basic difference between efﬁcient and inefﬁcient implementation
in a stripped-down framework of Figure 1.2. In particular, there is only a single
realization θ = θ displayed. We do not derive the policies but rather say that the
ﬁxed tax rate τ and ﬁxed quota L represent the policies. Consider ﬁrst the efﬁcient
implementation. We have mb = mb 0(e ;θ) in Figure 1.2. The taxed emissions e0 are
determined13 by the intersection τ = mb 0(e0;θ)while the emissions under quantity
implementation stay ﬁxed and are equal to quota L. Had the agency the possibility to
reset the policy, it would implement the quantity e that satisﬁes mb 0(e ;θ) = md (e);
that is, the level implied by the intersection of the ex-post marginal curves. As it
is unable to do that, certain welfare losses inevitably arise. Speciﬁcally, in Figure
12We refer to Section 1.3.4.
13We comment on the efﬁcient subsidized implementation below.
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Figure 1.2 Comparative Advantage in Sterilized System: Efﬁcient and Inefﬁcient Implementations Com-
pared
1.2, area Aq is the loss in welfare that the commitment to a ﬁxed level of emissions
induces. Similarly, area A+Ap is the loss in welfare that the commitment to a ﬁxed
price level induces.
Consider next the inefﬁcient implementation in Figure 1.2. This time, mb =
mb s (e ;θ) and mb s (e ;θ) = mb 0(e ;θ). Furthermore, the taxed emissions e s are de-
termined by the intersection between lines τ and s (e s ;θ). We illustrated earlier that
s (e ;θ) is everywhere higher than mb s (e ;θ). Thus, the realized emissions are strictly
lower than the emissions implied by the efﬁciency condition τ = mb s (e ;θ). In ev-
ery case, had the agency the possibility to reset the policy, it would implement the
quantity e that satisﬁes mb s (e ;θ) = md (e). Area Aq is the welfare loss that a com-
mitment to a ﬁxed level of emissions induces, while area Ap is the corresponding
welfare loss that a commitment to a ﬁxed price level creates. In particular, had the
implementation been efﬁcient, the tax welfare loss would have been A+Ap . Area
A displays the additional tax advantage that inefﬁcient implementation induces in
instrument choice.
We emphasize that area A evolves only if both the marginal beneﬁt and the price
function differ from the efﬁcient marginal beneﬁt function. For example, if a policy
applies efﬁcient but positive thresholds, then this condition is not satisﬁed. Rather,
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it holds that mb e = mb e (e ;θ) = mb 0 and e e = e0. Consequently, the efﬁciency
analysis in Figure 1.2 remains valid.
1.4.6 Prices Versus Quantities with Volume Effect
Next, we assume that the regulatory agency commits to the number of auctioned
permits in the quantity policy. This policy does not ﬁx the aggregate level of emis-
sions. This feature is remarkable. We now have an instrument where neither the
price nor the quantity remains immune to the realizations of the uncertainty. This
property generates a response called a volume effect.
Looking back at the deﬁnition in Equation (1.55), we see how the volume effect
depends on the different variances of prices and quantities. It is based on the value
of the quotient
Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (I )−Var (J ) .
In fact, the smaller the variance both in the price and in the quantity, the better it
is for instrument s . We may think that the volume effect tries to catch the trade-off
between the price and the quantity variances.
The deﬁnition of the volume effect (Equation (1.55)) together with variance for-
mulas (Equations (1.59) and (1.60)) imply that
Θ(τ, p l (θ)) = 2
α0
c0
+ α1c1
R0(p l )

α0
c0

+R1(p l )

α1
c1
 − 1≡ 2q − 1. (1.69)
Thus,
q =
α0
c0
+ α1c1
R0(p l )

α0
c0

+R1(p l )

α1
c1
 ,
and the volume effect does not vanish as long as q = 1. As for the size of q , we deﬁne
k =min(a, 1) and k =max(a, 1). Then, we have q(k) = q(k) = 1 and
q(k)> 1,0< k < k (1.70)
0< q(k)< 1,k < k < k
q(k)> 1,k > k.
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Figure 1.3 Two Graphs of the Function q(k). Parameters are a = 0.2 and s = 2 (the solid line) and
a = 5 and s = 2 (the dashed line).
To see this pattern, use deﬁnitions in Equations (1.47) and (1.48) in Section 1.4.1
and write the value of q(k) as
q(k) =
1+ uk2
1+ uak
1+ ua
1+ uk
. (1.71)
Speciﬁcally, if q = 1, then
u

k2+ a− k(a+ 1)=H (k) = 0, (1.72)
or, equivalently,
u(k − 1) (k − a) = 0. (1.73)
Inequalities in (1.70) follow, as the function H (k) in (1.72) is seen to be a parabola
opening up. We draw two functions of q(k) in Figure 1.3. The applied parameters
equal a = 0.2 and u = 2 (the solid line) and a = 5 and u = 2 (the dashed line). The
critical values of k (where q = 1) are k = 1 and k = 0.2 (the solid line) and k = 1 and
k = 5 (the dashed line).
Our general conclusion is that the decision to abandon a ﬁxed quota in the quan-
tity policy has the potential to yield a volume effect that inﬂuences the choice be-
tween prices and quantities. More speciﬁcally, note ﬁrst that the values q < 1 favor
the tax instrument, while the values q > 1 favor tradable permits. The inﬂuence
is seen to disappear at q = 1. By Equation (1.73), the volume effect will vanish at
critical points k = a and k = 1. Remember that these are the critical values in Ta-
ble 1.2 that induce e(p l (θ)) = e(pL(θ))) = e , so the non-sterilized system induces
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ﬁxed emissions at these critical points. It is then no wonder that the volume effect
vanishes at these points.
Second, we study the behavior of q in terms of k above, not in terms of a or u.
This choice naturally arises, as we are interested in the changes that subsidization
creates. We can also infer from the function H (k) (Equation (1.72)) that the changes
in parameters a and u affect the shape of function q(k), but preserve the order of
inequalities in (1.70).
Third, the value of q is positive and takes values larger than one at the extremes.
The latter of these facts follows, as we have
q(0) = 1+ ua and q(k)
k−→∞
=
1
k2 + u
1
k + ua
1+ ua
1
k + u
−→
k−→∞ 1+
1
ua
.
Fourth, with factor q now at our disposal, we write
e(p l (θ)) = e +

1− 1
q

c1α0+ c0α1
c1c0
θ. (1.74)
We call the quantity
c1α0+ c0α1
c1c0
θ
the tax response. Whenever q = 1, the emissions are ﬁxed so the quantity instrument
cleans the entire tax response away. Interestingly, if q > 1, then 0< (1− 1q )< 1, and
we say that the emissions partially adapt. Partial adaptation means that the sectors
under the quantity system do not abate the entire response, but only a fraction of it.
As we explain above, this particular effect favors the quantity instrument because it
relaxes the problematically stringent quota a bit. If q < 1 instead, then the system
of non-sterilized permits induces perverse behavior. We call the response perverse
because a positive productivity shock θ induces a response that will yield e(p l (θ))<
e . In summary, whenever q > 1, the volume effect is favorable to the quantities, so
the non-sterilized permits induce non-perverse behavior.14
14We mentioned the possibility that one instrument may become unanimously preferred over an-
other. In the present context, this will occur, if
Var

e

p l

>Var (e (τ)) .
As
Var (e (τ))−Var e p l =Var (e (τ)) 1
q

2− 1
q

,
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Finally, we brieﬂy note about one speciﬁc outcome. It is related to the assumption
that α1 = α0 = α, or equivalently, to the assumption that a = 1. Referring to the
deﬁnition of the volume effect (Equation (1.69)), we may state that
Θ(τ, p l (θ)) 1⇔ q  1.
Now, by Equation (1.73),
q  1⇔ u(k − 1)2  0.
As far as u(k − 1)2 > 0, then q > 1, so Θ(τ, p l (θ))> 1. Consequently, we may state
that the volume effect invariably favors quantities.15
1.4.7 Prices Versus Quantities: Volume Effect and Cost Effect
Combined
Our framework produces a rich variety of cost and volume effects. This means that
we cannot give a general prediction of their joint effect at the outset. We say that
volume effect dominates if Θ(τ,p
l (θ))
ρ > 1. By Equations (1.58), (1.69), and (1.71),
Θ(τ, p l (θ))−ρ=

2
1+ uk2
1+ uak
1+ ua
1+ uk
− 1

−

1+ uk2
 
1+ ua2

(1+ uak)2

,
or, after some manipulation (see Appendix A.9),
Θ(τ, p l (θ))−ρ= 1+ uk
2
1+ uka
u
1+ uk
(a− k)

1− k
1+ uk2
+
1− a
1+ uak

. (1.75)
Clearly, the relative size between cost and volume effects is determined by the
interaction between factors (a− k), (1− k), and (1− a). We may show that there
then if q < 12 , the tax instrument becomes the unanimously preferred instrument. While this remains
a feasible state of the world, our calculations merely assess it as an atypically extreme outcome. For
example, wemay calculate that values of a greater than 34will induce the condition q(k)< 12 . The value
a = 34 in the two-industry model implies that the larger industry is 34 times larger when measured by
the emission content of its production. Moreover, as will become clear soon, if q(k)< 1, the regulator
invariably uses sterilized permits as the quantity instrument.
15In this particular context, equations in Rule (1.24) show how efﬁciency requires that l0 = l1. Con-
sequently, thresholds need not be zero but they have to be equal in the efﬁcient policy.
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indeed exists various feasible values of a and k that may produce either Θ(τ,p
l (θ))
ρ > 1
or Θ(τ,p
l (θ))
ρ < 1.
Our calculations imply that the relationship between the cost and volume effects
is independent of u but strongly depends on a. Furthermore, in terms of Figure
1.3, we can say (for a given u and a) that Θ(τ,p
l (θ))
ρ < 1 over the intermediate values
of k such that k < k < k. This may not be a surprise because (by Equation (1.70))
q < 1 over the domain k < k < k, so it holds that Θ(τ, p l (θ)) < 1 in there. As far
as ρ> 1, the result Θ(τ,p
l (θ))
ρ < 1 will follow. However, we cannot say that the result
Θ(τ,p l (θ))
ρ > 1 holds over the extreme values of k (where k < k or k > k). Rather, we
can say that the result Θ(τ,p
l (θ))
ρ > 1 holds over the region k < k or over the region
k > k . The alternative that eventually results will depend on the value of a.
1.4.8 Quantities Versus Quantities
Next, we generalize the discussion by allowing the regulator the freedom to choose
between the sterilized and the non-sterilized systems. This means a choice between
two quantity instruments. This analysis is novel. Previous studies have not explicitly
come across similar comparisons. Furthermore, the result has repercussions as well,
since it affects the (more traditional) choice between the prices and the quantities
(see next section).
We modify the measure in Equation (1.57) to yield
Δ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =Var (pL(θ))
1− v
2
ρ
(γ L)2

γ − Θ
ρ
d

, (1.76)
where it holds that Θ ≡ Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) and v ≡ v(p l (θ), pL(θ)). After some te-
dious but straightforward calculations,16 we have
v(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =
Var (p l (θ))
Var (pL(θ))
=

1
q
2
(1.77)
16The calculations are in Appendix A.10. The value of Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) is calculated in Part I, while
v(p l (θ), pL(θ)) is calculated in Part II.
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and
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =
q − 1
q + 1
. (1.78)
Interestingly, the non-sterilized system does not always provide a lower price vari-
ance than the sterilized system, but it does so whenever q > 1. We say that non-
sterilized permits induce non-perverse behavior over this area.17
The measure Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) differs from an earlier counterpart (Θ(τ, p l (θ)) in
Equation (1.69)), but it shares dependency on factor q . A striking difference con-
cerns factor v = v(p l (θ), pL(θ)), as it now takes values strictly greater than zero.
However, the size of factor v does not affect the choice of the instrument. To see
this, consider the size ofΔ under different values of q . First, if q = 1, then v = 1 and
Δ= 0. Both systems produce a similar variance in emissions and in prices at the crit-
ical points k = a and k = 1 (see Table 1.2), so the regulator is indifferent between the
instruments. Second, if q < 1, then Θ < 0 and v > 1, and it unanimously holds that
Δ < 0. In other words, the values q < 1 invariably imply a unanimous advantage
for the sterilized system. This result does not come as a surprise, as we have already
indicated that the values q < 1 induce perverse behavior in the non-sterilized system.
Finally, if q > 1, then 0< v < 1. The value of v does mitigate the magnitude of Δ,
but it does not affect the choice between the instruments.
Whenever q > 1, we have 0< Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ))< 1. Thus, over the non-perverse
region, the volume effect works for the non-sterilized system. Recall our earlier
discussion that the cost effect favors the instrument with the lower variance in price.
Here, over the non-perverse region (q > 1), it holds (by Equation (1.77)) that
Var (pL(θ)>Var (p l (θ)).
With the help of representation in Equation (1.76), the reader can convince herself
that the cost effect indeed favors the non-sterilized permits. In summary, whenever
q > 1, we have Θρ < 1, so the combined cost-volume effect is invariably favorable to
the non-sterilized permit system.
17We refer back to the deﬁnition of the volume effect in Equation (2.68). In the present context,
we have Var (e(J )) = Var (e(pL)) = 0. So, whenever Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) > 0, we must have Var (p l ) <
Var (pL).
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1.5 Instrument Choice under Uncertainty
1.5.1 Comparison of Three Instruments
So far, we have qualiﬁed two effects that the subsidization policy potentially trig-
gers: the cost effect and the volume effect. In our ﬁnal section, we incorporate these
effects into a full-scale study of the comparative advantage. We start by collecting
the various formulas in the ﬁrst column of Table 1.3.18 The second column displays
the corresponding indifferences between two instruments. The column is based on
the fact that a regulator is indifferent between instruments I and J ifΔ(I , J ) = 0. By
Equation (1.57), the indifference is satisﬁed whenever
m =
ρ
Θ
,
where m ≡ dγ . Remember that factor ρ is the cost effect and Θ ≡ Θ(I , J ) is the
volume effect. We have ρ ≥ 1 (Equation (1.58)), while various volume effects are
given by Equations (1.64), (1.69), and (1.78).
Table 1.3 Prices vs. Quantities
Δ(τ, pL(θ)) = ρVar (p
0(θ))
2γ 2

γ − Θ(τ,pL(θ)))ρ d

m = fτL(q ;ρ) = ρ
Δ(τ, p l (θ)) = ρvτ l
Var (p0(θ))
2γ 2

γ − Θ(τ,p l (θ)))ρ d

m = fτ l (q ;ρ) =
1
2q−1ρ
Δ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) = ρvlL
Var (p0(θ))
2γ 2

γ − Θ(p l (θ),pL(θ))ρ d

m = fl L(q ;ρ) =
q+1
q−1ρ
We illustrate the choice between the subsidized prices and quantities with the help
of Figure 1.4. The ﬁgure is drawn in the m, q–plane. Part (a) consists of different
areas and different borders between these areas. Points inside the borders represent a
strict preference for one instrument over the other two, while a point along the bor-
der implies indifference between two instruments. As for the shape of the different
areas, we have
18We have uniﬁed the notation by incorporating the common variance into the various formulas.
This uniﬁcation generates two multiplicative factors: vτ l and vlL. However, based on the earlier anal-
ysis, it should be clear that these factors are strictly positive in the comparisons to come.
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Figure 1.4 The Instrument Choice under Uncertainty (a); The Critical Value q* (b)
d fτ l (q ;ρ)
dq
=− 2ρ
(2q − 1)2 < 0, fτ l (q ;ρ)q−→1+ −→ ρ, , fτ l (q ;ρ)q−→∞ −→ 0
and
d fl L(q ;ρ)
dq
=− 2ρ
(q − 1)2 < 0, fl L(q ;ρ)q−→1+ −→∞, fl L(q ;ρ)q−→∞ −→ ρ.
Figure 1.4(a) displays these properties.
Figure 1.4(a) also shows how the changes in q will affect the instrument choice.
Especially note how we draw the ﬁgure for a given level of the cost effect. Further-
more, we will have a non-degenerate ﬁgure (like Figure 1.4(a)), as long as we study
inefﬁcient outcomes. That is, we must have k = a. If k = a, then efﬁciency prevails,
and the ﬁgure will collapse into a single vertical line at q = 1. We are then back in
a traditional analysis (Equation (1.63)). We have ρ= 1, so the quantity (the price) is
the choice as long as m > 1 (m < 1).
In the world of inefﬁciency, the size of q strongly affects the choice of the instru-
ments. Speciﬁcally, it is important whether q is smaller, greater, or equal to one.
First, consider the case in which q < 1. Based on the discussion above, we know
that the regulator always sterilizes in the permit regime. Then, when it comes to the
choice between sterilized permits and tax, the modiﬁed Weitzman rule Δ(τ, pL(θ))
should be conducted. In Figure 1.4(a), the sterilized permits are chosen if the point
lies in area ΩL, while a point in area Ωτ implies that the tax is chosen instead. The
border between these two areas is a set of indifferences, so the points at the border
satisfy m = ρ> 1.
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Second, at q = 1, the regulator is indifferent between the sterilized and the non-
sterilized permits. As for the choice between prices and quantities, the indifference
occurs again at m = ρ. If m < ρ, then the price is chosen, and if m > ρ, then the
quantity should be chosen. Note carefully that we must have k = 1 so that both
q = 1 and ρ> 1 will hold.
Third, we may have q > 1. For a given q in this area, we have mlL = fl L(q ;ρ)>
mτ l = fτ l (q ;ρ). Thus, the tax is the preferred choice over 0 ≤ m < mτ l , the non-
sterilized permits are preferred over mτ l < m < mlL, and the non-sterilized permits
are preferred over m > mlL. In Figure 1.4(a), for every given (ﬁnite) value of q > 1,
there exists three non-empty sets for which the tax, the sterilized permits, and the
non-sterilized permits are the preferred choices, respectively. Then, in addition to
the areas ΩL and Ωτ , we also have an area Ωl , where the system of non-sterilized
permits is the preferred choice.
We then state:
Proposition 1 Assume that the regulator is not forced to keep the permit endowment
at a ﬁxed level but it may adapt it to the entries and exits of the polluting ﬁrms. In this
case, two factors cover the inﬂuence of subsidization on comparative advantage. Factor
ρ ≥ 1 records a pure inefﬁciency effect that the subsidization of the polluting sectors
causes. Factor q > 0 determines the level of the volume effect, which is a result of the
non-ﬁxed quota. If we denote the relation between the slopes of the marginal damage
and beneﬁt functions dγ by m, we have the following result:
i. If q < 1, then only taxes and sterilized permits are used. Moreover, whenever
m  ρ, thenΔ(τ, pL(θ)) 0.
ii. If q > 1, then taxes and both sterilized and non-sterilized permits are applied.
If m < ρ, then only taxes and non-sterilized permits are used. If m > ρ, then
only sterilized and non-sterilized permits are used. (The case m = ρ applies only
asymptotically.) The indifferences Δ(τ, p l (θ)) = 0 and Δ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) = 0 are
given by decreasing functions m = fτ l (q ;ρ) and m = fl L(q ;ρ), respectively.
iii. If q = 1, then the regulator is indifferent between the sterilized permits and the
non-sterilized permits. Whenever m  ρ, then Δ(τ, pL(θ)) =Δ(τ, p l (θ))  0.
However, depending on the efﬁciency of the allocation, it either holds that ρ = 1
or ρ> 1.
The proof follows our earlier treatment. Furthermore, we state
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Proposition 2 If q < 1, then the advantage of taxes over quantities invariably increases
as compared to the case with efﬁcient emission allocation. If q > 1, then there exists
a q = q∗, so that if q < q∗, then the advantage of taxes over quantities increases; if
q > q∗, then the advantage of quantities over taxes increases in comparison to the case
with efﬁcient emission allocation.
Proof. We have drawn an auxiliary line at m = 1 in part (b) of Figure 1.4. This
line determines the choice between prices and quantities in an efﬁcient setting. In
such a setting, if m  1, then Δ(τ, p0(θ))  0 (see Equation (1.63)). Next, choose
an arbitrary q < 1. We now know with certainty that the comparative advantage
of prices has increased. This follows, as there now exists values of m that satisfy
m > 1, but the tax is the preferred instrument. Instead, if we choose an arbitrary
q > 1, the conclusion about the inﬂuence depends on the speciﬁc value that q takes.
In general, with low values of q , the comparative advantage of prices again increases.
This happens as long as q < q∗, where q∗ is determined by the condition fτ l (q∗;ρ) =
1. Thus, over the region q < q∗, there exist values of m that satisfy m > 1, but the tax
is the preferred instrument. Finally, if q > q∗, the effect of the endogenous permit
supply is strong enough so that the comparative advantage of the quantities increases.
Regarding the result in Proposition 2, Table 1.3 shows us that quantities gain an
additional advantage as long as Θ(τ, p l (θ)) > ρ. In other words, the inﬂuence of
uncertainty on instrument choice changes at the precise moment when the volume
effect exceeds the cost effect.
We want to link our results to an earlier paper by Montero ([46], [49]). We al-
readymentioned in the Introduction that the regulator in hismodel shares the nature
of our regulator as she loses her full authority in a discrete framework. In Mon-
tero [49], there is a governmental incapability to implement the regulation without
cheating. Interestingly, the incapability means endogenous emissions in the system
of tradable permits. The aggregate permit endowment as such is truly ﬁxed, but be-
cause of the cheating, the level of emissions exceeds the level of the permit holdings in
some ﬁrms. Therefore, the aggregate level of realized emissions exceeds the aggregate
cap. Montero ﬁnds that the endogeneity invariably favors the quantity instrument
in the instrument choice. Montero’s insight is then that the cheating induces the
quantity instrument beneﬁcially away from the stringent quota.19
19For this interpretation, a useful reference is the hybrid instrument ﬁrst introduced by Roberts and
96
The apparent similarity between our model and the Montero [49] model con-
cerns the endogeneity of tradable emissions. However, endogenous emissions in
permit trading are not inevitable in our model as the regulator can decide whether
to sterilize the permit ﬂuctuations (and the subsequent emission ﬂuctuations). More-
over, the non-ﬁxed emissions do not necessarily favor the quantity instrument in our
model as it does in Montero. Finally, while Montero’s model operates under inef-
ﬁciencies as well, it does not stress the distinction between the cost and the volume
effect. Regarding this last point, we emphasize that the volume effect requires inef-
ﬁciencies to operate; that is, the volume effect arises only in the market, where the
ﬁrms trade permits under inefﬁcient trading ratios.
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss the industry where α1 = α0 = α. We calculate above
that q > 1 in this particular context. Furthermore, we write Equation (1.75) now as
Θ(τ, p l (θ))−ρ= u 1+ uk
2
(1+ uk)2
(1− k)2
1+ uk2
> 0. (1.79)
Thus, in terms of Figure 1.4, we have q∗ = 1, so we do not have an area where q < 1.
In this type of polluting industry, the volume effect invariably dominates the cost
effect, so the relative position of the quantity instrument is improved.
1.5.2 Extension of the Basic Model
We derive a basic model above to understand better the consequences that inefﬁcient
substitution causes in a regulatory framework with discrete choices. In explaining
our model in the beginning of the analysis, we also discussed that we somewhat re-
strict the generality as we study only permit demanders in both polluting sectors.
Here, we expand the framework as we brieﬂy discuss a model that allows both per-
mit surpluses and deﬁcits in the polluting industry.
Our extension is based on the idea that ﬁrms may switch between different types
of technologies. Recall that we discussed in the Introduction a polluting sector (see
Figure (1)) where ﬁrms are divided into subgroups. This division can be explained by
the different technology modiﬁcations that the ﬁrms apply. We may think of an old
brown technology that has been applied well before the environmental regulation.
The technology is still working but it is becoming expensive because of regulation.
Spence [62].
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However, ﬁrms may modify the brown technology to be greener by switching to
less polluting inputs or by installing end-of-pipe puriﬁcation technologies.
Assume that ﬁrms will differ in their possibilities in modifying the brown tech-
nology. We refer to Section 0.2.2 in the Introduction as we write beneﬁts for unit λ
that uses technology j within sector i as
B ji (λ) = b
j
i +θ
j
i − c ji λ,
where i = 0,1 and j = b , g . Thus, if j = b , the unit applies the old brown technol-
ogy, while j = g implies that the unit has modiﬁed the technology to be greener.
Furthermore, to keep in line with this chapter, we assume that the policy applies
sector-speciﬁc subsidies. We then have l bi = l
g
i = li , so the proﬁt function becomes
Π ji (λ) = B
j
i (λ)− s (α ji − li ),
where i = 0,1 and j = b , g .
We discuss in Section 0.2.2 that there exist two cut-off units within the industries.
First, unit λbi satisﬁes
Πbi (λ
b
i ) = 0
in industry i . The unit is indifferent between producing and exiting the market.
Second, there is unit λgi in industry i that satisﬁes
Πgi (λ
g
i ) =Π
b
i (λ
g
i ).
In the present context, this unit is indifferent betweenmodifying the technology and
using the old technology without modiﬁcations. Solving the cut-off units gives us
λgi =
Δbi +Δθi − sΔαi
Δci
and
λbi =
b bi +θ
b
i − s (αbi − li )
c bi
,
where Δbi = b
g
i − b bi > 0, Δθi = θ gi − θbi , Δαi = αgi − αbi < 0, and i = 0,1.
Unit λgi does not depend on the value of li , so the subsidization does not affect
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the determination of it. This particular outcome follows as subsidies are paid to
producing units but they are not conditioned on the applied technology.
One may continue the analysis towards the determination of aggregate variables
and eventually towards the instrument choice. We consider here only the equilib-
riumpermit price under a non-sterilized system. ByEquation (1.15), the equilibrium
satisﬁes
l =
∫ λg0
0
(αg0 − l0)dλ+
∫ λb0
λg0
(αb0 − l0)dλ+
∫ λg1
0
(αg1 − l1)dλ+
∫ λb1
λg1
(αb1 − l1)dλ,
where l is the number of auctioned permits. The ﬁrst part in the right-hand side
corresponds to net demand in sector zero, while the second part is the sector one
net demand. Note, in particular, that this new framework allows the presence of
supramarginal thresholds (αgi − li < 0) as well. Consequently, green ﬁrms may end
up selling their excess permits in the permit markets. We may write the equilibrium
condition above in the alternative form
l = λg0Δα0+λ
b
0 (α
b
0 − l0)+λg1Δα1+λb1 (αb1 − l1),
so that after inserting the various cut-off units into the condition, the equilibrium
price is
p l =
1
γ l

(Δb0−Δθ0)
Δc0
Δα0+
Δb1−Δθ1
Δc1
Δα1

+
1
γ l

b b1 −θb1

c b0
(αb0 − l0)+
b b1 −θb1
c b1
(αb1 − l1)

− l
γ l
,
where
γ l =
Δc1Δc0c
b
0 c
b
1
c b0 c
b
1

Δc1Δα
2
0+Δc0Δα
2
1

+Δc1Δc0

c b1 (α
b
0 − l0)2+ c b0 (αb1 − l1)2
 .
The non-sterilized price p l is comparable to another non-sterilized price, name-
ly to the price in Equation (1.16). Note that these prices differ in the absence of
subsidization (l0 = l1 = 0) as well. They differ because the underlying production
technologies are different. Note also that the subsidization (either l0 > 0 or l1 > 0 or
both) enters the non-sterilized permit here in a similar fashion as it does earlier (see
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Equation (1.16)).
1.6 Concluding Remarks
The original Weitzman [84] model provides a fundamental instrument choice rule
by assuming an efﬁcient allocation of emissions among the regulated units. We
extend this framework by incorporating inefﬁcient subsidization into regulation.
Speciﬁcally, our model describes subsidization within regulation where the number
of regulated units ﬂuctuates. This creates a new challenge to environmental agency,
as the quantity instrument does not automatically ﬁx the level of emissions. Rather,
the agency has to choose whether it should ﬁx the level of emissions. In any case,
environmental tax remains an option in regulation, and we end up studying subsi-
dized instrument choices between prices and quantities. We show that the ﬂuctuat-
ing number of ﬁrms remains an issue in the instrument choice as long as subsidiza-
tion remains inefﬁcient.
Overall, inefﬁcient subsidization in our model produces two effects that together
may favor either prices or quantities in the instrument choice. The cost effect records
the effect that the given amount of emission is inefﬁciently distributed in the pollut-
ing industry. This effect invariably favors the price instrument. The volume effect
records the effect that tradable permits apply a non-ﬁxed quota. The volume effect is
interesting because the Weitzman model [84] demonstrates how ﬁxed emissions is a
major difﬁculty in quantity regulation. Our analysis shows that a non-ﬁxed quota is
not necessarily beneﬁcial to the quantity instrument. However, there certainly exist
regimes where a non-ﬁxed quota is beneﬁcial and the advantages may be so great that
the inefﬁcient subsidization favors the quantity instrument.
We assume that only discrete projects reduce aggregate emissions. In our main
analysis, the closure of a polluting unit is the only means to reduce emissions, so
these choices dominate the policy content. One implication of this assumption is
that every active polluting unit is a permit buyer in the permit market. This setting
is simple and provides us the basic intuition about the inefﬁcient substitution. In
the future, we should study settings that allow for both permit surpluses and deﬁcits
in the market. Towards that end, we discuss an augmented model at the end of the
chapter. This model is based on the assumption that some polluters ﬁnd technology
updating proﬁtable. We continue with the topic when we concentrate on invest-
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ments, investment subsidies, and reciprocal trade in Chapter 2.
Ourmodel emphasizes the role of auctions in the implementation of tradable per-
mits. Overall, we think that the presence of an additional permit reserve (distributed
in permit auctions) will provide stability in the permit markets. It also constitutes
a tool in permit policy. Our focus on auctions leaves the method of grandfathering
(free allocations) in the background. Grandfathering can be incorporated easily into
the framework: just set the number of auctioned permits to zero in the system of
non-sterilized permits. We have a few comments on this approach. First, as grand-
fathering is just a special case of subsidization in our framework, our ﬁndings of
subsidization apply to it also. Most notably, the emission allocation may become
inefﬁcient. Second, the system of sterilized permits becomes infeasible under grand-
fathering. If the environmental agency loses the auctions, it cannot sustain a ﬁxed
level of emissions in the policy. We also like to note that policies do not only regu-
late existing units but future units as well. As we discussed in the Introduction, the
existing permit policies hold a reserve of permits to be auctioned to new units.
Our environmental agency is a restricted regulator. This is because the agency
takes some policy variables exogenously given. One may argue that the agency can
in practice be even more restricted than ours. After all, the agency is able to deter-
mine the overall policy strictness, as it is free to choose the imputed expected unit
price of emissions in the regulation. We agree that this comment is relevant. Think-
ing politically, as we do in this chapter, it is not only the size of the payments but
also the scope of the aggregate policy that matter among the regulated units. If the
agency is not only restricted by the subsidization but also by policy strictness, we
may argue that the analysis about the instrument choices above remains valid. The
basic reason is that we have assumed that marginal beneﬁt and damage functions are
linear. Consequently, it does not matter whether we study instrument choice under
optimized or non-optimized policy, as long as both instruments implement the same
unit price of emissions and that marginal functions are linear in the neighborhood
of the unit price.
Finally, note that the subsidy Si (p) depends on the permit price. Consider for a
moment an alternative permit system in which the subsidy is ﬁxed and equals
Si (τ) = τ li , (1.80)
τ is the (ﬁxed) unit price, and li is an emission threshold. We have a kind of hybrid
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permit system. While it does ﬁx the subsidy payment, it does not ﬁx the unit price
of emissions. If both prices and quantities apply the same ﬁxed subsidy, we can show
that the comparison between instruments reverts to the original Weitzman rule. To
yield intuition in these cases, we rewrite the number of ﬁrms in sector i (Equations
(1.4) as
λ∗i =
bi +θi − sαi
ci
,
where bi = bi +τ li ,
s is a unit price of emissions, and i = 0,1. Consequently, bi is effectively a new
constant of the marginal beneﬁt function. Our analysis in the main text shows
how changes in the constant affect policy strictness but do not affect the instrument
choice. We note that the same logic will apply with any ﬁxed subsidy Si (s ) = Fi that
is paid both in quantity and price regimes. It affects overall policy strictness but does
not affect the instrument choice.
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2 IMPERFECT PARTICIPATION
2.1 Some Background
Tradable permits and environmental taxes are the key means or “instruments” for
implementing an environmental policy. In the literature, these two instruments are
referred to as market-based instruments, and their use is particularly powerful when
the number of regulated ﬁrms is large (see Stavins [74]). However, in some of the
actual policies, only a subset of the polluters is being regulated. This is apparent in
the sulfur dioxide emissions trading program in the United States (Ellerman [13]),
in the European Union Emissions Trading System (European Commission [17]),
or more generally, in the various ﬂexibility mechanisms applied for greenhouse gas
reduction (Newell, Pizer, & Raimi [52]). This raises questions about the reasons
behind partial participation. Admittedly, the less-than-full participation may not
always represent regulatory failure, rather it reﬂects regulatory judgment. For ex-
ample, in learning-by-doing, the gradual progress from easily regulated companies
towards more laborious cases may well yield savings in the implementation costs.
In our theoretical model of this chapter, less-than-full participation in a market-
based environmental program is a starting point, but we do not ﬁnd it socially desir-
able. We assume that issues of implementation and monitoring of the program do
not justify less-than-full participation. Rather, some institutional and political fac-
tors explain the scope of regulation. We think that in situations like these, voluntary
participation is a potential mechanism to increase the participation rate toward fuller
participation. With voluntary participation, the general idea is to offer a carrot to
a ﬁrm to participate. Speciﬁcally, with tradable permits, the program offers a free
permit handout to a ﬁrm that agrees to cover its emissions through licenses. With
environmental taxes, the agency offers a tax exemption to ﬁrms that voluntarily pay
the Pigouvian tax. Whether permit handouts or tax exemption are applied, they
should be attractive enough so that a ﬁrm voluntarily participates. Overall, we have
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two speciﬁc questions in mind. First, under what circumstances does voluntary par-
ticipation raise social welfare? Second, if voluntary participation indeed represents
sensible policy, does it affect the choice between market-based instruments, namely,
between tradable permits and pollution taxes?
The model used in this paper is valid if the polluting industry consists of several
polluters and they emit homogenous pollution. For example, in global warming,
numerous polluters emit the same pollution, so it meets the criteria of our model. In
fact, the topic of the implementation of carbon reductions has sparked considerable
debate (Keohane [31]). While the majority of participants in this debate admit that
there is a need for a global carbon price, the decision between using carbon tax or
tradable permits for this purpose is still under consideration. Our work thus aims to
supplement this discussion, not least because the global scope of the regulation is far
from perfect. Furthermore, with regard to the question of voluntary participation,
the interest has so far largely focused on expanding the system of tradable permits.1
We offer a broader view, as we treat pollution tax as an equal alternative in voluntary
participation.2
Our model is a modiﬁed version of the Montero [47]model. Montero draws ex-
perience from the sulfur dioxide emissions trading program, which is an example of
a phase-in emissions trading program. Most interestingly, the program includes the
so-called substitution provision, which allows producers unaffected in the ﬁrst phase
of the program to participate voluntarily. The ﬁrst phase of the program mandates
only a subset of the producers to participate, while the number of mandated units
increases in the second phase. Voluntary participants receive an initial allocation of
tradable permits and the status of an affected ﬁrm. Montero emphasizes the issues
of imperfect information and distributional concerns as well as the cost and beneﬁt
uncertainty in market design. More generally, distributional concerns bring us to
the political economy of policy-making (Farrow [18]). Pollution permits, like envi-
ronmental taxes, circulate revenues and create winners and losers. In particular, the
revenue generated by the initial allocation of permits chieﬂy determines the scope
of voluntary participation. Ultimately, as revenue generating possibilities become
limited, Montero [47] shows that the market design turns into a second-best design,
1Bento, Kanbur and Leard [5] provide a recent contribution.
2If we look at the current global carbon policy implementation, a single global carbon price has
not yet emerged. As discussed in Newell et al. [52] and in Carl and Fedor [6], the current situation
includes the simultaneous use of many different and separate carbon markets, national carbon tax
systems, governmental green subsidies, and various development projects.
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where voluntary participation becomes inefﬁcient because not every low-cost, non-
affected ﬁrm opts in at the regulatory optimum.
Our model depicts a phase-in emissions policy with a provision for voluntary
participation. Our model follows Montero [47], as distributional concerns make
voluntary participation inefﬁcient and cost uncertainty drives our central results.
However, the models differ in several respects. First, and most importantly, our
focus is not on the design of a phase-in emissions trading program but on the com-
parison between tradable permits and environmental taxes. We examine how these
two different regulatory instruments perform in the implementation of a voluntary
participation provision. Second, as the objectives differ so much, the cost uncer-
tainty manifests itself in different ways. Montero asks how the uncertainties affect
the permit allocation rules, whereas our work presents a comparative study of in-
strument choice under uncertainty (Weitzman [84]). Third, our model depicts how
investment possibilities in green environmental technology may enhance voluntary
participation. Our model does not explain why one of the sectors lies outside the
cap, but it gives a clear signal and rationale for enclosing some ﬁrms inside the cap
on a voluntary basis. Our model shows that voluntary participation provision sub-
sidizes the switch from old brown technology to new green technology.
Generally speaking, the voluntary participation provision beneﬁts environmen-
tal policy as a larger part of existing pollution becomes controlled. When it comes
to the implementation of these beneﬁts, the distributional properties between the
instruments can be uniﬁed. In our model, any expected net beneﬁts that a phase-in
emission trading program generates can be generated through a phase-in environ-
mental taxation program. However, our main result states that inefﬁcient voluntary
participation strongly affects the instrument choice. We arrive at this conclusion
by following the framework of Chapter 1, where the traditional Weitzman model
is extended to better understand the consequences of the imperfections in the mar-
ket.3 Consequently, we regard our current work as an application of this general
framework. According to the central story of our model, the implementation of
voluntary participation necessarily requires subsidies, and the presence of the subsi-
dies immediately leads to potential inefﬁciencies, which affect the instrument choice
in a fundamental manner.
We summarize our results into three concepts: the scope effect, the cost effect,
3Second-best implementation is inherently present in this chapter as it is in Montero [47].
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and the volume effect. The scope effect is a novel feature, arising solely due to im-
perfect participation. The scope effect depicts how the instrument choice is affected
when the scope of regulation expands from imperfect towards perfect participation.
We show that the scope effect will beneﬁt the quantity instrument. The cost effect
depicts the inﬂuence of inefﬁciency on the instrument choice. It records the fact that
the scope is increased by applying inefﬁcient subsides. We show that the cost effect
favors stable prices. Thus, a tax system with a ﬁxed price has an unambiguous advan-
tage. The volume effect records inﬂuences when the quantity rule does not ﬁx the
level of emissions. Like in Chapter 1, the basic framework here includes ﬂuctuations
in the number of polluting units. However, voluntary participation adds variability
in this section as the participation rate becomes a stochastic variable as well. In par-
ticular, if the participation rate is strictly lower than one, the agency faces a situation
in which it cannot stabilize the level of emissions by ﬁxing the number of permits.
This means that that the volume effect becomes an inevitable effect in the inefﬁcient
instrument choice.
A recent contribution by Meunier [43] considers instrument choice in a setting
where participation can be interpreted as imperfect. It studies a setting in which an
unregulated good pollutes alongside a regulated polluting good. However, the ap-
proach differs in many ways from ours. Most importantly, ﬁrms’ discrete decision
making is missing in Meunier [43]. This implies, for example, that his framework
omits the voluntary participation provision that is central in our work. Further-
more, our model has only one unpriced externality, whereas in Meunier [43] there
are more than one. Note that we will consider positive technological externalities as
a separate case in Chapter 3.
When studying instrument choice under uncertainty and imperfect participa-
tion, our workmixes three distinct branches of the literature: the long-run efﬁciency
properties of taxes and tradable permits (Farrow [18]; Pezzey [54]), voluntary par-
ticipation (Montero [47]), and inefﬁcient policy implementation under uncertainty
(Chapter 1; Montero [49]). In doing so, our work supports the line originating
from Weitzman [84]. Recent contributions that share our topics include those of
D’Amatoa and Dijkstra [10], Krysiak [34], Shinkuma and Sugeta [68], Krysiak and
Oberauner [33], and Mandell [40]. Krysiak and Oberauner [33] and Mandell [40]
study the design of a hybrid instrument (Roberts & Spence [62]). The hybrid na-
ture of these policies is indirectly present in our study, as the endogeneity of permit
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supply has the potential to soften the extreme nature of the quantity instrument.
D’Amato and Dijkstra [10], and Krysiak [34] study technical change toward green
investments, while Shinkuma and Sugeta [68] incorporate distributional concerns
and sequential decision-making into their analysis. Common to all of these studies
is the assumption that participation is perfect.
2.2 Regulation without Voluntary Participation
2.2.1 The Industry
This chapter presents studies of three policies that will give rise to three different
market structures. We will study markets with perfect participation, zero volun-
tary participation, and positive voluntary participation. In perfect participation,
regulation mandates that every unit in the polluting industry participate. As far as
we have two sectors, AandN , in the polluting industry, the policy regulates both sec-
tors. With zero voluntary participation, there is no voluntary program in progress.
In our framework, the policy regulates only sectorAwhile sector N stays completely
out of it. With positive voluntary participation, non-affected ﬁrms become regulated
voluntarily. The policy regulates every unit in sector A, while the policy may reg-
ulate units in sector N . To draw a difference between cases of perfect participation
and positive voluntary participation, we denote sector N by NA under positive vol-
untary participation. In summary, sectors A and N go along with the whole chapter
while the policy will change along the way.
The polluting industry consists of two distinct sectors. The sectors, denoted by
A and N , are heterogeneous in terms of emissions-generating technologies but they
emit homogenous pollution as a by-product of their production. The beneﬁt for
unit η of producing one commodity unit in sector A is
BA(η) = bA+θA− cAη, (2.1)
where bA and cA are positive constants while θA is a random variable. The ﬁrms
in sector N may choose between two production technologies to produce the com-
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modity unit. The beneﬁt for unit λ after choosing technology i is
Bi (λ) = bi +θi − ciλ, (2.2)
where i = 0,1. Again, bi and ci are positive constants while θi is a technology-
speciﬁc random shock. We assume that Δb ≡ b1 − b0 > 0 and Δc ≡ c1 − c0 > 0.
Furthermore, we will denoteΔθ≡ θ0−θ1.
We assume that uncertainty contains both an aggregate and an idiosyncratic part.
The total shock then consists of a technology-speciﬁc shock (ε j ) and an economy-
wide shock (ε). Every industry in the economy shares the economy-wide shock.
The uncertainty takes an additive form, which means that
θ j =
ε+ ε j
2
,
where j = 0,1,A. In particular,
Δθ=
ε0− ε1
2
,
so the variableΔθ does not include the aggregate shock. We further assume that the
variables ε and ε j are identically and independently distributed random variables, so
E(ε) = E(ε j ) = 0 andVar (ε) =Var (ε j ) = σ
2, j = 0,1,A. Then, E(θA) = E(Δθ) =
0 and Var (θA) =Var (Δθ) = σ
2.
We denote the unit price of emissions by s . It is part of the environmental pay-
ment function Pj (s ,α j , l j ). Speciﬁcally, we have
Pj (s ;α j , l j ) = s (α j − l j ),
where j = 0,1,A. Parameter α j is the level of emissions that a ﬁrm produces if
it utilizes technology j , while l j is a technology-speciﬁc threshold level set by the
regulator. Then, the proﬁt for unit η is
ΠA(η) = BA(η)− PA(s ;αA, lA) = BA(η)− s (αA− lA),
while the proﬁt for unit λ using technology i is
Πi (λ) = Bi (λ)− Pi (s ;αi , li ) = Bi (λ)− s (αi − li ), (2.3)
where i = 0,1. Every parameter in Pj (s ;α j , l j ) is a non-negative ﬁgure. Thus,
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whenever Pj > 0, then l j < α j , and Pj is effectively a fee. Conversely, if Pj < 0,
then, l j > α j , and Pj is a compensation
4 to a unit that utilizes technology j , where
j = 0,1,A.
Within the sectors, there exist cut-off units that are indifferent between two op-
tions. Speciﬁcally, the cut-off unit η0A has B(η
0
A) = 0, so
η0A=
bA+θA
cA
. (2.4)
The cut-off unit η0A emerges if emissions are not regulated at all in sector A. Con-
versely, the cut-off unit ηA has
ΠA(ηA) = 0, (2.5)
so
ηA=
bA+θA− s (αA− lA)
cA
. (2.6)
Clearly, if lA < αA, then we have ηA < η
0
A. We take sector A as an incumbent in-
dustry. After implementation of the regulation, the units [0,ηA] stay in the market,
while the most unproductive units [ηA,η
0
A] exit the industry due to the rising cost
burden.
We assume that the size of sector N is ﬁxed and equals λ00. Furthermore, it holds
that
Π0(λ
0
0)> 0.
The units in sector N choose between technologies zero and one. We assume that
Δα≡ α0−α1 > 0, so the emission level of one commodity unit production is lower
using technology one than using technology zero. Hence, the cut-off unit λ1 satisﬁes
Π0(λ1) =Π1(λ1) ⇐⇒ (2.7)
b0+θ0− c0λ1− s (α0− l0) = b1+θ1− c1λ1− s (α1− l1),
and, in particular, if s = 0 (no regulation), then
4The terms supramarginal and inframarginal are used in the literature (Pezzey [54]). If l j < α j ,
then the threshold is inframarginal, and if l j > α j , then the threshold is supramarginal.
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Π0(λ
0
1) =Π1(λ
0
1) ⇐⇒ b0+θ0− c0λ01 = b1+θ1− c1λ01.
We will denoteΔl ≡ l0− l1, so we have
λ01 =
Δb −Δθ
Δc
(2.8)
and
λ1 =
Δb −Δθ+ s (Δα−Δl )
Δc
. (2.9)
If the regulation target is to drive the economy toward greener production, then
we clearly should have λ1 > λ
0
1. If this is the case, then the units [0,λ1] use green
technology while the units [λ1,λ
0
0] use polluting brown technology. As compared
to the choices without regulation, the units

λ01,λ1

switch from brown to green
technology. It may also be the case that λ01 = 0. This means that green technology
becomes economically viable only because of the environmental regulation.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the industry. The line Bj (λ) corresponds to the technology
j business-as-usual proﬁts, while the line Π j (λ) involves the inﬂuence of the regu-
lation, j = 0,1,A. In drawing the sectors, we use solid lines to describe beneﬁts
and non-solid lines to describe ﬁnal proﬁts (including payments). In particular, note
how our assumptions about Δb and Δc determine the structure of sector N . The
assumptions mean in practice that ﬁrms apply green technology at the low end of
the distribution. Figure 2.1(b) also shows how the utilization of green technology
increases in sector N as a result of the regulation. In general, by Equations (2.8) and
(2.9),
λ1−λ01 = s (Δα−Δl ) ,
so the utilization of green technology increases in sector N as long as
Δα−Δl > 0. (2.10)
This condition is equivalent to
α0− l0 > α1− l1. (2.11)
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Figure 2.1 The Impact of Regulation. Various cut-off values are determined in sector A (a) and in sector
N (b).
Remember that α0 > α1, so that technology zero is the dirty brown technology.
Consequently, Condition (2.11) says that the agency should subsidize green technol-
ogy more than brown technology. In Figure 2.1(b), the regulation shifts the proﬁt
lines inward, so we have l j < α j , where j = 0,1. On the other hand, if l0 < α0
and l1 > α1, the regulation shifts the proﬁt line Π0(λ) inward and the proﬁt line
Π1(λ) outward, and the Condition (2.11) automatically holds. Overall, the condi-
tion Δα−Δl > 0 is a sensible minimum target of the policy, as it induces strictly
positive emission reductions in sector N .
Finally, by Figure 2.1(a), we see how η0A > ηA, so the regulation induces some
low-proﬁt ﬁrms to exit from sector A. By Equation (2.6), this happens as long as
αA− lA> 0.
2.2.2 Perfect Participation
A public agency regulates the polluting industry because pollution creates harm and
no voluntary bargain between the emitters and the sufferers has thus far been suc-
cessful. The instrument used in regulation is either that of environmental taxation
or a system of tradable permits. Furthermore, an important feature in the frame-
work is the leader–follower set-up. Both the regulatory agency and the ﬁrms face
the same uncertainty. The crux of the matter is that the agency sets the regulatory
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parameters before everyone learns of the uncertainty, and the agency is unable to
re-optimize subsequently. Firms make all their choices only after the regulation is
ﬁxed and after everyone has learned of the uncertainty.
We ﬁrst study the standard model of regulation, namely, the case in which partic-
ipation is perfect. We assumed above that technology-speciﬁc pollution intensities
are different between the technologies. If we denote the emissions in sector A and N
by eA and eN , respectively, then
eA=
∫ ηA
0
αAdλ= αAηA (2.12)
and
eN =
∫ λ1
0
α1dλ+
∫ λ00
λ1
α0dλ= α0λ
0
0−Δαλ1. (2.13)
We take the pollution as homogenous in nature, so the total level of pollution
e = eA+ eN (2.14)
will be of interest. We assume that quadratic damage function reﬂects the harm, so
the damage is
D(e) =
d
2
e2, (2.15)
where d > 0.5 Furthermore, given the industry as speciﬁed above, we write the
beneﬁts as
B =
∫ ηA
0
BA(λ)dλ+
∫ λ1
0
B1(λ)dλ+
∫ λ00
λ1
B0(λ)dλ. (2.16)
Alternatively, we can represent the beneﬁts in terms of emissions. In this case, we
denote the beneﬁts by B(e) and observe that this function is labeled as an abatement
cost function in the literature. It can be shown that the abatement cost function is
quadratic here and that
γ =
Δc cA
cA (Δα)
2+Δcα2A
(2.17)
5We assume the damage function is known with certainty. For more about this assumption, see
Chapter 1, footnote 8.
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is the slope of themarginal abatement function.6 Finally, for notational convenience,
we write
BU =
∫ η0A
0
BA(λ)dλ+
∫ λ01
0
B1(λ)dλ+
∫ λ00
λ01
B0(λ)dλ (2.18)
and
U =
∫ η0A
0
αAdλ
∫ λ01
0
α1dλ+
∫ λ00
λ01
α0dλ. (2.19)
We call these the counterfactual beneﬁts and counterfactual emissions, respectively.
We introduce an “unrestricted" agency in this opening section. The entire pol-
luting industry participates in the regulation, and the policy does not apply sub-
sidies. Consequently, following the discussion in Chapter 1, the threshold policy
lA = l0 = l1 = 0 induces efﬁcient emission allocation.
7 The regulator sets the strict-
ness of the policy by choosing a proper tax rate. By Equations (B.1) and (B.2) in
Appendix B.1, the beneﬁts and emissions can be written as a function of the unit
price s as
B(s ) = BU − 12γ s
2
and
e(s ) = U − 1
γ
s ,
where BU and U are deﬁned in Equations (2.18) and (2.19), respectively. Denote the
optimal rate by τ, so the necessary ﬁrst-order condition requires that
E
dB
dτ
− dD
de
d e
dτ

= 0,
or, that
τ = dE [e] . (2.20)
The derived policy rule is a standard one. It equates the price of the emissions to the
6We derived an abatement cost function earlier in Section 1.3.1.
7Chapter 1 also shows that an efﬁcient allocation does not necessarily require zero subsidies. We
will discuss this issue later in this chapter.
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expected level of marginal damage.
If the agency implements the permit policy, it ﬁxes ﬁrst the number of pollution
permits at level l and then auctions them off. At market equilibrium, the demand
and supply of permits are equal, so
eA+ eN = l .
The equilibrium permit price8 that satisﬁes this condition is
p = p¯ + γ

αA
cA
θA+
Δα
Δc
Δθ

. (2.21)
Especially note how a green industrial shock (Δθ < 0) moves the permit price down.
As far as the strictness of the permit policy is concerned, it is determined as in Chap-
ter 1 (Section 1.3.2.2). The expected price p¯ is taken as the choice variable, and it
should be set to satisfy
p¯ = τ.
The number of permits l is adapted to meet this price.
The other choice concerns the instrument in the regulation. Different instru-
ments will induce different responses but there is a certain kind of symmetry be-
tween these responses. On one hand, the price is variable with tradable permits
(Equation (2.21)), while in the tax system, the price is truly ﬁxed. On the other
hand, as
e(τ) = l +
αA
cA
θA+
Δα
Δc
Δθ,
the quantity is variable with taxes, while in the permit system, the quantity is ﬁxed
and equal to l . Most importantly, even though it holds that E(p) = τ and E(e(τ)) =
l , the expected welfares between instruments may differ.
Let us deﬁne the comparative advantage between instrument I and J as
Δ(I , J ) = E [(B(I )−D(e(I )))− (B(J )−D(e(J )))] . (2.22)
In our model,
8A note about the notation: We use a bar to indicate expected value.
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EB(s ) = EBU − 12γ E

s2

,
ED(e(τ)) =
d
2
l 2+
d
2
E

αA
cA
θA+
Δα
Δc
Δθ
2
,
and
D(e(p)) =
d
2
l 2.
Based on these, it is easy to calculate that
Δ(τ, p) =
1
2
Var (p)
γ 2
(γ − d ) . (2.23)
The comparison follows the so-called Weitzman principle. It holds that the slopes
of the marginal beneﬁt γ and damage d functions solely determine the choice be-
tween the price (environmental tax) and the quantity (tradable permits). Thus, the
choice between the instruments is immune to the size of the uncertainty. Note also
that the comparison yields the standard Weitzman result, despite the assumed tech-
nology. The standard result in instrument choice holds, even though we assume
technology transitions in sector N .9 Note also that the assumption of zero subsi-
dies is important. In Chapter 1, we study a policy of perfect participation that uses
positive thresholds. We ﬁnd that this feature of the policy may strongly inﬂuence
the comparative advantage Δ(τ, p). We will return to this issue toward the end of
this chapter after we have studied imperfect participation ﬁrst.
2.2.3 Imperfect Participation
We start our study of imperfect participation by studying a policy without volun-
tary provision. The policy regulates only sector A, and the units in sector N stay
completely outside of the regulation. The beneﬁts are
Ba =
∫ ηA
0
BA(λ)dλ+
∫ λ01
0
B1(λ)dλ+
∫ λ00
λ01
B0(λ)dλ
9In other words, the result holds, even if the marginal beneﬁt function is only piece-wise linear in
terms of the units (see Figure 2.1(b)).
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while the emissions equal
ea =
∫ ηA
0
αAdλ+
∫ λ01
0
α1dλ+
∫ λ00
λ01
α0dλ.
We deﬁne units ηA, λ
0
1, and λ
0
0 in Section 2.2.1. As for the aggregate beneﬁts of
emissions, we write
B(eA, eN ) = BA(eA)+BN (eN ).
Speciﬁcally,
d 2BA(eA)
d e2A
= γa ,
where
γa =
cA
α2A
. (2.24)
The details of the regulation resemble those of the perfect participation. Con-
sequently, the regulator either ﬁxes the tax rate τa or the number of the auctioned
permits la . According to Equations (B.7) and (B.8) in Appendix B.1, the beneﬁts and
the emissions as a function of the price level can be written as
B(sa) = BU − s
2
a
2γa
and
e(τa) = U − 1γa sa ,
where BU and U are deﬁned in Equations (2.18) and (2.19), respectively. At the
optimum, the tax rate (and the expected price level p¯a) satisﬁes
τa = dE [e(τa)] , (2.25)
so, in terms of the parameters of the model, we have
τa =
γad
γa + d
EU . (2.26)
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Furthermore, we have
τa > τ and la > l
(see Appendix B.2, Part I), where τ and l are the policy choices with perfect partic-
ipation. We note that we use factors
u ≡ cA
Δc
, a ≡ Δα
αA
, (2.27)
and
n = 1+ ua2 (2.28)
in Appendix B.2. These factors are important as we will apply them repeatedly in
the forthcoming sections.
Let us consider the policy choice more closely for a moment. First, note that
(by assumption) the restricted regulator takes the scope of an environmental policy
as given. Had she the opportunity to choose the scope, the regulator would prefer
perfect participation (Appendix B.2, Part II). Second, the imperfection alters the na-
ture of the abatement cost function. The function is only partial in nature, as some
proﬁtable abatement projects remain outside the set of plausible projects. Third, the
policy calculations reﬂect the imperfect participation. The agency can only inﬂu-
ence the emissions of sector A, so the emissions eN merely enter the calculations as
an exogenously given entity. Regarding the strictness of the policies, the shift in the
marginal abatement cost function explains the observed differences.10 However, the
traditional ﬁrst-best externality pricing rule E sa = dE [e(sa)] holds even if partici-
pation is not perfect.
In the permit markets, the supply of permits equals the demand, or, equivalently,
eA= la , (2.29)
so the equilibrium price satisﬁes
pa = τa + γa
αA
cA
θA. (2.30)
10In terms of emission reductions, the exclusion of sector N effectively means that the marginal
abatement curve shifts upward at every level of emission reduction (see Figure 1 in Montero [47]). As
marginal damages are increasing, the price and level of regulated emissions are increasing as well.
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As for the aggregate emissions, we have
e(pa) = la + eN , (2.31)
so
e(pa) = la + E [eN ]− ΔαΔc Δθ.
Sector N remains outside the cap, so the emissions are uncertain with tradable per-
mits. As for the tax policy, we have emissions equal to
e(τa) = la + E [eN ]+
αA
cA
θA− ΔαΔc Δθ.
We deﬁne the comparative advantageΔ in Equation (2.22). We enter the various
prices and quantities from above into this formula and write
Δ(τa , pa) =
1
2
Var (pa)
γ 2a
(γa − d ) . (2.32)
In principle, less-than-full participation in the environmental program maintains the
basic rule of instrument choice.11 If the slope of the (effective) marginal beneﬁt func-
tion exceeds the slope of the marginal damage function, then the price instrument
should be chosen. We can also show that, as long as the permits are auctioned off,
the selection of the regulated sector does not matter; that is, if sector N is the sole
regulated industry, the rule in Equation (2.32) remains intact.
Fundamentally, we are interested in studying changes between different compar-
ative advantages. In the present case, we seek differences between perfect and im-
perfect participation. In theory, we have two potential directions for change. The
participation in regulation may turn from partial towards perfect or vice versa. The
inﬂuence in instrument choice depends on the direction of the change: The quantity
instrument will be favored as the regulatory regime shifts from imperfect to perfect
participation. Conversely, the imperfection favors the price instrument.
The reason for these changes lies on the beneﬁt side. As we are mainly interested
in regulation that increases participation in regulation, we brieﬂy discuss this case
11The analysis rules out any covariance between the random variables by assumption. Interestingly,
the presence of covariance may induce differences between perfect and imperfect participation. In fact,
regarding instrument choice, Weitzman [84] discusses the inﬂuence of covariance. See also Stavins [73]
and Meunier [43].
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here. If a voluntary provision succeeds in attracting new cost-saving projects into
regulation, it will result in lower total and marginal cost curves. Following the basic
principles of instrument choice, the less steep marginal cost curve means that more
weight will be given to the slope of marginal damage d . In other words, as the rela-
tive importance of pollution damages increases, the relative importance of quantity
control increases. More formally, it is straightforward to show that Equations (2.17),
(2.24), and (2.28) together yield
γa = γn,
where (by Equation (2.28)) n > 1, so γa > γ . So, we may rewrite the comparative
measure under perfect participation (Equation (2.23)) as
Δ(τ, p) =
Z
2
Var (pa)
γ 2a
(γa − nd ) , (2.33)
where
Z =
1+ (ua)2
1+ ua2
> 0. (2.34)
The multiplier n > 1 is the additional weight given to the slope of the marginal dam-
age.12 For example, let γa = d , so (by Equation (2.32)) it holds that Δ(τa , pa) = 0.
The regulator is indifferent between prices and quantities under imperfect partic-
ipation. If participation becomes perfect (and the policy choices become optimal
alongside it), then (by Equation (2.33)) Δ(τ, p) < 0 and the quantities become the
preferred choice. We call the multiplier n the scope effect in instrument choice.13
12The size of factor Z is irrelevant for instrument choice, as it only magniﬁes the size of the measure
Δ.
13It also holds that
Δ(τa , pa) =
1
2
1
Z
Var (p)
γ 2
(γn− d ) .
That is, the price instrument will be favored as the regulatory regime shifts from perfect to imperfect
participation.
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2.3 Regulation with Voluntary Participation
2.3.1 The Industry
Above, we studied policy that regulates only a fraction of the polluting ﬁrms. The
agency took this state as exogenously given. In the following sections, the agency
will change the policy target: As the mandatory approach does not turn out to be
successful in sector N , then the agency will try the voluntary approach instead.14
In terms of environmental payments, the environmental fees do not work in sector
N . Thus, in the implementation of the voluntary provision, the agency must apply
subsidies in sector N instead.
The non-affected sector N is denoted by NA as some units in sector N become
involved in regulation. The polluting industry then consists of two distinct sectors,
the affected sector A and the non-affected sector NA, and the agency takes this dis-
tinction as a given. As mentioned earlier, ﬁrms in the affected sector face mandatory
environmental regulation, while ﬁrms in the non-affected sector do not. The par-
ticipation is then imperfect. However, voluntary participation is now plausible, so
ﬁrms in sector NA may voluntarily become affected.
Participation is not a random process but is based on economic incentives. A unit
in sector NA decides whether to participate and, if it participates, whether to switch
to green technology. The functions Bi (λ) and Πi (λ) (in Equations (2.2) and (2.3))
above describe the various consequences. More speciﬁcally, with respect to partici-
pation, it must hold that Πi (λ)≥ Bj (λ) at least for one technology i , where j = 0,1.
These conditions simply state that the participation should raise the current proﬁts.
With respect to the switch in technology, the conditionΠ1(λ)≥Π0(λ) should apply.
To be proﬁtable, voluntary participation invariably requires that Pi ≤ 0, i = 0,1.
To satisfy this, the policy must have li ≥ αi . Voluntary participation requires that
the policy employs supramarginal thresholds. However, it does not necessarily fol-
low that every ﬁrm will participate, nor that every ﬁrm will use the same technol-
ogy in sector NA. Within this diversity of possibilities, Table 2.1 collects the various
participation regimes and the corresponding conditions for determining the cut-off
units ηA and λ1. Especially note how the three regimes depend on the sizes of thresh-
14This view naturally presupposes that society beneﬁts from increasing participation. Wewill return
soon to this issue below.
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Table 2.1 The Responses
l1 ≥ α1, l0 ≥ α0
Brown and green participate⎧⎨⎩ ΠA(ηA) = 0Π1(λ1) =Π0(λ1)⎧⎨⎩ BA(ηA) = s (αA− lA)B0(λ1)−B1(λ1) = s (Δα−Δl )
l1 ≥ α1 and l0 < α0
Only green participates⎧⎨⎩ ΠA(ηA) = 0Π1(λ1) = B0(λ1)⎧⎨⎩ BA(ηA) = s (αA− lA)B0(λ1)−B1(λ1) = s (l1−α1)
l1 < α1 and l0 ≥ α0
Only brown participates⎧⎨⎩ ΠA(ηA) = 0Π0(λ1) = B1(λ1)⎧⎨⎩ BA(ηA) = s (αA− lA)B0(λ1)−B1(λ1) = s (l0−α0)
olds, so they will depend on the details of subsidization. Note also that in our analy-
sis below, the environmental agency does not determine the subsidization but rather
takes it as exogenously given. Environmental agency is a restricted agency, so it does
not choose the regime but rather takes the regime as given.
For example, consider the policy in the middle of Table 2.1, that is, the policy
where only green technology will participate. Based on the low end of the middle
section, the cut-off units are
ηA=
bA+θA− s (αA− lA)
cA
and λ1 =
Δb −Δθ+ s (l1−α1)
Δc
. (2.35)
Figure 2.2 illustrates the polluting industry. In Figure 2.2(b), the units [0,λ1] par-
ticipate in the voluntary program and use green technology, while the units [λ1,λ
0
0]
do not participate and continue to use polluting brown technology. It holds that
0 < λ1 < λ
0
0, so technologies zero and one exist side by side at the industry equilib-
rium. Note also that the units

λ01,λ1

switch from brown to green technology as a
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Figure 2.2 Voluntary Participation. A case in which only green technology participates. Various cut-off
values are determined in sector A (a) and in sector NA (b).
result of the voluntary provision.
2.3.2 Efﬁcient Allocation
A conspicuous new feature in the analysis of imperfect participation is the use of
subsidies. The use of supramarginal thresholds becomes a necessity when the agency
pursues greater participation. Let us discuss the fundamental changes in social wel-
fare that voluntary participation creates. We start with the aggregate beneﬁts across
technologies. For this purpose, we set the stochastic variables equal to zero for a
moment and write the optimization problem under certainty as
max
ηA,λ1
∫ ηA
0
BA(λ)dλ+
∫ λ1
0
B1(λ)dλ+
∫ λ00
λ1
B0(λ)dλ
s .t . e = αAηA+α0λ
0
0−Δαλ1.
If we denote the Lagrange multiplier by μ, the solution requires that⎧⎨⎩ BA(ηA)−μαA= 0B1(λ1)−B0(λ1)+μΔα= 0 . (2.36)
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Consequently, the satisfaction of these rules guarantees an efﬁcient emission alloca-
tion. Furthermore, if we enter the efﬁcient units back to the objective function, we
have an abatement cost function B(e).
Efﬁcient implementation means that we specify the values lA, l0 and l1 in such a
way that they will lead the economy towards an efﬁcient allocation of emissions. In
this exercise, we need technology-speciﬁc response functions across industries. These
functions are calculated in the lower parts of the cells in Table 2.1. Consequently,
by incorporating efﬁcient thresholds lA, l0 and l1 into these reaction functions, an
efﬁcient allocation of emissions (implied by Equations (2.36)) follows.
First, assume that both technologies will participate. Clearly, the efﬁciency will
follow if
lA
αA
=
Δl
Δα
. (2.37)
For example, assume that the units in the affected sector have to purchase every single
permit from the auction. Then lA = 0 and the efﬁciency will follow as long as l0 =
l1.
15 More generally, by letting lA > 0, the efﬁcient allocation requires that Δl >
0. It requires that the agency subsidize brown technology users more heavily than
green polluters. Furthermore, the more ﬁrms in sectors A are subsidized, the more
brown technology users should be subsidized (in relative terms). These efﬁciency
arguments may well raise some distributional and political debates. In particular, if
the size of the threshold lA is non-negotiable, the efﬁcient subsidization might be
considered as too extreme a solution and will be rejected. Nevertheless, the rule in
Equation (2.37) is an example of the relative incentives that we already discussed in
Chapter 1 within a two-sector model.16
In the second case of interest, only green technology participates (middle part in
Table 2.1).17 An efﬁcient implementation means that an equality
αA− lA
αA
=
l1−α1
Δα
(2.38)
should hold. In particular, if lA = 0, then efﬁciency requires that l1 = a0. More
15Furthermore, it must hold that l0(= l1)≥ α0.
16It can be shown that the rule in Equation (2.37) also applies in the case of perfect participation. In
that context, the principle that polluters pay (lA= l0 = l1 = 0) holds as a speciﬁc efﬁcient solution.
17It holds that l0 < α0 under this particular subsidization regime. Consequently, the brown units
do not participate. The participation then solves Π1(λ) = B1(λ).
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generally, the efﬁcient implementation implies (utilize Equations (2.35)) that
λ1 =
Δb + sΔα

1− lAαA

Δc
.
Even though we subsidize brown production in the affected sector (lA> 0), we have
λ1 > λ
0
1, so the efﬁciency always induces an increase in the use of green technol-
ogy.18 Note also that, if lA > 0, then the efﬁcient allocation means that l1 < a0.
Whenever ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidization in the affected sector increases, the efﬁcient
solution requires that ﬁrm-speciﬁc subsidization of the voluntary participants de-
crease. Furthermore, note that an efﬁcient solution does not automatically require
perfect participation. It is quite possible that λ1 < λ
0
0, so that not every ﬁrm volun-
tarily participates in an efﬁcient solution.
In the third and ﬁnal case, the policy induces only brown technology units to
participate (bottom part in Table 2.1). We see that efﬁcient allocation will not hap-
pen. In fact, efﬁciency calls for the brown ﬁrms in sector N to turn towards greener
production, so the mere subsidization of brown production cannot implement this
goal.
2.3.3 Restricted Choice
We do not take efﬁcient implementation as granted. Rather, we will incorporate
into analysis the same assumption as in Chapter 1. The environmental agency does
not determine the thresholds lA, l0, and l1. We assume that the thresholds do not
necessarily reﬂect the efﬁciency view.
Wewill consider the ﬁrst and second cases discussed above. These policies are able
(at least in principle) to implement efﬁciency. We do not pursue the most general
representation but rather somewhat restrict the set of plausible thresholds. In both
cases, we will set lA = 0 from the outset, so the ﬁrms in sector A buy every single
license they use, or pay the tax for every emission unit that they produce. Relaxing
the assumption lA= 0 is discussed at the end of the chapter.
The ﬁrst case questions the outcome l0 > α0, so it must hold that l0 ≤ α0 instead.
The actual policy cannot subsidize brown production. This implies that a voluntary
participant never uses brown technology. In fact, we do not sustain a positive l0 at
18We are interested in solutions in which the environmental regulation causes the level of aggregate
emissions to decrease. Then, it must be the case that lA< αA.
124
all, so we take l0 = 0 instead. Regarding green production, we do not ﬁx a certain
value but assume a continuum of plausible values. However, we set l1− α1 ≥ 0, so
some ﬁrms do participate and reduce emissions upon participation.19
In the second case, we reject the assumption l0 ≤ α0 and choose l0 > α0 instead.
This means that the entire brown industry will participate. This may sound like a
useless and even harmful policy especially in situations where the subsidization of
ﬁrms is difﬁcult. After all, subsidization of brown technology as such induces no
pollution reductions that are the main purpose of the voluntary provisions. One
beneﬁcial consequence of the policy is that it may enclose the entire sector NA in-
side the regulation. We show how this feature will have a substantial effect on the
regulatory outcome. However, we require that the voluntary participation provi-
sion has to induce some ﬁrms to switch from brown to green technology. Referring
to our earlier discussion (see especially Condition (2.11)), this policy requires that
Δα−Δl ≥ 0.
The cut-off units then become
ηAm =
bA+θA− smαA
cA
and λ1m =
Δb −Δθ+ smϕm
Δc
, (2.39)
where m = 1,2. The subscript m refers to different implementations: either only
green technology participates (m = 1) or both green and brown technologies partic-
ipate (m = 2). Speciﬁcally,
ϕ1 = l1−α1 ≥ 0 (2.40)
and
ϕ2 ≡Δα−Δl ≥ 0. (2.41)
The factor ϕ1 applies whenever only green participates, while ϕ2 applies if both col-
ors participate. The non-negativity ofϕ1 andϕ2 follows from our assumption above.
The positive values imply that voluntary provision induces positive emission reduc-
tions.
19We have assumed that every ﬁrm that utilizes technology one will be subsidized. This assumption
simpliﬁes the presentation without affecting the quality of our main results.
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2.3.4 Instrument Design
2.3.4.1 Second-Best Policy
The restricted regulator now takes the voluntary participation era and the (possi-
bly inefﬁcient) threshold distribution (lA, l0, l1) as given and chooses the strictness
of the policy and the instrument to be applied. In this approach, we incorporate the
cut-offs (Equations (2.39)) into the beneﬁts (Equation (2.16)) and into the damages
(Equations (2.12)−(2.15)), and differentiate the expected social welfare with respect
to the tax rate τm . We do this in Appendix B.1 (part Voluntary Participation, Equa-
tion (B.13)). It holds that
τm =
dγ lmγ
L
m
γ Lm
2+ dγ lm EU , (2.42)
where
γ lm =
cAΔc
Δcα2A+ cA (ϕm)
2 , (2.43)
γ Lm =
cAΔc
Δc(αA)2+ cAΔαϕm
, (2.44)
EU is the expected counterfactual, and m = 1,2. The factors γ lm and γ
L
m turn out to
be slope coefﬁcients in certain marginal beneﬁt functions.
We present three points about efﬁcient solutions. These are:
i. In an efﬁcient solution, γ lm = γ
L
m , m = 1,2.
ii. If the solution is efﬁcient, we have τ1 = τ2.
iii. The rule τm = dE [e(τm)] (corresponding to earlier rules in Equations (2.20)
and (2.25)) holds only if the solution is efﬁcient.
We can prove the ﬁrst point by noting (by Equations (2.37) and (2.38)) that the
condition ϕm = Δα must hold at efﬁcient solutions. The second point follows, as
we incorporate the condition γ lm = γ
L
m into the deﬁnition of τm (Equation (2.42)).
Thirdly, we use the value of e(τm) (Equation (B.11) in Appendix B.1) when we write
dE (e(τm))−τm = dEU − d + γ
L
m
γ Lm
τm .
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After incorporating τm from Equation (2.42),
dE (em)−τm = dEU
⎛⎜⎝1− γ
l
m
γ Lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
⎞⎟⎠= dEU (γ Lm)2
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm

1− γ
l
m
γ Lm

.
Clearly, τm = dE [e(τm)] as long as γ lm = γ Lm , where m = 1,2. As a corollary, we
can write the general relationship between the tax rate and expected emissions as
τm =
γ lm
γ Lm
dE [em] , (2.45)
where m = 1,2.
2.3.4.2 Differences Between Optimal Expected Prices and Quantities
We are interested in implementation of voluntary participation that increases social
welfare. We show in next section that this objective can be expressed as a condition
n >ρm , (2.46)
where n is the scope effect deﬁned above in Equation (2.28) and m = 1,2. Factor ρm ,
called a cost effect, contains the inﬂuence of the inefﬁcient subsidization. It is shown
below that ρm > 1 as long as the subsidization is inefﬁcient and that ρm = 1 under
efﬁciency. Remember that the scope effect describes the beneﬁts that the inclusion
of new cost-saving projects create in the regulated industry. In this respect, cost effect
displays the costs of these projects and records the fact that inefﬁcient subsidies are
employed to attract new projects. The Condition (2.46) then presents an intuitive
idea that social welfare increases if beneﬁts exceed the costs.
We state next the various results concerning optimal expected prices and quanti-
ties (see Appendix B.2, Part III):
Lemma 1 Let us denote
km ≡ ϕmαA ≥ 0, (2.47)
where m = 1,2. Then,
i. The sign of the difference τm − τ depends on the sign of a − km. Speciﬁcally, if
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km > 0 and a− km = 0, then τm −τ = 0.
ii. The sign of the difference τm − τa depends on the sign of a − km. Speciﬁcally, if
km = 0, then τm −τa = 0.
iii. E [e (τm)] − E [e (τ)] > 0 as long as ρm > 1. If ρm = 1, then E [e (τm)] −
E [e (τ)] = 0.
iv. E [e (τa)]− E [e (τm)] > 0 as long as n > ρm. If n = ρm, then E [e (τa)]−
E [e (τm)] = 0.
We denote emissions under perfect participation by e(τ), while e(τa) and e(τm)
represents emissions under zero and strictly positive voluntary participation, respec-
tively. In general, the sign differences between different optimal tax rates cannot be
nailed down unambiguously. We derived similar results in Chapter 1. Note further
that, by Equations (2.37) and (2.38), efﬁciency implies that a− km = 0. Thus, under
efﬁciency, the optimal tax rate τm equals the perfect participation rate τ. On the
other hand, zero voluntary participation means that km = 0, so τm = τa under zero
participation.20
The differences between optimal expected emissions are essential in the analysis
to come. First, the emissions under voluntary participation strictly exceed the emis-
sions under perfect participation (E [e (τm)]> E [e (τ)]) as long as the subsidization
is inefﬁcient (ρm > 1) and they are equal under efﬁciency (ρm = 1). Second, the vol-
untary participation decreases emissions (E [e (τa)]> E [e (τm)]) as long as n >ρm .
If no ﬁrm participates, then n = ρm and E [e (τa)]− E [e (τm)].
We claim (see Condition (2.46)) above that the scope effect should exceed the
cost effect in a meaningful policy. In Appendix B.2, Part III, we write these effects in
terms of parameters of the model. In particular, by Equation (B.21), we may write
n
ρm
=
(1+ uakm)
2
1+ uk2m
,
where
u ≡ cA
Δc
> 0 , a ≡ Δα
αA
> 0, km ≡ ϕmαA ≥ 0, (2.48)
(see Equations (2.27) and (2.47)) and m = 1,2. Consequently, we have nρm > 1 as long
20Note that the condition k2 = 0 holds if voluntary participation equals zero (l0−α0 = l1−α1 = 0),
but it may hold under positive participation as well (l0−α0 = l1−α1 > 0).
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as the condition
1+ uakm +

1− km
a

> 0 (2.49)
holds. In particular, the condition a > km is sufﬁcient for a meaningful policy.
21
2.3.4.3 Comparison of the Regulatory Regimes
The next question we pose is about the overall meaningfulness of the voluntary pro-
vision. After all, the imperfect implementation of voluntary participation induces
inefﬁciencies, so it may also crucially reduce the beneﬁts of the policy. As for the
existence of this trade-off, we have:
Proposition 3 If the environmental agency has the opportunity to choose the voluntary
provision in place of perfect participation, it would still prefer perfect participation. On
the other hand, assume that Condition (2.46) applies. Then the agency prefers strictly
positive voluntary participation to zero voluntary participation.
Proof. We calculate ﬁrst the expected welfare under positive voluntary participation
in Appendix B.1, Part Voluntary Participation. By Equation (B.14), it equals
EWτm = EBU −
γ Lm
γ lm
τm
EU
2
− d
2
EΦ2,
where
Φ= aA
θA
cA
−ΔaΔθ
Δc
and m = 1,2. The expected welfares under perfect participation and zero voluntary
participations are (by Equations (B.6) and (B.9) in Appendix B.1)
EWτ = EBU −τ EU2 −
d
2
EΦ2
and
EWτa = EBU −τa
EU
2
− d
2
EΦ2,
respectively. Note that the three expected welfares are calculated using the optimal
tax rates. Note further that these rates are (by Equations (2.20), (2.25), and (2.45))
21Note that we have either a− k1 = α0−l1αA or a− k2 ≡
Δl
αA
.
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τ = dE [e(τ)] , τa = dE [e(τa)] , and τm =
γ lm
γ Lm
dE [e(τm)] ,
where m = 1,2. Now,
EWτm − EWτ =−
γ Lm
γ lm
τm
EU
2
+τ
EU
2
=

τ− γ
L
m
γ lm
τm

EU
2
= d (E [e(τ)]− E [e(τm)]) EU2
and
EWτm − EWτa =−
γ Lm
γ lm
τm
EU
2
+τa
EU
2
= d (E [e(τa)]− E [e(τm)]) EU2 ,
where m = 1,2. By Lemma 1, we have E [e(τ)]− E [e(τm)] < 0 and E [e(τa)]−
E [e(τm)] > 0. As d > 0 and EU > 0, we have
EWτ > EWτm > EWτa , (2.50)
where m = 1,2.
2.3.5 Prices and Quantities
2.3.5.1 Permit Implementations
Let us return to the implementation issues. The restricted agency implements the
regulation either by environmental taxes or by tradable permits. In the implemen-
tation of the permit policy, it should deliver an appropriate number of permits. In
general, if we denote the total number of permits in the market by Lm , then
Lm = lm + ι1
∫ λ1m
0
l1dλ+ ι2
∫ λ00
λ1m
l0dλ= lm + ι1λ1m l1+ ι2

λ00−λ1m

l0, (2.51)
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where lm is the number of auctioned permits, m = 1,2 and symbols ι1 and ι2 are
indicator variables.22 We deﬁne them as
ι1 =
⎧⎨⎩ 0 if l1 ≤ α11 if l1 > α1 (2.52)
and
ι2 =
⎧⎨⎩ 0 if l0 ≤ α01 if l0 > α0 . (2.53)
Thus, ι1 takes the value of one whenever units in green technology voluntarily par-
ticipate, while ι2 is one whenever units in brown technology voluntarily participate.
Above, we ruled out the case where only units in brown technology participates.
Then, ι2 can take the value of one only if ι1 takes the value of one. Conversely, ι1 can
be one even though ι2 is zero because we allow only green technology to participate.
In any case, the last part in Equation (2.51) stands for the “private permit supply”
(i.e., the accumulation of the free initial allocation).
We write the permit market equilibrium as
lm =
∫ ηAm
0
αAdλ− ι1
∫ λ1m
0
(l1−α1)dλ− ι2
∫ λ00
λ1m
(l0−α0)dλ= ηAm(lm)αA (2.54)
−λ1m(lm) [ι2(m) (l0−α0)− ι1(m) (l1−α1)]− ι2(m)λ00 (l0−α0) .
The right-hand side gives the total demand, while the left-hand side is the supply of
the auctioned permits. We insert ﬁrst the values of ηAm and λ1m from Equations
(2.39) into the aggregate demand. After this, we solve the equilibrium price, which
gives us
pm = γ

bA+θA
cA
αA− Δb −ΔθΔc [ι2(m) (l0−α0)− ι1(m) (l1−α1)]

(2.55)
− γ ι2(m)λ00 (l0−α0)+ lm ,
22The units with different technologies enter in a lumpy fashion. That is, as l0 becomes strictly
greater than α0, the number of λ
0
0 − λ1 brown ﬁrms enter the voluntary program. Similarly, as l1
becomes strictly greater than α1, the number of λ1 green ﬁrms enter the program.
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where
γ =

cAΔc
ΔcαAαA+ cAϕm [ι2 (l0−α0)− ι1 (l1−α1)]

and m = 1,2. Deﬁnitions (2.40), (2.41), (2.52), and (2.53) together allow us to write
the permit price as
pm =
cAΔc
Δcα2A+ cA (ϕm)
2

bA+θA
cA
αA− Δb −ΔθΔc ϕm

− cAΔc
Δcα2A+ cA (ϕm)
2

ι2(m)λ
0
0 (l0−α0)+ lm

,
or by Equation (2.43) as
pm = γ
l
m

bA+θA
cA
αA− Δb −ΔθΔc ϕm − ι2(m)λ
0
0 (l0−α0)− lm

,
where ι2(1) = 0, ι2(2) = 1, and m = 1,2. Finally, we denote the deterministic part of
the price as pm , so
pm = pm + γ
l
m

θA
cA
αA+
Δθ
Δc
ϕm

, (2.56)
where m = 1,2.
The tax rate τm calculated in Equation (2.42) gives us the stringency of the tax
policy. The stringency of the permit policy follows as we set pm = τm (see Chapter
1, Section 1.3.2.2). As for the other variable of interest, namely, the regulated level
of emissions, we write ﬁrst Equation (2.14) as
e(sm) = αAηAm +α0λ
0
0−Δαλ1m .
Next, we insert the values of ηAm and λ1m from Equations (2.39) and ﬁnd that
e(sm) = α0λ
0
0+αA

bA+θA− smαA
cA

−Δα

Δb −Δθ+ smϕm
Δc

= EU +αA

θA− smαA
cA

−Δα
−Δθ+ smϕm
Δc

,
where EU is the level of expected counterfactual emissions. After arranging, it holds
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that
e(sm) = EU +αA
θA
cA
+Δα
Δθ
Δc
− sm

Δc (αA)
2+ cAΔαϕm
cAΔc

,
or, by using Equation (2.44), it holds that
e(sm) = EU +αA
θA
cA
+Δα
Δθ
Δc
− 1
γ Lm
sm . (2.57)
Importantly, as far as pm = τm , then
E [e(τm)] = E [e(pm)] ,
where m = 1,2. Therefore, the two instruments will yield the same expected level
of emissions.
2.3.5.2 Notational Issues
To facilitate the upcoming analysis, we develop some new notation. We will intro-
duce parameters R0(sm) and R1(sm), where the price entry inside the parenthesis
indicates that the parameters are speciﬁc to the implementation. We can now repre-
sent the unit price of emissions as
sm = s m + γ
L
m

R0(sm)
αA
cA
θA+R1(sm)
Δα
Δc
Δθ

. (2.58)
With permit implementation,
R0(pm) =
γ lm
γ Lm
and R1(pm) =
ϕm
Δα
R0(pm), (2.59)
(see Equation (2.56)), while with tax implementation
R0(τm) = R1(τm) = 0, (2.60)
where m = 1,2. As for the emissions, deﬁne ﬁrst
em = EU − 1γ Lm pm .
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Then, we can rewrite the emissions (Equation (2.57)) as
e(sm) = em + (1−R0(sm))αAcA θA+ (1−R1(sm))
Δα
Δc
Δθ, (2.61)
where m = 1,2. The reader can verify that inserting the speciﬁc values from Equa-
tions (2.59) and (2.60) into this formula will indeed yield the correct emissions.
Depending on the implementation, it holds that l1 ∈ [α1,α0] (m = 1) or Δl
∈ [0,Δα] (m = 2). Furthermore, by using the deﬁnitions of a and u (Equations
(2.27)), we may also write
R0(pm) =
1+ uakm
1+ uk2m
and R1(pm) =
km
a
R0(pm). (2.62)
Since
R0(pm) =
a
km
1+ uakm
a
km
+ uakm
the magnitudes of R0 and R1 depend on the sizes of a and km .
Finally, let us consider the variables at the extremes. First, let akm = 1. We know
that this corresponds to an efﬁcient allocation. It either holds that l1 = α0 (m = 1)
or l1 = l0 (m = 2). In either case, we have R0(pm) = R1(pm) = 1 and ϕ1 = ϕ2 =Δα,
so
pm = pm + γ

αA
cA
θA+
Δα
Δc
Δθ

and e(pm) = em .
By our discussion above (see also Part i in Lemma 1),
pm = p + γ

αA
cA
θA+
Δα
Δc
Δθ

and e(pm) = e , (2.63)
where m = 1,2. In particular, the ﬂuctuating emissions will disappear.23
Finally, if l1 = α1 and l0 = α0, the allocation is extremely tight, so not a single ﬁrm
will opt in. This time, we have km = 0, so, by Equations (2.62), we have R0(p
l
m) = 1
23We note two things about the efﬁcient implementation here. First, the price under imperfect
participation (pm ) behaves like a price under perfect participation (p). Thus, the participation of the
brown technology is immaterial as long as the policy implements the same amount of green technology
as the perfect participation induces. Second, the efﬁcient prices p1 and p2 are the same as p even though
the thresholds between the implementations differ. However, we discuss in Chapter 1 that different
efﬁcient thresholds will yield different efﬁcient prices. The answer to this dilemma merely lies in the
assumption lA = 0. If we assume that lA > 0 instead, then the efﬁcient prices will differ similarly as
they do in Chapter 1.
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and R1(p
l
m) = 0, m = 1,2. As participation is zero, then it also holds that ι1 = ι2 = 0
(by Equations (2.52) and (2.53)). Writing Equations (2.55) and (2.57) out in full, we
have p1 = p2 = pa and e(p1) = e(p2) = ea . Consequently,
pm = pa = pa + γa
αA
cA
θA and e(pm) = ea = ea − ΔαΔc Δθ, (2.64)
where m = 1,2. In summary, if not a single non-affected ﬁrm opts in, then the
prices and quantities are similar to our earlier formulas under imperfect participation
without the voluntary provision.
2.3.6 Prices Versus Quantities
2.3.6.1 Comparative Advantage
We move to our main subject of this chapter, instrument choice under uncertainty.
We introduced the concept of inefﬁcient subsidization above. The agency takes the
subsidization and the scope of the policy as given, so it regards these as the constraints
in its optimization. Hence, in the study of the instrument choice, we not only con-
centrate on efﬁcient outcomes but also study inefﬁcient cases. We essentially review
a continuum of effects that the different levels of subsidies—and consequently, the
different levels of voluntary participation—produce. To accomplish this, the concept
of comparative advantagewill be applied. Remember that we already introduced this
concept in Equation (2.22).
We study the choice between tax and permit system when either the brown tech-
nology in sector NA participates (m = 2) or does not participate (m = 1). We state
Proposition 4 The comparative advantage between prices and quantities under volun-
tary participation is given by
Δ(τm , pm) =
Z∗
2
ρm
Var (pa)
γ 2a
(γa −Θm nρm d ), (2.65)
where Z∗ > 0 and m = 1,2. The inﬂuence of voluntary participation on the instrument
choice is given by Θm
n
ρm
, where Θm = Θ(τm , pm) is the volume effect, n is the scope
effect, and ρm is the cost effect.
As for the proof of the proposition, we refer to the analysis of an upcoming sec-
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tion (Section 2.3.7.1). Speciﬁcally, Equation (2.79) allows24 us to write
Δ(τm , pm) =
ρm
2
Var (pm)
γ Lm
2 γ − Θmρm d

, (2.66)
where γ is the slope of the marginal abatement function. Furthermore, using the
deﬁnitions of p (Equation (2.21)) and pm (Equation (2.56)), we may write
Var (pm)
γ Lm
2 = 1+ ukm1+ ua
2 Var (p)
(γ )2
,
where u, km , and a are deﬁned in Equation (2.48) and m = 1,2. Thus,
Z∗ = Z

1+ ukm
1+ ua
2
> 0,
where Z is given by Equation (2.34). Finally, in writing Representation (2.65), we
utilize our earlier discussion about the change in participation. In particular, we
utilize Representation (2.33).
2.3.6.2 Combined Cost–Scope Effect
By Equation (2.65), the choice between the instruments τm and pm is affected by the
factor nρm . The term n > 1 is labeled the scope effect (Equation (2.28)). This effect
arises when sector NA becomes incorporated into the pool of affected sectors. In
the present context, scope effect records the effect that the switch from one efﬁcient
implementation to another creates in the instrument choice. Speciﬁcally, it records
the effect that the reduction of the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function creates.
We label the term ρm a cost effect. The cost effect supplements the scope effect
by the fact that regulation is inefﬁcient. Even though the scope of the regulation
becomes wider, it inevitably becomes inefﬁcient as well. Utilizing the variables km ,
u, and a (Equations (2.48)), we may write
ρm =

γ Lm
2
γγ lm
= 1+
u (km − a)2
(1+ uakm)
2 , (2.67)
24It becomes clear that v = v(τm , pm) = 0 in Equation (2.66).
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where m = 1,2. The cost effect disappears when ρm = 1. This occurs as the per-
mit allocation induces efﬁcient allocation of emissions (km = a). Under inefﬁcient
voluntary participation (km = a) instead, the cost effect invariably hurts the quan-
tity instrument. In fact, we will later show that the cost effect in general favors the
instrument with the lower variance. In each case, we see that the cost effect will
increase as we move further away from the efﬁcient solution.
Concerning the combined effect nρm , we argued above that the result
n
ρm
> 1
should hold in a meaningful policy. This condition guarantees that societal beneﬁts
exceed costs in the implementation of voluntary participation. By this argument,
the combined cost–scope effect favors the quantity instrument.
2.3.6.3 Volume Effect
According to Section 2.3.7.1, we may write
Θm =Θ(τm , pm) = 2
R0(pm)

αA
cA
2
+R1(pm)

Δα
Δc
2
	
R0(pm)

αA
cA

2
+
	
R1(pm)

Δα
Δc

2 − 1, (2.68)
where m = 1,2. The factor Θm is called the volume effect. It gives the additional
inﬂuence that the ﬂuctuating quota induces on instrument choice. By the compara-
tive advantage in Equation (2.65), wheneverΘm > 1, then the quantity instrument is
favored. IfΘm < 1, the price instrument has an additional advantage. WhenΘm = 1,
the volume effect disappears. As for the particular size of the volume effect, denote
ﬁrst
qm = q(pm) =
R0(pm)

αA
cA
2
+R1(pm)

Δα
Δc
2
	
R0(pm)

αA
cA

2
+
	
R1(pm)

Δα
Δc

2 . (2.69)
Then, Θ(τm , pm) 1, as qm  1. By Equations (2.62), we may further write
qm =
1+ uk2m
1+ ukma
1+ u2kma
1+ u2k2m
, (2.70)
where the factors km ≥ 0, u > 0, and a > 0 are given in Equations (2.48). By straight-
forward calculations, we may state that
qm  1⇔ kmu(u − 1) (a− km) 0. (2.71)
137
In general, the volume effect is seen to vanish (Θ = 1) if voluntary participation
equals zero (km = 0) or is perfect (km = a). The effect also vanishes if the cost pa-
rameters are equal (u = 1).25 We discuss above (see Equation (2.49)) how condition
a−km > 0 is sufﬁcient for a meaningful implementation of voluntary participation.
However, by Equation (2.71), this condition alone does not favor a particular instru-
ment. Rather, the volume effect favors the quantity instrument as long as u > 1. We
also notice the possibility that Θ < 0. Such an extreme outcome means that the tax
instrument is a unanimously preferred instrument, so it should always be applied in-
stead of instrument pm . When compared to the traditional Weitzman framework,
this is a new state of the world. It becomes possible solely because of the variability
in the emissions under the quantity system. In particular, this effect is seen to arise
as long as qm <
1
2 .
2.3.6.4 Discussion of the Comparative Advantage
We just derived a comparison between subsidized prices and quantities. The analysis
revealed that the choice of the instrument depends on the sign of the difference
γa −Θm nρm d ,
where γa and d are the slopes of the marginal beneﬁt and damage functions, respec-
tively, while Θm is the volume effect and
n
ρm
is the combined cost–scope effect. A
positive difference means that the tax is preferred, while negative values mean that
the chosen instrument is quantities.
We discuss in Chapter 1 that the volume effect equals zero whenever the envi-
ronmental agency controls the level of aggregate emissions. However, the emission
control is only thinkable if the whole sector NA voluntarily participates (m = 2).
The policy analysis in this case resembles the corresponding analysis in Chapter 1.
If the sterilized system is used, then volume effect disappears (Θm = 1), so the com-
bined cost–scope effect will dominate. If only green technology participates (m = 1),
then the emission control is impossible. The agency can control the total number
25If u = 0, we have qm = 1. If u −→∞, it holds that
qm =
1
u + k
2
m
1
u + kma
1
u2 + kma
1
u2 + k2m
=
u−→∞
k2m
kma
kma
k2m
= 1
by the use of Equation (2.69). In both cases, the volume effect vanishes.
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of permits, but the number of permits does not equal the level of emissions. It can
be shown that the nature of the instrument choice changes radically if the agency
commits to the number of permits in a market, where total emission control is im-
possible. Although possible, we do not consider such a policy relevant, so we do not
report the analysis here.
We present an extensive discussion about the inﬂuences of subsidization in Chap-
ter 1. However, the analysis in there deals only with mandatory participation. The
sectors in there are also more standard because no switch to green investment is pos-
sible. As for the imputed policy in there, the agency does not use supramarginal
subsidization but rather applies inframarginal thresholds. Furthermore, the uncer-
tainty is industry-wide, so every polluting unit in the polluting industry faces the
same shock.
Despite these differences, the analysis in this section is very similar to that of
Chapter 1. We comment on two major differences. First, the discussion about the
scope effect is missing in Chapter 1 simply because the scope effect is solely due to
imperfect participation. Second, the different assumptions about the nature of un-
certainty produce some different policy implications between the studies. The un-
certainty variables are identical in Chapter 1, while they are identically distributed
here. The volume effects in particular reﬂect these differences. For example, the cen-
tral role of the parameter u here is solely due to the assumed nature of uncertainty.
We can show (see below) that this effect is truly due to the nature of the assumed
uncertainty, not because of voluntary participation.
We take imperfect participation without voluntary participation as a point of
departure. This means that any change between the instruments occurs relative to
this regime. This choice implies that we are primarily interested in the expansion of
the scope: The implementation of the voluntary provision means that the scope of
the regulation increases. However, if one compares the changes in the instrument
choice relative to the original Weitzman result (with perfect participation), then it
will be appropriate to use the representation in Equation (2.66).
Overall, if Θm
n
ρm
> 1, the relative position of the quantities is improved, while
the value Θm
n
ρm
< 1 indicates a stronger case for prices. We will calculate the size
of the total effect in Appendix B.3. We show that the various individual effects will
pull into opposite directions in such a way that no simple recommendations cannot
be given. However, if we operate relative to the original Weitzman analysis (so that
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Θm
ρm
is the total effect), then more structure evolves (see Appendix B.3).
Finally, we note how the critical points km = a (efﬁcient implementation) and
km = 0 (zero participation) are special as they both produce the traditionalWeitzman
measure. To see this, write ﬁrst
Var (pm)
γ Lm
2 = 1+ uakm1+ ua2

αA
cA
θA− kma
Δα
Δc
Δθ
2
,
where m = 1,2. The outcome km = a implies that Θm = 1, ρm = 1, and that
Var (pm)
γ Lm
2 = αAcA θA− ΔαΔc Δθ
2
=
Var (p)
γ 2
.
Thus, by Equation (2.66),
Δ(τm , pm) =
ρm
2
Var (pm)
γ Lm
2 γ − Θmρm d

=
km=a
1
2
Var (p)
γ 2
(γ − d ) , (2.72)
soΔ(τm , pm) =Δ(τ, p), where m = 1,2.
Second, the value km = 0 implies that Θm = 1. Furthermore,
ρm = 1+
u (km − a)2
(1+ uakm)
2 =km=0
1+ ua2 = n.
So,
Δ(τm , pm) =
km=0
n
2
E
%α
c
θA
&2
(γ − 1
n
d ), (2.73)
or after applying the relation γa = nγ ,
Δ(τm , pm) = E
%α
c
θA
&2
(γA− d ) =Δ(τa , pa),
where m = 1,2. In summary, the critical points will yield the traditional Weitzman
measures. This will happen because the implementations are efﬁcient at these points.
It also happens that both the cost and volume effects disappear at the critical points.
This holds if only green technology participates (m = 1) or if the whole sector NA
participates (m = 2). Note also the common source behind the cost and volume
effects. They both require inefﬁcient implementation to operate.
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2.3.7 Further Issues in Comparative Advantage
2.3.7.1 The Derivation of Comparative Advantage
Recall that instruments operate in one of the two mutually exclusive regimes m so
that m = 1,2. A unifying theme across different implementations is the certain struc-
ture that various prices and quantities follow. According to Section 2.3.5.2, we may
write every price as
sm = s m + γ
L
m

R0(sm)
αA
cA
θA+R1(sm)
Δα
Δc
Δθ

and every quantity as
e(sm) = em + (1−R0(sm))αAcA θA+(1−R1(sm))
Δα
Δc
Δθ,
where R0(sm) and R1(sm) are the implementation-speciﬁc parameters, and E sm = s m
and Ee(sm) = em . Furthermore, referring to Equation (B.12) (Appendix B.1), we can
write the social welfare as
B(sm)−D(e(sm)) = BU − 12γ lm s
2
m − d2 (e (sm))
2 , (2.74)
where BU are the counterfactual beneﬁts.
Consider the comparative advantage Δ(I , J ) between the two instruments I and
J as deﬁned in Equation (2.22). We apply the welfare in Equation (2.74) when we
write the comparative advantage in terms of variances26 as
Δ(I , J ) =
Var (J )−Var (I )
2γ lm
− d
2
(Var (e(I )−Var (e(J )) .
Expanding the different variances gives us
Δ(I , J ) =Var (J )
1− v
2
⎡⎣ 1
γ lm
− d 1
γ Lm
2
⎛⎝2q(J )1− v q(I )q(J )
1− v − 1
⎞⎠⎤⎦ , (2.75)
26We also apply calculations in Appendix A.6.
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where
q(J ) =
R0(J )

αA
cA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
Δc
2
	
R0(J )

αA
cA

2
+
	
R1(J )

Δα
Δc

2 (2.76)
and
v = v(I , J ) =
Var (I )
Var (J )
.
The representation in Equation (2.75) is by no means obvious, so we will present the
derivation of it in Appendix B.4. We further modify the comparative advantage to
yield
Δ(I , J ) =
ρm (1− v)
2
Var (J )
γ Lm
2 γ − d 1ρm (2Q − 1)

, (2.77)
where
Q ≡Q(I , J ) = q(J )1− v
qm (I )
qm (J )
1− v (2.78)
and ρm is given by Equation (2.67). Finally, we denote the volume effect by Θm , so
that
Δ(I , J ) =
ρm (1− v)
2
Var (J )
γ Lm
2 γ − d Θmρm

, (2.79)
where
Θm ≡Θm(I , J ) = 2Q(I , J )− 1. (2.80)
We would like to comment on these measures in relation to our earlier represen-
tations in Chapter 1. In both chapters, we derive the instrument choice in terms of
various variances. In the present case, it holds that
Var (I ) =

γ Lm
2
σ2

R0(I )
αA
cA
2
+

R1(I )
Δα
Δc
2
(2.81)
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and
Var (e(I )) = σ2

(1−R0(I ))αAcA
2
+

(1−R1(I ))ΔαΔc
2
. (2.82)
for instrument I (see Section 2.3.5.2). Compare these to our earlier representations
of Equations (1.59) and (1.60) in Chapter 1. The formulas havemuch in common but
they are different. The sole reason behind the differences lies in the different natures
of uncertainty. In Chapter 1, the stochastic variables are identical across the pol-
luting units, while they are identically distributed here. The analysis of instrument
choice reﬂects the difference as well. The dominant role of factor u (see Equation
(2.71)) displays this fact.
Second, there is an important and illuminative representation between Var (I )
and Var (e(I )). We calculate in Appendix B.5 that
Var (e(I )) =Var (U )−Var (I )2q(I )− 1
γ Lm
2 . (2.83)
As Var (U ) is the variance of emissions in the absence of regulation, the represen-
tation shows how the environmental policy succeeds to change it. Thus, as long
as q(I ) > 12 , policy I will succeed in reducing the variance in emissions. Based on
Equation (2.68), we may also write
Var (e(I )) =Var (U )−Var (I )Θ(τm , I )
γ Lm
2 .
Speciﬁcally, we have Var (e(τm)) =Var (U ).
2.3.7.2 Quantities Versus Quantities
We make a brief note about “quantities versus quantities" here. We discuss the issue
in Chapter 1 at length in a perfect participation framework. In the present context,
the issue is valid, if the whole sector NA voluntarily participates. In that case, the
total emission control is feasible.
In brief, two different quantity instruments evolve as the agency may either com-
mit to the total number of permits or to the total number of auctioned permits,
respectively. Given that every ﬁrm in the polluting industry is regulated, the ﬁrst
option ﬁxes the aggregate emission level while the second does not. Assume that the
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policy indeed ﬁxes the emissions and let us denote the corresponding permit price
in the market by pL2 . By the representation in Equation (2.77), the comparative ad-
vantage is
Δ(p l2 , p
L
2 ) =
ρ2 (1− v)
2
Var (J )
γ L2
2 γ − dρ2 (2Q − 1)

,
where v = v(p l2 , p
L
2 ) and Q = (p
l
2 , p
L
2 ). It can be shown that
R0(p
L
2 ) = R1(p
L
2 ) = 1,
so (by Equation (2.76)),
q2(p
L
2 ) = 1
and (by Equation (2.78)),
Q(p l2 , p
L
2 ) =
1− vq(p l2 )
1− v .
The term q(p l2 ) was earlier calculated in terms of k, a and u in Equation (2.70). To
study the size of factor Q(p l2 , p
L
2 ) further, we need to know more about the variance
factor v.27
2.3.7.3 Perfect Participation: Instrument Choice
The subsidization has a socially beneﬁcial role above as it supplements incomplete
environmental policy. Wewill brieﬂy discuss next how the subsidization framework
adapts to a more standard setting, namely, to the regulation of an entire polluting in-
dustry. Thus, we will return to the main theme of Chapter 1. There are two main
differences between the chapters. First, we do not assume here that uncertainty vari-
ables are identical but rather that they are identically distributed. Second, themotive
27Based on intuition, we are inclined to predict that Var (pL2 )> Var (p
l
2 ), so that
0< v =
Var (p l2 )
Var (pL2 )
< 1.
After all, the non-sterilized system does not limit the emissions level to a ﬁxed quantity but allows
it to accommodate. Lower variance in price should then reﬂect this accommodation. However, this
intuition is incorrect. It can be shown that the variance does not invariably decrease if we let the
emissions ﬂuctuate.
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for subsidization differs between chapters. The motive here is not about supporting
the polluting ﬁrms against closures but rather to promote the transformation to-
wards green production.
Let us then assume that the aim of the policy under perfect participation is to
provide an extra boost to green technology. Consequently, the aim of the subsi-
dization is the same as in the main text above, whereby increasing the participation
means in practice that investments in green technology should be supported. The
major change is that we no longer have to apply supramarginal thresholds, but we
may use inframarginal thresholds as well. In mathematical terms, increasing green
production when every ﬁrm participates means that Δα−Δl ≥ 0 (see Conditions
(2.10) and (2.41)). We can deduce that this target can be implemented with various
thresholds. In particular, it is implementable by supramarginal policy (l1 > α1) or
by inframarginal policy (α1 > l1).
Adaptation to perfect participation is fairly simple. We just apply the framework
that was originally written to the policy where whole sector NA voluntarily par-
ticipates.28 Consequently, the comparative advantage derived in Equation (2.79) is
useful as such in the study of perfect participation. In particular, we get the cost
effect ρ2 and the volume effect Θ2 as we insert
k2 ≡ Δα−ΔlαA > 0
into Equations (2.67) and (2.68), respectively. By Equation (2.71), the volume effect
will favor the quantity instrument (so that Θ(τ2, p2)> 1) as long as
k2 =
Δα−Δl
αA
> 0
where a−k2 = ΔlαA . Assume that the policy subsidizes green technology (l1 > 0) and
does not subsidize brown technology (l0 = 0). This means that Δl = −l1 < 0, so
a − k2 < 0. Thus, the volume effect will favor the quantity instrument as long as
u < 1. In other words, it will favor the quantity instrument as long asΔc > cA.
Finally, let us brieﬂy comment on the assumption lA = 0 that we have applied
so far. By construction, the inﬂuence of lA in the instrument choice is channeled
through factor k2. We may then conclude that setting lA> 0 merely affects the value
28This means that one has to apply values ι1 = 1 and ι2 = 1 everywhere (see Equations (2.52) and
(2.53)).
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of k2. Written in full, we have
k2 =
Δα−Δl
αA− lA .
2.3.7.4 Perfect Participation: To Subsidize or Not to Subsidize
Our analysis has focused on the subsidization of green technology in a regulation
wherebymarket-based instruments regulate the emissions. Furthermore, our policy-
making is restricted by inefﬁcient subsidization. If the environmental agency alone
could decide, it would promote neutrality. In the present context (with perfect par-
ticipation), the neutrality condition can be found from Equation (2.37). Accord-
ingly, if the brown production in sector A (all ﬁrms in there use only brown tech-
nology) is not subsidized at all (lA= 0), then the neutrality principle rules that green
technology should not be favored at the expense of brown technology. In other
words, the principle advises to use the rule l1 = l0.
We brieﬂy consider another case of subsidization under perfect participation. We
show how the subsidization of green technology is good policy when this policy is
the only policy available. In a sense, this approach represents another example of
restricted policy implementation.
Let the subsidy equal S. It is paid to ﬁrms applying green technology. As the
subsidy is the only instrument in the regulation, it affects only units in sector N .
Speciﬁcally, the number of ﬁrms in sector N becomes (Equation (2.9))
λ1 =
Δb −Δθ+ S
Δc
.
We are interested in the change of the expected social welfare that the introduction
of subsidization induces. We have29
dEW
dS
= E

(B1(λ1)−B0(λ1))−D ′(e) d edλ1

dλ1
dS

,
where
dλ1
dS
=
1
Δc
> 0
29The various components in welfare are introduced in Section 2.2.1.
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and (by Equation (2.13))
d e
dλ1
=−Δα < 0.
Furthermore, the discussion about the polluting industry in Section 2.2.1 implies
that
B1(λ1)−B0(λ1) =−S.
Thus, we have
dEW
de
=
−S + ED ′(e)Δα 1
Δc
.
We are speciﬁcally interested in the change in social welfare that the introduction of
subsidization induces. We have
dW
de
++++
S=0
=
Δα
Δc
E

D ′(U )

,
where U is the level of counterfactual emissions (Equation (2.19)). As D ′(e) > 0,
then
dW
de
++++
S=0
> 0.
We may conclude that the introduction of subsidization is welfare enhancing.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
Concerning questions of voluntary participation, the theoretical literature has fo-
cused on the design of tradable permit systems. We supplement this literature by
taking a step back and asking whether environmental taxes can outperform tradable
permits. We employ environmental taxation as an alternative and equal means of
dealing with the policy questions concerning imperfect participation and provision
of voluntary participation. This is possible because, in principle, taxes and tradable
permits share the same distributional properties. We ﬁnd that voluntary participa-
tion does affect the instrument choice as long as the policy applies inefﬁcient imple-
mentation.
Fundamentally, in thinking about the state of the regulation, participation is ei-
ther perfect or imperfect. Within imperfect participation, provision of voluntary
participation aims to increase the participation rate toward perfect participation.
We study voluntary participation in a framework where participation and green
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investments are linked to each other. Firms will make new green investments be-
cause of the incentives that voluntary participation provides to them. However, we
ﬁnd a fundamental trade-off that governs the voluntary provision. The provision is
certainly beneﬁcial as it widens the scope of the regulation towards proﬁtable envi-
ronmental projects. At the same time, it attracts these projects with subsidies that
turn the emission allocation inefﬁcient. We start our analysis by identifying socially
beneﬁcial subsidization proﬁles. After that, we compare how prices and quantities
perform in implementing these beneﬁcial voluntary provisions.
Overall, our focus is on subsidization that supports investments towards greener
production. We build a framework that allows the analysis under both perfect and
imperfect participations. We identify three central inﬂuences in the instrument
choice: scope, cost and volume effects. The scope effect records the inﬂuence that the
increased scope of regulation has on instrument choice. The term “increased scope"
means that not every polluting ﬁrm is regulated originally but that the number will
increase thanks to environmental program. Consequently, this effect is present only
in cases that include imperfect participation. The scope effect basically records the
consequences of the policy to the beneﬁt side. Speciﬁcally, the increased scope re-
duces the slope of the marginal beneﬁt function. In instrument choice, this is a ben-
eﬁcial change to the quantity instrument. We conclude in the main text that the
quantity instrument becomes more attractive if the environmental agency succeeds
in increasing participation in an efﬁcient manner. Cost effect is a consequence of
an inefﬁcient allocation. To enable the increased scope of the regulation, the policy
must necessarily apply subsidies, and this opens the door for inefﬁciencies. We show
that, unlike the scope effect, the cost effect invariably favors the price instrument.
The volume effect adds to the instrument choice the fact that emissions will ﬂuctu-
ate under the quantity instrument. As in Chapter 1, this may or may not beneﬁt
the quantity instrument. The cost and volume effects work both in imperfect and
perfect participation regimes.
We already described the workings of cost and volume effects in Chapter 1. The
special issue in the current chapter concern these effects when only a fraction of
ﬁrms participate voluntarily. Eventually, there may still exist polluting units in the
polluting industry that will lie outside the regulation. One feature in our framework
is that the traditional rules in instrument choice apply as long as voluntary provision
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is implemented efﬁciently.30 We emphasize that this is the case even though there are
polluting units lying outside the regulation. If voluntary provision is implemented
inefﬁciently, cost and volume effects will arise and the instrument choice is affected.
Based on our model, we may conclude that voluntary participation in itself does not
affect the instrument choice but that inefﬁciency in the implementation does.
We motivate this chapter by voluntary participation under imperfect participa-
tion, but we discuss how the analysis is valid in the cases of perfect participation as
well. Furthermore, even though the policy supports green investments by supra-
marginal thresholds, the analysis is valid in cases of inframarginal thresholds as well.
We only require that the subsidization policy should encourage the application of
green technology in every implementation. More formally, we show in the main
text that this target requiresΔα−Δl ≥ 0, whereΔα= α0−α1 > 0 is the difference
between brown and green emissions andΔl = l0−l1 is the difference between brown
and green emission thresholds. AsΔα−Δl = (α0− l0)− (α1− l1), the targeted pol-
icy is implementable either by supramarginal policy (l1 > α1) or by inframarginal
policy (α1 > l1). The reader may also ﬁnd that the volume effect is somewhat elab-
orated in this chapter. This is because we do not assume that uncertainty variables
are identical but identically distributed.
In deriving these new results, our work mixes three distinct branches of liter-
ature: one concerning long-run efﬁciency properties of taxes and tradable permits
(Farrow [18]; Pezzey [54]), the second concerning voluntary participation (Montero
[47]), and the third concerning inefﬁcient policy implementation under uncertainty
(Chapter 1; Montero [49]). The novel framework urges new applications that pro-
vide new intuition.
30The efﬁciency issue is similar to Montero [47]. However, in his model, efﬁcient voluntary imple-
mentation corresponds to a market where every polluting unit participates.
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3 MULTIPLE EXTERNALITIES
3.1 Some Background
One general ambition of environmental policy-making is the transition towards en-
vironment-friendly green technology. Within this approach, green investments re-
place brown polluting thereby reducing the amount of negative environmental ex-
ternalities (pollution). One way to support this transition is to make the brown
technology relatively more expensive. In theory, this may occur either by subsidiz-
ing green technology or by taxing the use of brown technology. However, internal
forces of the polluting industrymay also affect the speed of transition from brown to
green technology. By these forces, we mean the various interdependencies between
ﬁrms. One such interdependency is that additional application of a certain technol-
ogy becomes easier as the number of appliers increases. Such effects are external
to individual ﬁrms, so they can be labeled as technological externalities (Griliches
[21], [22]). Thus, if a positive technological externality exists and if the direction
of this effect is clear, then the transition towards green technology can be enhanced
by supporting the externality-generating sector. Therefore, we have to take into ac-
count two externalities: the environmental externality, which is external, and the
technological externality, which is internal to the polluting industry. (Jaffe, Newell,
& Stavins [25].)
Our prime question concerns the instrument choice under uncertainty. We note
from the outset that the instruments in this chapter are not standard. They include
simultaneous regulation of two separate externalities. On one hand, the choice is
made between market-based instruments (i.e., tradable permits and environmental
taxes) to deal with the environmental externality, that is the homogenous pollution.
On the other hand, there exists another externality: the technological externality.
This means that the additional use of a certain production technology in one sector
has some future effects on the productivity in the other sector. Our ﬁrst question
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concerns the necessity of an additional regulation in dealing with the technologi-
cal externality. Second, if the policy needs additional regulation, there is a further
question about the implementation of the policy, namely, how does the price and
quantity instruments compare when there is more than one externality concerned.
In our model, two sectors constitute a polluting industry. In both sectors, ﬁrms
have access to two technologies: brown and green. The industry inherits brown tech-
nology from the past, when pollution was not a big issue in private investment cal-
culations. Green technology is a new technology that will gradually replace brown
technology. Among other beneﬁts, green technology has a lower environmental
burden than brown technology. Of the various possible interdependencies between
different industries and technologies, we will pick one case for closer review. We ex-
amine a sector that plays a leading role in the introduction of green technology. The
accumulated experiences in this leading sector affect the introduction of green tech-
nology in the other sector. Likely, the more the ﬁrms in the leading sector switch
from brown to green technology, the easier it will be for the ﬁrms in the other sector
(the follower) to do the same.1
We argue that the policy should internalize the externalities by economic incen-
tives. In the present context, this means that various payments should be applied.
For example, the use of technology standards (including the use of a uniform tech-
nology standard) is a potential tool in the policy mix. In our model, however, the
technology standards approach does not work properly. The efﬁcient allocation
of emissions requires simultaneous use of both green and brown technology. The
policy-making is complicated by the fact that the agency lacks data of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
efﬁciencies in utilizing different technologies. Together, these two things imply that
technology standards cannot replace economic incentives.
As for the content of the payment policy, we divide a payment into two parts.
The ﬁrst part, the environmental payment, is the price of emissions times the amount
of emissions. Every polluting unit must make this payment. The second part is a
subsidy payment that is paid to a polluting unit that generates a positive spillover. We
show that this positive subsidy payment to a polluter is an essential part of optimal
policy.
Our results bring new insights into the implementation issues of environmental
policy. Whenever there exist several externalities, the results help in selecting the
1We will follow this view most of the time by assuming a strictly positive externality throughout
the work. We will discuss the negative case brieﬂy at the end of the work.
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proper strictness of the policy as well as in choosing between various instruments in
the implementation of the policy. In general, the study contributes to the issue of
ﬁrm subsidization. We show how the environmental payment alone does not yield
social optimality. We give an efﬁciency-based reason for subsidies to internalize the
technological externalities. We are then studying a regime (“the efﬁcient regime")
where the policy applies subsidies for reasons of efﬁciency. Furthermore, as a secondary
objective, we study amore restricted framework. We do not take for granted that the
environmental agency always has the authority to internalize both the negative en-
vironmental externality and the positive technological externality. This observation
leads us to study a policy in which the regulatory agency controls only the negative
environmental externality. In other words, we also study a regime (“the inefﬁcient
regime") where the policy does not apply subsidies, even though it should for efﬁciency
reasons.
There is a further dimension in policy-making, as the agency may choose be-
tween ﬁxed and ﬂuctuating payments. The regulation is organized by market-based
instrumentation. This means that the regulatory choice is between pollution taxes
and tradable permits. The payment structures are designed to include the unit price
of emissions (tax rate or permit price). The price is further designed to affect both
parts of the payment, the environmental payment and the subsidy. Note also that
we assume uncertain beneﬁts in the polluting industry. With these things taken to-
gether, the tax implementation means ﬁxed payments while the permit implemen-
tation means ﬂuctuating payments.
We end up studying instrument choice between subsidized prices and quantities.
We ﬁnd two new effects in the instrument choice (cf. Weitzman [84]). The slope
effect captures the fact that the spillover effect makes the abatement curve less steep.2
This feature will invariably favor the quantity instrument. We also ﬁnd other effects
that we collect under the term “cost effect." In the previous chapters, we showed
how the cost effect favors the price instrument. In the implementations of this chap-
ter, the cost effect favors the price instrument as well. However, unlike in the ear-
lier chapters, here the cost effect merely reﬂects ex-post inefﬁciency. The polluting
sectors become ﬁrmly connected by the spillover effect. Even though the environ-
mental agency deliberately develops efﬁciency ex-ante, the policy does not remain
efﬁcient ex-post. In every case, we show that the various parameters of the model
2The slope effect is a base effect discussed in the Introduction. The scope effect in Chapter 2 is
another base effect.
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determine the size of the cost effect. The strength of the spillover effect is one such
parameter.
Chapters 1 and 2 provide earlier examples of the relationship between the en-
vironmental payment and the subsidy. In there, the central theme is the study of
instrument choice when the policy must apply inefﬁcient subsidization. In Chapter
1, we give no explicit reason for the use of subsidization. One plausible explana-
tion relates to the inﬂuence of various stakeholders and interest groups. After all,
subsidization can be used for various purposes, such as lowering the environmental
payments of polluting ﬁrms or as boosting green investments. Conversely, Chap-
ter 2 offers a welfare-enhancing reason for subsidies. The policy employs subsidies
in a program of voluntary participation, and regulation expands to include so-called
non-affected ﬁrms in this program. We discuss how the ﬁrst-best policy becomes eas-
ily inaccessible in such a program, either because of technical or political restrictions
(see also Montero [49]).
Meunier [43] discusses instrument choice in an inefﬁcient regime. He argues that
his model can be applied in the case of simultaneous regulation of environmental
externalities and knowledge spillovers.3 The Meunier model and our model share
the linear-quadratic framework, but they differ in some important respects. Meunier
describes the efﬁcient policy only brieﬂy, while our work emphasizes subsidization
and the variety of tools that the efﬁcient implementations can apply.4 Second, our
work assumes that the polluting industry (i.e., the pool consisting of every polluting
unit) is under the control of the regulatory agency. In Meunier, instead, one of the
industries remains beyond regulation.5
Requate [61] discusses the link between environmental policy instruments and
advanced environmental technology. Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins [25] discuss the si-
multaneous presence of knowledge spillover and an environmental externality. The
literature also includes earlier models that mix the choices of environmental policy
3For further discussion about the knowledge spillovers in this particular context, see the references
in Meunier [43]. Heal and Tarui [23] and Smulders and DiMaria [70] offer a supplementary look at
the subject.
4In addition to knowledge spillovers, we can ﬁnd other types of externalities that promote efﬁcient
subsidization. For example, Shinkuma and Sugeta [68] study instrument choice in the long run, when
the entry itself creates an externality. We discuss this study in the Introduction.
5In describing the efﬁcient regime, Meunier [43] brieﬂy refers to the existence of Pigouvian taxes.
According to our study, the implementation in the efﬁcient regime includes elements from taxation
and subsidization. Overall, the regulatory regime in Meunier [43] differs signiﬁcantly from ours, so
the second-best results in Meunier do not directly apply to our study in this chapter.
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instruments and environmental production technologies in a Weitzman [84] frame-
work. These include D’Amato and Dijkstra [10], Krysiak [34], and Mendelsohn
[42]. The model of D’Amato and Dijkstra [10] can be considered as a pure model of
adoption.6 Conversely, in Mendelsohn [42], there is an explicit (uncertain) relation-
ship between technological advances and R&D expenses. Speciﬁcally, for Mendel-
sohn [42], innovation is a pure private good, so the ﬁrm under investigation has
proper private incentives.7 Innovation effectivelymakes the long-termmarginal cost
curve less steep than the corresponding short-term curve (with zero innovation).
Then, as compared to a world with zero innovation, the quantity instrument is fa-
vored. This follows from the basic principles of instrument choice. Accordingly, as
the relative importance of pollution damages increases, the relative importance of
quantity control increases.
In ourmodel, the slope effect captures practically the same effect that theMendel-
sohnmodel does, namely, that investmentwill make the slope of the abatement func-
tion less steep. This favors the quantity instrument. However, in our model, there
is an additional effect: the cost effect that reﬂects inefﬁcient subsidization. As we
argue above, the cost effect favors the price instrument, so it draws the instrument
choice in the opposite direction. In summary, we will supplement the Mendelsohn
model by the effects that inefﬁcient subsidization creates. In the Mendelsohn model,
all the gains of investments are purely private. There is no reason for subsidization
and, correspondingly, no room for cost effects.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Polluting Industry
The polluting industry consists of two sectors: g and r . A sector consists of numer-
ous inﬁnitesimally small ﬁrms. Within a sector, every ﬁrm may choose between two
production technologies, 0 and 1, to produce the commodity unit. In sector k, the
6The adaptation in D’Amato and Dijkstra [10] means a discrete jump in the marginal function.
Here, the adaptation is a smooth and continuous process.
7In other words, no technological externalities or knowledge spillovers exist. This implies that
there is no efﬁciency-based reason to subsidize the investment.
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beneﬁt for unit λk after choosing technology i is
Bki (λ
k ) = b ki +θ
k
i − cki λk + F ki , (3.1)
where i = 0,1 and k = g , r . The factors b ki and c
k
i are positive constants, andθ
k
i ’s are
technology- and sector-speciﬁc random shocks. We assume thatΔb k = b k1 − b k0 > 0
and Δck = ck1 − ck0 > 0 and denote Δθk = θk0 − θk1 , where k = g , r . Factor F ki is
called an externality effect.
We assume that the uncertainty in our model contains an aggregate and an id-
iosyncratic part. More precisely, the total shock consists of a technology-speciﬁc
shock (εki ) and an economy-wide shock (ε). Every producer in the economy shares
the economy-wide shock. Furthermore, the size of the technology-speciﬁc shock
depends on the sector in which the technology is applied. The uncertainty takes an
additive form, which means that
θki =
ε+ εki
2
,
where i = 0,1, and k = g , r . In particular,
Δθk =
εk0 − εk1
2
,
so the aggregate shock is seen to cancel out from the variable Δθk . It also holds
that the variables ε and εki are identically and independently distributed random
variables, so E(ε) = E(εki ) = 0 and Var (ε) = Var (ε
k
i ) = σ
2, with i = 0,1 and
k = g , r . Then, E(Δθk ) = 0 and Var (Δθk ) = σ2, with k = g , r . We will further
simplify our analysis as we assume only one externality effect. We let
F g0 = F
g
1 = F
r
0 = 0
and
F r1 =φλ
g
1 > 0,
where λg1 is the number of ﬁrms that use technology one in sector g .
In principle, externalities can ﬂow between and within the technologies and sec-
tors and they can be either negative or positive.8 However, we substantially restrict
8Appendix C.1 discusses a general linear externality effect.
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the externality ﬂows from the outset. There is only one effect within the whole pol-
luting industry. The externality ﬂows from sector g to sector r between units that
use technology one. We then assume that sector g is an externality generator while
sector r is an externality recipient. In what follows, we denote technology zero as
brown (polluting) technology and technology one as green (clean) technology. This
means that the externality exists within the green, not within the brown technology.
Furthermore, the assumed positive effect implies positive spillovers: The entrant cre-
ates not only private beneﬁts but also public beneﬁts.9 Overall, the application of
green technology in sector g will increase the productivity of green technology in
sector r . As always, the most important feature of an externality is that it causes real
effects but it has no price.
3.2.2 The Externality-Generating Sector
In sector g , the beneﬁt for unit λg after choosing technology i is
B gi (λ
g ) = b gi +θ
g
i − c gi λg , (3.2)
where i = 0,1. The environmental regulation means a policy implementation that
applies either tradable permits or environmental taxes. We use s to denote the unit
price of emissions. The proﬁt for unit λg using technology i becomes
Πgi (λ
g ) = B gi (λ
g )− sαgi + S gi (s ), (3.3)
where i = 0,1. The parameter αgi is the level of emissions if a unit utilizes tech-
nology i . The factor S gi (s ) is a technology- and sector-speciﬁc payment rule. Most
importantly, it depends on the unit price of emissions. If S gi (s ) > 0, it is a subsidy.
It is then paid to an active ﬁrm producing in sector g and using technology i . As
the policy regulates the production of emissions, the emission content of the pro-
duction is important. We assume that Δαg = αg0 − αg1 > 0, so the emission level of
producing a unit of commodity is lower using technology one than using technol-
ogy zero. We take technology zero as an incumbent (polluting) technology, while
technology one stands for new (clean) technology. Thus, we can consider the switch
from technology zero to technology one as a green investment.
9The negative effect, in turn, implies that some scarce resources are congested. Product market
rivalry may also explain the negative sign.
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We assume that the size of the sector g is ﬁxed and it equals λg+0 . Furthermore,
B g0 (λ
g+
0 ) = b
g
0 +θ
g
0 − c g0 λg+0 > 0.
Within sector g , a cut-off unit exists that is indifferent between two options. The cut-
off λg+1 is indifferent between using technology zero and one. It holds that B
g
0 (λ
g+
1 )
= B g1 (λ
g+
1 ), so
λg+1 (θ) =
Δb g −Δθ g
Δc g
. (3.4)
Note that λg+1 may well take values greater than zero, so the model includes the
possibility that some ﬁrms use clean technology even in the absence of regulation.
The introduction of the regulation inﬂuences the determination of the cut-off
unit. Denote the new unit by λg1 . We have
λg1 =
Δb g −Δθ g + sΔαg +ΔS g
Δc g
= λg+1 +
Δαg
Δc g
s +
ΔS g
Δc g
, (3.5)
where ΔS g = S g1 − S g0 . Written this way, λg1 is a response function that depends
on the policies s and ΔS g . As far as s > 0, the condition ΔS g > 0 is a sufﬁcient
condition so that emissions are reduced by green investments.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the regulatory outcome in sector g . The line B gi (λ
g ) cor-
responds to sector i business-as-usual proﬁts, while the line Πgi (λ
g ) involves the in-
ﬂuence of the regulation, i = 0,1. We use solid lines to describe the proﬁts in the
absence of regulation, while the non-solid lines depicts regulated proﬁts. In particu-
lar, note how our assumptions about Δb g and Δc g determine the structure of the
sector. These assumptions mean that ﬁrms at the low end of the distribution apply
green technology, while ﬁrms at the high end use brown technology. Furthermore,
we have assumed that Δα
g s+ΔS g
Δc g > 0, so the utilization of green technology increases.
Types

0,λg1

use green technology while types [λg1 ,λ
g+
0 ] utilize polluting brown
technology. As compared to the business-as-usual choices, types
	
λg+1 ,λ
g
1


switch
from brown to green technology.10
In earlier chapters, the payment rules (S gi (s )) depend on the technology- and
10It is perfectly feasible that green technology proﬁts increase because of regulation in sector g . In
terms of Figure 3.1, the lineΠg1 (λ
g )would shift outwards. Investments in green technology will clearly
increase.
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Figure 3.1 The Impact of Regulation in Sector g
sector-speciﬁc threshold levels (l gi ). We can apply thresholds here as well. Let
S gi (s ) = s l
g
i ,
where i = 0,1. We have
Πg0 (λ
g
0 ) =Π
g
1 (λ
g
1 ) ⇐⇒ λg1 (θ) = λg+1 (θ)+
(Δαg −Δl g )
Δc g
s , (3.6)
whereΔl g ≡ l g0 − l g1 . Thus, if the agency wants to reduce emissions through invest-
ments, it should setΔαg >Δl g , or equivalently, set
αg0 − l g0 > αg1 − l g1 . (3.7)
In the derivation above, we allow the possibility that the agency can apply pay-
ment rules that differ between technologies (i ) and sectors (k). It could also be the
case that the policy cannot apply technology-speciﬁc subsidies. That is, it can use
only sector-speciﬁc subsidies. This assumption has immediate consequences. After
inserting the new assumption S g1 = S
g
0 into Equation (3.5), we have
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λg1 = λ
g+
1 (θ)+
Δαg
Δc g
s .
Thus, the agency is unable to promote green investments by this type of subsidiza-
tion.
3.2.3 The Externality-Receiving Sector
In sector r (as in sector g ), every ﬁrm chooses between technologies zero and one.
Then, a unit λr has either
B r0 (λ
r ) = b r0 +θ
r
0 − c r0 λr (3.8)
or
B r1 (λ
r ) = b r1 +θ
r
1 − c r1 λr +φλg1 (3.9)
after choosing either technology zero or one, respectively. The corresponding prof-
its are
Πri (λ
r ) = B ri (λ
r )− sαri + S ri (s ), (3.10)
where αri is the emission content of technology i , while S
r
i (s ) is the payment rule,
i = 0,1. Factor φλg1 is the externality effect, where λ
g
1 is the number of ﬁrms that
use technology one in sector g . We further assume thatΔαr = αr0 −αr1 > 0. We also
denoteΔS r = S r1 − S r0 .
In general, we cannot ﬁx the sign of φ from the outset. Both the negative and
positive externalities remain as real-life options. If φ> 0, then the green investment
in sector g improves the relative proﬁtability of the green technology in sector r .
However, if φ < 0, then the green investment in sector g congests the applications
of green technology in sector r . In what follows, we derive our results under the
positive technological externality, φ > 0. We discuss the other option at the end of
the study.
As in sector g , we take the number of ﬁrms in sector r as given. Let λr+0 denote
the number of ﬁrms in sector r . Speciﬁcally, we assume that
B r0 (λ
r+
0 ) = b
r
0 +θ
r
0 − c r0 λr+0 > 0.
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The cut-off unit λr+1 is a ﬁrm that is indifferent between technologies zero and one
in the absence of regulation. The unit is not ﬁxed, but rather satisﬁes B r0 (λ
r+
1 ) =
B r1 (λ
r+
1 ). As the proﬁtability of technology one in sector r is inﬂuenced by the use
of technology one in sector g , the size of λr+1 depends on the number of ﬁrms that
use technology one in sector g . Then, the size of λr+1 depends on the fact whether
sector g is regulated or not, so it depends on whether the number of units is λg+1 or
λg1 in sector g . In what follows, we will assume that the policy treats the two sectors
equally. That is, if it regulates sector g , then it regulates sector r as well. Then,
λr+1 =
Δb r −Δθr +φλg+1
Δc r
, (3.11)
or, after utilizing Equation (3.4),
λr+1 =
1
Δc r

Δb r +
φ
Δc g
Δb g −Δθr − φ
Δc g
Δθ g

. (3.12)
After the regulation, the cut-off unit is denoted by λr1 , where
λr1 =
Δb r −Δθr + sΔαr +ΔS r +φλg1
Δc r
. (3.13)
Furthermore, by Equations (3.5) and (3.12),
λr1 (θ) = λ
r+
1 +
(φΔαg +Δc gΔαr )
Δc gΔc r
s +
Δc gΔS r +φΔS g
Δc gΔc r
. (3.14)
Finally, we make one more assumption: both technologies will always exist in
both markets. This assumption mainly concerns the uncertainty outcomes. Effec-
tively, we assume that uncertainty is small so that an entire technology will never
exit. The assumption also concerns the size of the externality effect. We assume that
the externality effect is small so that both technologies will exist in sector r .
3.2.4 Efﬁcient Allocation of Emissions
We start our study of social choices by considering the choice under certainty. By the
various sector- and technology-speciﬁc beneﬁts from above, the aggregate beneﬁts in
the polluting sector amount to
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B =
∫ λg1
0
B g1 dλ+
∫ λg+0
λg1
B g0 dλ+
∫ λr1
0
B r1 dλ+
∫ λr+0
λr1
B r0 dλ (3.15)
=
∫ λg1
0

b g1 − c g1 λ

dλ+
∫ λg
λg1

b g0 − c g0 λ

dλ
+
∫ λr1
0

b r1 − c r1 λ+φλg1

dλ+
∫ λr
λr1
(b r0 − c r0 λ)dλ.
In addition to the technological externality, another type of externality exists to
which every ﬁrm in the industry contributes. It is a negative externality caused
by the production. More speciﬁcally, we take it as homogenous pollution. Homo-
geneity means that only the aggregate amount of the externality matters, not the
distribution of emitters.
Our interest lies in socially efﬁcient allocation. In such an allocation, a policy
will control both the technological externality and the pollution. In other words,
the beneﬁts in Equation (3.15) are maximal, given that the emissions are equal to
e =
∫ λg1
0
αg1 dλ
g +
∫ λg+0
λg1
αg0 dλ
g +
∫ λr1
0
αr1 dλ
r +
∫ λr+0
λr1
αr0 dλ
r (3.16)
= λg+0 α
g
0 −Δαgλg1 +λr+0 αr0 −Δαrλr1 .
The efﬁcient units, denoted by λge and λre , satisfy⎧⎨⎩ Δb
g −Δc gλge +φλre +μΔαg = 0
Δb r −Δc rλre +φλge +μΔαr = 0
, (3.17)
or ⎡⎣ −Δc g φ
φ −Δc r
⎤⎦⎡⎣ λge
λre
⎤⎦=−
⎡⎣ Δb g
Δb r
⎤⎦−μ
⎡⎣ Δαg
Δαr
⎤⎦ ,
where μ is the shadow value of the emission constraint. The efﬁcient units are
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⎡⎣ λge
λre
⎤⎦= 1
Δc gΔc r −φ2
⎡⎣ −Δc r −φ
−φ −Δc g
⎤⎦⎛⎝−
⎡⎣ Δb g
Δb r
⎤⎦−μ
⎡⎣ Δαg
Δαr
⎤⎦⎞⎠ ,
or,
λge =
Δc rΔb g +φΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +μ
Δαr1φ+Δα
gΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 (3.18)
and
λre =
φΔb g +Δc gΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +μ
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 . (3.19)
We assume that λge > 0 and λre > 0, soΔc
gΔc r >φ2.
Abatement cost function gives the maximal beneﬁts for a given level of emissions.
Consequently, this deﬁnition requires that the emission allocation is efﬁcient. We
know that, by deﬁnition,
μ=
dB
d e
,
so μ(e) represents the marginal abatement function. We calculate in Appendix C.2
that
μ(e) = cA− c e ,
where A is a constant (independent of e) and
c =
Δc gΔc r −φ2
Δc r (Δαg )2+ 2φΔαgΔαr +Δc g (Δαr )2
. (3.20)
The parameter c is the slope of the marginal abatement function. Especially note
the way the positive spillover effect enters through φ into the slope parameter.
We already analyzed how the sectors will react to the regulation. Referring to this
analysis (especially to Equations (3.5) and (3.13)), the cut-off units λg1 and λ
r
1 satisfy⎧⎨⎩ Δb
g −Δc gλg1 + sΔαg +ΔS g = 0
Δb r −Δc rλr1 +φλg1 + sΔαr +ΔS r = 0
. (3.21)
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We show in Appendix C.3 that the efﬁcient subsidy rule satisﬁes11
ΔS g =
Δαg
Δαr
ΔS r −φλr1 . (3.22)
As a corollary, we show that
μ= s +
ΔS r
Δαr
at the efﬁcient implementation. Thus, μ = s as long asΔS r = 0.12
3.3 Social Welfare
3.3.1 Optimal Policy
An optimal policy maximizes expected social welfare. In Appendix C.4, we will
solve the following problem:
Max
τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r
EW = E
⎡⎣∫ λg1
0
B g1 dλ
g +
∫ λg+0
λg1
B g0 dλ
g +
∫ λr1
0
B r1 dλ
r +
∫ λr+0
λr1
B r0 dλ
r
⎤⎦
− E D(e(λg1 ,λr1 ) ,
where λg1 ≡ λg1 (τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r ) and λr1 ≡ λg1 (τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r ) are the sector-speciﬁc re-
sponses calculated in Equations (3.5) and (3.14), respectively. The optimal policy
consists of a tax rate (τ) and subsidies (ΔS g ,ΔS r ) for sectors g and r , respectively.
We assume that the damages are homogenous, so they will depend on the aggregate
level of emissions. In particular, we will assume that the damages are
D(e) =
d
2
e2, (3.23)
11Note that the efﬁciency supports subsidy proﬁle
ΔS g =
Δαg
Δαr
ΔS r ,
even if the positive externality remains absent (φ= 0). We discuss this issue in depth in Chapter 1.
12We remind the reader about our discussion in Chapter 1 concerning the efﬁcient subsidized im-
plementations. In particular, the differences between efﬁcient implementations were shown to be only
nominal.
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where d > 0, so we will concentrate on the quadratic damages of pollution that
do not depend on uncertainty. We show that the optimal policy produces optimal
expected cut-offs Eλg1 and Eλ
r
1 that satisfy two conditions, namely
τ− ED ′(e) = −ΔS
g +φEλr1 (θ)
Δαg
and
τ− ED ′(e) = −ΔS
r
Δαr
.
Note that these conditions together imply
ΔS g =
Δαg
Δαr
ΔS r −φEλr1 (θ).
Referring to Equation (3.22) above, this condition merely states that the emission
allocation should be efﬁcient.
Next, to keep the presentation ﬂuent, we make the following assumption:
S r1 = S
r
0 = 0.
This assumption is a natural one, as it states that the policy should not substitute the
spillover-receiving sector. Then,ΔS r = 0, and the optimal policy satisﬁes
ΔS g =φEλr∗1 (θ).
Thus, as for the regulation of the negative externality, it holds that
τ = ED ′(e). (3.24)
3.3.2 Pegged Implementation of the Optimal Policy
Above, we solve the optimal policy as a combined tax-subsidy policy. Speciﬁcally,
the implementation applies policy ΔS g in the externality-generating sector, where
ΔS g ≡ S g1 − S g0 . From here on, we will apply (another natural) assumption as we
assume
ΔS g = S g1 = S. (3.25)
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This assumption means that S g0 = 0, so the old dirty technology is not subsidized at
all. The assumption in Equation (3.25) does not restrict the generality of the analysis
but it helps in reading it.
We say that the implementation
S =φEλr1 (θ) (3.26)
employs a lumpy payment. We consider next a rule that evolves as a function of the
permit price. We write
Eλr1 (θ) =
φΔb g +Δc gΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 ED
′(e)
by using the optimality condition in Equation (C.13) in Appendix C.4. By Equation
(3.24), it further holds that
φEλr1 (θ) =φ
φΔb g +Δc gΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +φ
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 τ. (3.27)
This way of writing reveals the fundamental fact that the policy ultimately depends
on the unit price of emissions. In particular, if we set Δθr = Δθ g = 0 in rule
S =φλr1 (θ), we have
S(s ) =φ
φΔb g +Δc gΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +φ
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s . (3.28)
Consequently, we have payment rule S(s ) that is linear in s . It holds that
E [S(s )] =φ
φΔb g +Δc gΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +φ
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 E s ,
so the rule satisﬁes the optimality condition in Equation (3.27) as long as E s = τ.
We will soon study the performance of rule S(s ) under uncertainty.
Note how the two externalities interact through variablesφ and s in rule S(s ). If
s = 0, then pollution is not an issue and the technological externality alone can be
internalized by the constant part of rule S(s ). On the other hand, if the technological
externality does not exist, then φ= 0, so S = 0. For future references, we denote
S(s ) = Γ + Γs s , (3.29)
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where Γ > 0 and Γs > 0.
We also like to comment on the efﬁciency of the implementation ex-post, that
is, when uncertainty has turned into a set of publicly known parameters. Accord-
ing to our earlier calculations, efﬁciency means that a condition S = φλr1 (θ) holds.
However, by deﬁnition,
λr1 (θ) =
S(s )
φ
− (Δc
gΔθr +φΔθ g )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 .
As we rule out contingent payment rules (i.e., rules contingent on the outcomes of
uncertainty), the allocation inevitably becomes inefﬁcient ex-post.13
3.4 Prices Versus Quantities
3.4.1 The Framework
We start our investigation by providing a framework that we will apply throughout
the rest of the study. The framework consists of (uncertain) beneﬁts and damages
as functions of the emissions price and the subsidies.14 We assumed above a speciﬁc
efﬁcient implementation that provides a positive subsidy S for the externality gen-
erators and a zero subsidy for the others. We incorporate this fact into the model by
rewriting Equation (3.5) as
λg1 =
Δb g −Δθ g + sΔαg + S
Δc g
= λg+1 (θ)+
Δαg
Δc g
s +
S
Δc g
(3.30)
= λg+1 (θ)+ zg s + γg S
for subsidy S. Furthermore, the cut-off unit in sector r becomes (Equation (3.14))
13We remark that this state is not normally observed in the studies of instrument choice. Rather,
the efﬁciency condition is strictly deterministic. It should be evident that the spillover effect among
the polluting industry is responsible for the new state.
14The policy cannot internalize the technological externality by ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology rules. In
essence, the regulatory agency lacks ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. The industry should use both brown
and green technologies, but the agency cannot distribute the technology standards in the absence of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc data. Naturally, a uniform technology standard does not work either.
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λr1 =
Δb r −Δθr + sΔαr +φλg∗1 (θ)
Δc r
(3.31)
= λr+1 (θ)+
Δαr +φzg
Δc r
s +
φγg
Δc r
S = λr+1 (θ)+ zr s + γr S.
Especially note how subsidies ﬂow indirectly into sector r through the technolog-
ical externality. Even though the policy does not subsidize units in sector r , the
subsidization in sector g beneﬁts these units.
We use B(s , S,θ) to denote uncertain beneﬁts. We incorporate the cut-off units
fromEquations (3.30) and (3.31) into beneﬁts in Equation (3.15). At themost general
level, we write
B(s , S,θ) = Ψ1(s , S)+Ψ2(s , S,θ), (3.32)
where Ψ1 is totally independent of the uncertainties while Ψ2 is not. We write the
deterministic part in Appendix C.5 (see Part I, Equation (C.17)) as
Ψ1(s ) = z(S)+ z1 s + z2 (S) s − z32 s
2, (3.33)
where factors z(S) and z2 (S) depend on subsidy S. We also write the stochastic part
as
Ψ2(s ,θ) = y(θ)− y1(θ) (S +Δαg s ) (3.34)
in Appendix C.5 (see Part III, Equation (C.26)). In particular, we show in there that
E [y(θ)] = 0 and E [y1(θ)] = 0.
We wrote the emissions formula above in Equation (3.16). We incorporate the
cut-off units from Equations (3.30) and (3.31) into the formula. The emissions in
terms of s and S are
e(s , S,θ) = x +

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

Δθ g +
Δαr
Δc r
Δθr (3.35)
−

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

S − zrΔαr +Δαg zg  s
= x + x(θ)− x1S − x2 s .
Speciﬁcally, the term x does not include either uncertainties, subsidies S, or the price
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s (see Appendix C.5, Equation (C.27)), and
x(θ) =

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

Δθ g +
Δαr
Δc r
Δθr . (3.36)
Clearly, E [x(θ)] = 0.
3.4.2 The Pegged Implementation
Consider the optimal pegged implementation. We will consider ﬁrst the implemen-
tation by tax policy (s = τ) and after that by tradable permits (s = p). We start
by inserting “the pegged rule" S(s ) from Equation (3.29) into the representations of
Equations (3.32) and (3.35). Now, it holds that
Lemma 2
Ψ1(s ) = Ψ
1− 1
2c
s2 (3.37)
and the level of emissions equals
e (s ;θ) =X + x(θ)− s
c
, (3.38)
whereΨ
1
and X are constants (do not depend on s or θ), x(θ) is given by Equation (3.36),
and c is given by Equation (3.20).
Proof. See Appendix C.5 for Parts II and IV and Equations (C.24) and (C.28).
We will show next that the pegged implementation truly reproduces the optimal
rule (as presented in Equation (3.24)). The optimal policy satisﬁes (by Equations
(3.33), (3.34), and (3.35))
dEW
dτ
=
dE [B −D]
dτ
= E

dΨ1(τ)
dτ
+
Ψ2(τ,θ)
dτ
− d e d e(τ,θ)
dτ

= 0. (3.39)
By Equation (3.34),
E
Ψ2(τ,θ)
dτ
= E

y1(θ)

dS(τ)
dτ
+Δαg

.
As subsidy S(τ) is as constant, we have
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E
Ψ2(τ,θ)
dτ
=

dS(τ)
dτ
+Δαg

E [y1(θ)] ,
so E Ψ
2(τ,θ)
dτ = 0. By this information and by Lemma 2, we write the condition in
Equation (3.39) as
E

τ
c
− d e
c

= 0,
so
τ = d e .
Thus, the expected price should be equal to the expected marginal damage under the
pegged design.15
If the policy applies tradable permits, the permit market equilibrium satisﬁes l =
e , so (by Equation (3.35))
l = x + x(θ)− x1S(p)− x2 p, (3.40)
where l is the total number of permits in the market and p is the permit price. In
particular, as S(p) is a linear rule (Equation (3.29)), it holds that
p = p +
x(θ)
x2
.
As a deterministic relationship exists between p and l , we can take p as the policy
variable as well. Then,
dEW
d p
= E

dΨ1(p)
d p
+
Ψ2(p,θ)
d p
− d e d e(p,θ)
d p

= 0.
Speciﬁcally,
E
Ψ2(p,θ)
d p
= E

y1(θ)

p + x(θ)
d p
+Δαg

= (1+Δαg )E [y1(θ)] = 0.
Thus,
dEW
d p
= E

p
c
− d e
c

= 0,
15The bar above represents the expected value.
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so the ﬁrst-best permit policy satisﬁes
p = d e .
3.4.3 Second-Best Design
We are also interested in a second-best setting, where the agency identiﬁes the tech-
nological externality but it cannot directly control it. As direct internalization is not
an option, the agency will only indirectly control it. This is possible, as the agency
has the mandate to control the negative externality, that is, the pollution.
We incorporate the second-best setting into the model by setting S = 0. We insert
the value S = 0 into Equations (3.33), (3.34), and (3.35). It follows that the non-
stochastic part of the beneﬁts is
Ψ1s b (s ) = z(0)+ z1 s −
z3
2
s2,
while
e(s ,θ) = x + x(θ)− x2 s . (3.41)
The second-best design then satisﬁes
dEW
dτ
=
dE [B −D]
dτ
= E

z1− z3 s − d e(τ,θ)dτ

= 0
or
τs b =
x2
z3
d e +
z1
z3
.
Clearly, τs b deviates from the ﬁrst-best rule. Note also that we can derive the second-
best permit policy p s b = τs b along the lines of an earlier section.
Before closing the section, we quickly review the way the marginal beneﬁts be-
have in the ﬁrst- and second-best designs. In the ﬁrst-best design, we denote
c = 1/
d 2Ψ1(s )
d s2
.
We already interpreted the constant (see Equation (3.20) above) as the slope of the
augmented abatement cost function. We employ the term “augmented" as the slope
parameter records the inﬂuence of the technological externality. Actually, quoting
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Equation (3.20), the inﬂuence of the technological externality lies in parameter φ =
0. Ifφ= 0, then c becomes the slope of the standard abatement cost function. It is a
straightforward task to show that the slope of the abatement function gets less steep
when a positive technological externality steps in.
In the second-best design,
dΨ1s b (s )
d s
= z1− z3 s .
Deﬁne
cs b =
1
z3
, (3.42)
where (by Equation (C.18) in Appendix C.5)
z3 =Δc
r (zr )
2− 2φzg zr +Δc g

zg
2
.
After (some laborious) expanding (zg and zr are deﬁned in Equations (3.30) and
(3.31), respectively), we write
cs b =
Δc gΔc r
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2− φ2Δc g (Δαg )2
. (3.43)
Clearly, cs b > c . Ifφ= 0, then cs b becomes again the slope of the standard abatement
cost function.
3.4.4 Pegged Comparative Advantage
It is time to move to the main subject of our study, namely, to the instrument choice
under uncertainty. An integral part of the model is the so-called Weitzman assump-
tion. According to this assumption, the agency sets the policy parameters ﬁrst.
Then, the regulated ﬁrms react to the uncertainty and the game ends. That is, both
parties move only once. Another question concerns the set of feasible instruments.
We have already assumed that the agency may choose between an environmental tax
and tradable permits. A further question concerns the presence of the technological
externality and the subsidy rule. We will apply the so-called pegged payment, which
is a function of the emissions price. Consequently, if the price of the emissions is
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ﬁxed, then payment S becomes ﬁxed as well. We will discuss alternative implemen-
tations later on.
We will base the instrument choice on the comparative advantage (Weitzman
[84]). We denote it byΔ. In choosing between instruments τ and p, we have
Δ (I , J ) = EB(I (θ),θ)− ED(e(I (θ),θ))− [EB(J (θ),θ)− ED(e(J (θ),θ))] (3.44)
= EB(I (θ),θ)− EB(J (θ),θ)− [ED(e(I (θ),θ))− ED(e(J (θ),θ))] .
Speciﬁcally, a strictly positiveΔ (I , J ) implies that the agency prefers the instrument
I (θ).
We let I (θ) = τ and J (θ) = p(θ). We calculate next the differences in beneﬁts
and damages in the comparative advantage. The subsidy follows the rule in Equation
(3.29). As we denote the permit price in this design by p, then the subsidy is
S(p) = Γ + Γs p. (3.45)
The permit price is determined by the market, where the demand of permits equals
the supply. The equilibrium (see Equation (3.40)) satisﬁes
l = x + x(θ)− x1S(p)− x2 p,
or, by Lemma 2,
l =X + x(θ)− 1
c
p.
The equilibrium price then satisﬁes
p(θ) = τ+ c x(θ). (3.46)
Recall that E p(θ) = τ, where τ is the tax rate.
Next, the representation in Equation (3.32) states that
B(s ,θ) = Ψ1(s )+Ψ2(s ,θ).
Inserting factor Ψ2(s ,θ) (Equation (3.34)) together with rule S(p) (Equation (3.45))
into the beneﬁts gives us
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B(s ,θ) = Ψ1(s )+ y(θ)− y1(θ) (Γ + Γs p +Δαg p) ,
where Ψ1(s ) is given by Equation (3.37) in Lemma 2. We further denote
η= (Γs +Δα
g )> 0 (3.47)
and
Ξ(θ) = y1(θ)Γ , (3.48)
so
B(s ,θ) = Ψ1(s )+ y(θ)−Ξ(θ)− y1(θ)ηs . (3.49)
We pay speciﬁc attention to the cross product between uncertainty and unit price,
namely to the product y1(θ)s . This product will mainly explain the forthcoming
new effect in instrument choice. As for the expected beneﬁts under tradable permits,
the permit price process follows Equation (3.46) and Ψ1(s ) follows Equation (3.37).
We then have
EB(p(θ),θ) = Ψ
1− c
2
E (x(θ))2+ E [y(θ)−Ξ(θ)− y1(θ)ητ]− cηEy1(θ)x(θ).
(3.50)
The tax design ﬁxes the price of the emissions so that s = τ. The subsidy rule
becomes
S(τ) = Γ + Γsτ,
so the subsidy is a ﬁxed entity. The expected beneﬁts in the tax regime are
EB(τ) = Ψ
1
+ E [y(θ)−Ξ(θ)− y1(θ)ητ] ,
so the difference becomes
EB(τ,θ)− EB(p(θ),θ) = cηEy1(θ)x(θ)+ c2E (x(θ))
2 . (3.51)
Emissions remain ﬁxed in the quantity instrument implementation. With taxes,
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we apply Equation (3.35), so that
e(τ,θ) = x + x(θ)−

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

S(τ)− zrΔαr +Δαg zg τ,
or, by Lemma 2,
e(τ,θ) =X + x(θ)− τ
c
= e + x(θ). (3.52)
We then calculate the difference in expected damages as
E [D(e(τ,θ))−D(e(p(θ))] = d
2
E (x(θ))2 . (3.53)
We incorporate the differences in Equations (3.51) and (3.53) into the comparative
advantage in Equation (3.44). We have
Proposition 5 Let c > 0 be the slope of the marginal abatement function, d > 0 be the
slope of the marginal damage function, andφ> 0 be the externality effect. Furthermore,
assume that the efﬁcient subsidy rule in Equation (3.45) internalizes the technological
externality. Then, the comparative advantage between the price and the tax instrument
is
Δ (τ, p) =
c − d
2
E (x(θ))2+ cηEy1(θ)x(θ), (3.54)
where cηEy1(θ)x(θ)> 0.
The measure Δ (τ, p) consists of two additive terms. The term c−d2 E (x(θ))
2 is
the traditional Weitzman effect. Accordingly, the instrument choice depends on the
slopes of the abatement cost function (c ) and the damage function (d ). The second
term is cηEy1(θ)x(θ). By Equation (C.25) in Appendix C.5,
y1(θ) =
φ
Δc gΔc r

Δθr +
φ
Δc g
Δθ g

,
so, if φ = 0, then y1(θ) = 0. Thus, if no technological externality exists, then the
second term in the measureΔ (τ, p) does not exist.
Overall, if the knowledge spillover disappears, the comparative advantage reduces
to a standard Weitzman [84]measure. First, as we just noted, the valueφ= 0 implies
that y1(θ) = 0. Second, in the absence of the spillover effect, the slope of the abate-
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ment function reduces to a standard slope denoted by cz (see Equation (3.58) below).
Third, the variance E (x(θ))2 reduces to E (xz (θ))
2, which by Equation (3.36) equals
E (xz (θ))
2 = E

Δαg
Δc g
Δθ g +
Δαr
Δc r
Δθr
2
.
In summary, the comparative advantage reduces to a standard Weitzman [84] mea-
sure,
Δ (τ, p) =
cz − d
2
E (xz (θ))
2 .
3.4.5 Graphical Illustration
The result just derived is not standard, so further illustration is needed. We do this
graphically, and, for the sake of an easy exposition, we draw the ﬁgure in terms of
the quantity (the emissions). The exact shape of the marginal beneﬁt curve is not
obvious at the outset. We base the ﬁgure on the previous section and, speciﬁcally,
on the application of Lemma 2.
Recall that we operate in a pegged regime. The relation between price s and the
quantity e can be written (by Equation (3.38)) as
X + x(θ)− s
c
− e = 0. (3.55)
We solve s (e ;θ) and insert it into the beneﬁts in Equation (3.32). Speciﬁcally, by
Equation (3.37),
Ψ1(s (e ;θ)) = Ψ
1− 1
2c
(s (e ;θ))2 ,
and by Equation (3.49),
Ψ2(s (e ;θ),θ) = y(θ)−Ξ(θ)− y1(θ)ηs (e ;θ),
so,
mb (e ;θ) =
dB(s (e);θ)
d e
=

dΨ1(s (e ;θ))
d e
+
Ψ2(s (e ;θ),θ)
d e

d s (e ;θ)
d e
= cηy1(θ)+ s (e ;θ),
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or
mb (e ;θ) = cX + c x(θ)+ cηy1(θ)− c e . (3.56)
We see the in special pattern how uncertainty (θ) shifts the marginal beneﬁt func-
tion.
To understand the previous comparative advantage (Equation (3.54)), one has to
understand a key feature of the standard model ﬁrst. By standard model, we refer
to a model without technological externality, which is to say that φ = 0. The key
feature is that the marginal beneﬁt function mb (e ;θ) and the price function s (e ;θ)
are one and the same thing.16 Conversely, in our model,
mb (e ;θ)− s (e ;θ) = cηy1(θ) = 0. (3.57)
As long as φ = 0, then y1(θ) = 0 and mb (e ;θ) = s (e ;θ). Note further that the
emissions in the tax regime are determined by the price function. Equation (3.55)
then gives us the emissions response
e (τ;θ) = cX + x(θ)− τ
c
.
In Figure 3.2, the tax policy is a horizontal line at τ, while the permit policy is
represented by a vertical line placed at e = l . The uncertainty that we assume is
plain, as there are only two possible states of the world. Please note that the sub-
script d stands for low realization of uncertainty, while the subscript u represents
high realization of uncertainty. We denote the marginal damage curve by md . By
assumption, it remains stable.
Figure 3.2 represents the discrepancy between the marginal beneﬁts (the mb -
curves) and the price functions (the s -curves). Referring back to Equation (3.56),
the factor cηy1(θ) shifts the mb -curve away from the s -curve.
17 The ﬁgure also
shows that the market tax response is either ed or eu . Had they been determined
by the marginal beneﬁt responses (as they would in a standard model), they would
have been embd and emb u , respectively. The quota is ﬁxed, so the emissions under
the quantity system stay ﬁxed at e = l .
16We already reviewed this feature in a different context (see Section 1.4.5, Chapter 1).
17The expected curves would lie on top of each other. This follows, as Ey1(θ) = 0. Furthermore,
they would cross the point where the vertical line l and the horizontal line τ cross.
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Figure 3.2 Prices vs. Quantities under a Positive Technological Externality That Is Internalized in an
Efﬁcient Way
We have also incorporated the ex-post optimal policies into Figure 3.2. If the
agency could reset the policy, it would follow the black dots in the ﬁgure. The com-
mitment to a certain instrument creates a certain welfare loss. In Figure 3.2, the
quantity policy loss is equal to an area Q1 +Q2, while the loss with tax policy is
equal to p1. In particular, note the inﬂuence of the technological externality. In the
absence of it, there would have been an additional area equal to p2 that would have
been counted as a cost to the price instrument. In this respect, the pegged policy
favors the price instrument.
Mendelsohn [42] studies endogenous technological change and instrument choice
under uncertainty. In his model, innovations in clean technology make the beneﬁt
curve less steep, that is, less responsive to the changes in price. Mendelsohn com-
pares comparative advantages with and without R&D. If we want to interpret our
results in a similar manner, we should compare regimes with and without positive
spillovers. In practice, one has to control the differences between two separate slopes
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of the abatement functions. In this approach, we write
cz =
Δc gΔc r
Δc r (Δαg )2+Δc g (Δαr )2
> 0 (3.58)
as the slope of the abatement function in the absence of spillovers. Using this, we
write a new version of the comparative advantage as
Δ (τ, p) =
1
n

cz − nd
2
E (x(θ))2+ czηEy1(θ)x(θ)

, (3.59)
where
n =
cz
c
=
Δc gΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2
Δc r (Δαg )2+Δc g (Δαr )2+ 2φΔαgΔαr
Δc r (Δαg )2+Δc g (Δαr )2
.
As both terms in the multiplication are strictly greater than zero, then n > 1. In
Equation (3.59), the term outside the brackets is strictly larger than zero, so it does
not affect the sign of the measure. On the contrary, the coefﬁcient n inside the
brackets favors the quantity instrument.
Factor n catches the same kind of effect that Mendelsohn discusses. That is, it
catches the effect that a new impact (investment, spillovers) makes the slope of the
abatement function less steep.18 We denote this effect as a slope effect. It belongs to
a larger group of effects that we labeled as the base effects in the Introduction. These
effects follow as we move between representations that apply efﬁcient implementa-
tions. In Chapter 2, we have another base effect (also denoted by n), namely, the
so-called scope effect. It is calculated between perfect or imperfect participations in
regulation.
In Mendelsohn [42], the beneﬁts of investments are purely private, so subsidiza-
tion is not required for efﬁciency reasons. Consequently, effects like cost effects
do not evolve there. In Figure 3.2, instead, the price function shifts away from the
marginal beneﬁt function because of the cost effect. We already discussed in Chapter
1 that the price function and the marginal beneﬁt function are two separate entities
under inefﬁcient subsidization. We showed that the price function tilts away from
the marginal beneﬁt function at the horizontal axis (see Figure 1.2). However, there
is a fundamental difference between the chapters. In Chapter 1, expected beneﬁts
and price functions are genuinely separate entities, while here, these functions di-
18Note that some writers (see Requate [61]) interpret the presence of spillovers as a form of R&D.
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verge only ex-post. We discussed in the Introduction how efﬁciency is ruined ex-ante
in Chapter 1, while here, efﬁciency is developed ex-ante but ruined ex-post.
3.4.6 Second-Best Comparative Advantage
We deﬁned the second-best design above as a policy in which the technological ex-
ternality is controlled only indirectly. In particular, subsidies are not an option in
the design. This means that the second-best policy is studied by setting S = 0 in our
framework. In this section, we are interested in the instrument choice in the second-
best setting. We will calculate the value of comparative advantage as presented in
Equation (3.44). Here, it corresponds to
Δ (τs b , ps b ) = EB(τs b ,θ)− EB(ps b (θ),θ)− [ED(e(τs b ,θ))− ED(ls b )] , (3.60)
where ps b is the permit price, τs b is the tax rate, and ls b is the quota in the second-
best design. We discussed the determination of τs b and ls b in Section 3.4.3.
In the permit markets, the market equilibrium will satisfy (by Equation (3.41))
ls b = x + x(θ)− x2 s ,
so the equilibrium permit price is
ps b (θ) =
1
x2
(x + x(θ)− ls b ) .
As E [ps b (θ)] = τs b , we may also write
ps b (θ) = τs b +
x(θ)
x2
= τs b +wx(θ).
Furthermore, by Equation (3.35),
w =
1
x2
=
1
zrΔαr + zgΔαg
, (3.61)
or, by expanding, (we deﬁne zg and zr in Equations (3.30) and (3.31), respectively),
w =
Δc gΔc r
Δc g (Δαr )2+φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2
. (3.62)
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By comparing Equations (3.43) and (3.62), we see that w = cs b .
After incorporating the value S = 0 into representations in Equations (3.33) and
(3.34), the beneﬁts in the second-best design are
B(s ,θ) = Ψ1(s )+Ψ(s ,θ) = z(0)+ z1 s − 12cs b s
2+ y(θ)− y1(θ)Δαg s .
We further incorporate the permit price (s = ps b (θ)) into the beneﬁts and calculate
the expected beneﬁts as
EB(ps b (θ),θ)
= Ψ
1
+ E [y(θ)− y1(θ)τs b ]−wΔαg Ey1(θ)x(θ)− w
2
2cs b
E (x(θ))2 .
Speciﬁcally,
EB(ps b (θ),θ)− EB(τs b ,θ) = wΔαg Ey1(θ)x(θ)− w
2
2cs b
E (x(θ))2 (3.63)
=
w
cs b

cs bΔα
g Ey1(θ)x(θ)− w2 E (x(θ))
2

.
On the other hand, according to Equation (3.41), the emissions in the tax system are
e(τs b ,θ) = e s b + x(θ),
while the emissions with tradable permits are ﬁxed and equal to e s b . Together, these
give us the difference in expected damages as
E [D(e(τs b ,θ))−D(ls b )] = d2 E (x(θ))
2 . (3.64)
Notably, the difference in expected damages is precisely the same as in the ﬁrst-best
comparative measure above (see Equation (3.53)). Altogether, after incorporating
the differences in beneﬁts (Equation (3.63)) and in damages (Equation (3.64)) into
the comparative advantage (Equation (3.60)), we have
Δ (τs b , ps b ) =

w2
cs b
− d

E (x(θ))2
2
+wΔαg Ey1(θ)x(θ). (3.65)
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The second-best comparativemeasure has a similar structure to its ﬁrst-best coun-
terpart in Equation (3.54). In addition to the usual slope comparison, an additive
(positive) cross product emerges. Thus, even though the technological uncertainty
remains unpriced, the additive cross product remains in the comparative advantage.
Another question concerns the qualitative nature of this new measure. One may
wonder how does the second-best design affects the comparative advantage as com-
pared to original measure by Weitzman [84]. To answer this, we ﬁrst write the com-
parative advantage as
Δ (τs b , ps b ) =
r1c − d
2
E (x(θ))2+ c r2Ey1(θ)x(θ),
where
r1 =
w2
c cs b
and
r2 =
wΔαg
c
.
We have
Lemma 3 i) r1 > 1 and ii) r2 > 0.
Proof. The non-negativity of r2 follows from the non-negativity of w,Δα
g , and c .
As for the size of factor r1, see Appendix C.6.
Thus, as compared to the mere standard outcome, where r1 = 1 and r2 = 0, the
implemented policy will favor the price instrument.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
We extend the workings of traditional market-based instruments (i.e., tradable per-
mits and environmental taxes) to cover subsidization as well. This is required as we
assume that positive externality (knowledge spillovers) exists within the polluting
industry. We show how pricing only the negative externality (pollution) and set-
ting the price of positive externality to zero does not produce an optimal societal
outcome. We further follow the framework by Weitzman [84], which is essentially
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a second-best study of regulation under uncertainty. It asks, whether the environ-
mental agency should commit to a price instrument or a quantity instrument, when
the agency is forced to make a binding commitment in its policy. The agency can-
not reset the policy parameters once new information arrives or it cannot base the
regulation on state-contingent contracts. We show that these means are especially
required here to secure the efﬁciency of emission allocation. As subsidization in-
evitably becomes inefﬁcient, it affects the choice between prices and quantities. In
particular, the inefﬁciency is reﬂected in the cost effect of the instrument choice,
and like in the earlier chapters, the cost effect will favor the price instrument, that is
environmental taxation.
The implementation in this chapter uses payments that consist of two parts: the
environmental payment and the subsidy payment. A specialty in the optimal policy
analysis is the fact that it clearly promotes subsidization but does not explicitly state
the form of subsidization. This fact carries a close resemblance to the original anal-
ysis of Weitzman, where the optimal policy promotes the pricing of emissions but
does not explicitly state whether prices or quantities should be applied. We end up
promoting a linear rule in subsidization that explicitly depends on the unit price of
emissions. In particular, when this rule is incorporated into the system of tradable
permits, the subsidy will depend on the permit price. In comparing prices and quan-
tities, we compare implementations where one implementation (quantities) applies
a stochastic subsidy rule while the other (prices) applies a ﬁxed subsidy rule.
We call the stochastic subsidy rule the pegged subsidy rule. The name originates
from the currency markets, where a currency peg represents one kind of exchange
rate policy. Under the policy, typically one (small) currency follows another (big)
one in a ﬁxed relationship. However, as we explained above, the optimal policy does
not ﬁx the type of the subsidy implementation. This gives us reason to look after
rules outside the pegged subsidy rule. First, wemay consider a kind of hybrid system
in which the price of emissions is determined in the markets, but the subsidy is ﬁxed
and equal to the subsidy under taxes. In other words, the permit policy would apply
the rule (see Equation (3.29))
S(τ) = Γ + Γsτ, (3.66)
where τ is a tax rate. Alternatively, as we do in Chapters 1 and 2, we may analyze a
rule that utilizes emission thresholds in subsidization. In the present context, a unit
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is entitled to an emission threshold l ki as long as it applies technology i in sector k .
Consequently, the unit is entitled to a subsidy payment equal to
S(p) = p l ki .
In particular, in the policy above, the threshold-based subsidy would be
S(p) = p l g1 (3.67)
as the subsidy is paid only to a polluting unit that uses green technology in the
externality-generating sector.
We do not analyze these alternatives at length but rather leave the issue for future
reviews. However, according to our preliminary calculations, the functioning of the
hybrid system (subsidy rule in Equation (3.66)) is not standard. In particular, we
have calculated that the comparative advantage resembles the second-best compara-
tive advantage that we derive in Equation (3.65). As for the other implementation,
namely, the threshold case (depicted in Equation (3.67)), we remind the reader about
our extensive discussion about the threshold implementations in Chapter 1. Based
on that discussion, we note how threshold implementations may create a volume
effect. The volume effect is absent in the analysis of this chapter only because the
permit endowment is entirely auctioned off. Even though the number of ﬁrms ﬂuc-
tuates between different technologies in different sectors, the level of emissions stays
constant throughout the entire study.
Finally, we remark about the possibility that a negative externality could prevail
among the polluting industry. We have brieﬂy analyzed this possibility. As far as
optimality requires (see Equation (3.26)) that S = φEλr1 (θ), we have φ < 0 and
Eλr1 (θ)> 0, so S < 0. This means that the optimal policy should tax ﬁrms in sector
g because of their externality generation. Furthermore, the value φ < 0 can be
shown to affect one of the main results of this chapter, namely, Proposition 5. In
particular, the negative technological externality gives rise to a series of complex
impacts. This is in contrast to the case of positive technological externality, which
yields much more predictable outcomes.
Overall, our interest lies in regulation in a situationwhere both negative and posi-
tive externalities exist simultaneously. We consider knowledge spillover as a positive
externality. The properties of knowledge spillover are fairly intuitive and uncontro-
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versial, at least in theory. The accurate identiﬁcation and measurement of the effect
is a bigger issue. In this respect, our approach does not question the identiﬁcation
of the effect but rather takes the spillover effect as a known parameter. A natural
extension would be to incorporate an uncertain spillover effect into the problem
of instrument choice. Instead of concentrating on uncertain marginal beneﬁts and
damages, we might focus on the uncertain spillover effect. Our current framework
would need considerable elaboration in order to conform to such an approach.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the opening part of his 1965 book “Theory of Production", Ragnar Frisch [19], the
co-recipient of the ﬁrstNobelMemorial Prize in Economic Sciences, reviews various
basic concepts of production. Among other things, he discusses the case of joint
production: “In this case the technical process itself contains an element which makes it
impossible (or very difﬁcult) to produce one product without at the same time producing
one or more other products," (Frisch [19], p. 11). He draws a further distinction
between main products, bi-products, and waste products in joint production. He
ends up speculating that "a change in the price situation may result in the bi-product or
even waste product being elevated to the status of main product," (Frisch [19], p. 11).
We think that the general attitude toward the environment has changed. Nowa-
days, the quality of air, land and water is a big issue. We do not see the burning
of coal as a single production of electricity but rather as a joint production of both
electricity and carbon dioxide. However, to assure an economist that actual change
has occurred, a change in the “price situation" is needed. We think that is changing
as well. We have witnessed various approaches in the pricing of the “waste product."
For example, we have witnessed the pricing of carbon dioxide (Newell et al.[52];
Carl & Fedor [6]).
In our interpretation, the pricing of the waste products corresponds to Piquovian
taxation as ﬁrst suggested by Arthur Pigou [57]. In this approach, the meaning of
taxation is not merely to collect public revenues but to guide waste producers to-
ward socially acceptable choices. In the thesis, we clarify in numerous places what
is meant by socially acceptable choices. Even more extensively, we concentrate on
the details of waste pricing: on direct and indirect ways of pricing. The price can be
implemented directly by setting a tax on waste, or the policy can set the price only
indirectly by imposing a quota on waste and establishing a market where the quota is
traded. These two implementations—environmental taxes and tradable permits—are
called market-based instruments in the literature (Stavins [74], [75]). In considering
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their mutual relationship, we regard the paper of Weitzman [84] as a seminal study.
Weitzman shows that it matters whether the policy directly controls the price (the
tax) or the quantity (the quota) especially when regulation suffers from uncertain-
ties.
We complement the study of instrument choice by focusing on discrete pollution
choices and instrument payments. We base our theoretical framework on a simple
observation that the instrument payments guide the polluting units in their discrete
choices. The market-based policies set a unit price to an unpriced commodity but
they simultaneously create transfer payments. We study how the payments inﬂu-
ence the discrete production choices like whether to close down the operation for
good or not, whether to voluntarily participate in regulation or to stay outside of it,
whether to modify the existing production line, to invest to a new green factory, or
to produce in an old style with the same technology as before the regulation. Impor-
tantly, discrete choices are major choices, as a single discrete choice typically reduces
several units of waste in a cost-effective way.
We assume that a transfer payment contains two parts. The ﬁrst part is the unit
price of emissions times the amount of emissions. As such, it can be interpreted as
a factor payment (for the use of environment). The second part is called a subsidy,
which offers some ﬂexibility in regulation. A central characteristic of a subsidy is
the conditionality of the payment. It is paid to a producing unit only if it satisﬁes
a certain condition (e.g., it is an active ﬁrm, uses a certain kind of technology, or
participates in a public program). In every case, both parts in a transfer payment are
assumed to depend on the unit price of emissions. Consequently, the policy-maker
can directly control the tax payments while it controls the quota payments only
indirectly. This is the central distinction in the thesis.
We study our research question in three cases. First, we study direct political
motives behind subsidization. We study subsidization of ﬁrms in the fear of ﬁrm
closures and in the hope for green investments. In both cases, the environmental
agency sees no reason for subsidization but rather take it as a constraint in policy-
making. In our second case, the agency accepts subsidization, as the subsidies are
vital in correcting the weaknesses of existing regulation. Without subsidization, the
participation in regulation is only imperfect, as the mandatory regulation covers
only part of the relevant polluters. In the third case, the social welfare again calls for
subsidization because of positive externalities. Investments in green technology in
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one sector enhances the productivity of green technology in another sector. Without
proper subsidization in the externality-generating sector, its ﬁrms do not properly
invest in green technology.
We ﬁnd three kinds of effects in instrument choice: base, cost, and volume ef-
fects. Base effects catch inﬂuences that exist within the polluting industry. In Chap-
ter 2, the voluntary provision succeeds in attracting cost-reducing projects under
the regulation. This is further reﬂected in the downward shift of the aggregate cost
curve. Likewise, in Chapter 3, a knowledge spillover is reﬂected in the cost curve.
We assume that the spillover operates within the green technology. Consequently,
the aggregate emission cost curve shifts downwards as some polluting units in the
externality-receiving sector beneﬁt from the positive externality. We show how base
effects end up favoring the quantity instrument in the instrument choice. A decrease
in the costs of regulation inside the polluting industry allows the regulation to em-
phasize the emission damages, so a decrease allows the regulation to emphasize the
stability of emissions.
The cost effect records inefﬁciency in the instrument choice. Cost effects evolve
as subsidization induces inefﬁciency. We show how the cost effect favors stability in
the unit price of emissions. As an emission tax is an extremely stable price, the cost
effect is very favorable to taxation. Taken together, base and cost effects are found
to pull in opposite directions.
Base and cost effects are all intuitively clear and well behaving. Their inﬂuences
are monotonic in the sense that they favor only one instrument. Our analyses indi-
cate that volume effects are less predictable, but there is no difﬁculty in deﬁning the
effect. It is the effect that arises when the tradable emission quota is no longer ﬁxed.
However, there are regimes where the volume effect favors the quantity instrument
and regimes where it does not favor. We derive these regimes as a function of the
various parameters of the model. In our simple framework of Chapter 1, we study
at length how various subsidies affect the nature of the volume effect.
Overall, we provide a simple framework for the study of subsidized instrument
choice. In doing that, we use some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we con-
centrate on the determination of two endogenous variables within the regulated in-
dustry. Furthermore, in studying the discrete choices, we assume that the polluting
units take the level of their activity as given.
Let us brieﬂy discuss these simplifying assumptions. In the thesis, a polluting sec-
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tor is divided into two polluting sectors that are further divided into two production
technologies. These assumptions together allow the simultaneous determination of
four choice variables. Even though we mainly concentrate on the determination of
two variables, we outline an extended model at the end of Chapter 1 that determines
four outcomes. We think that further research using extended models is needed, as
the (two-variable) model actually analyzed may produce too speciﬁc results.
There is another, perhaps more subtle, concern. An important difference be-
tween the models in Chapter 1 and 2 is that Chapter 2 studies intra-ﬁrm permit
trading while Chapter 1 does not study. Intra-ﬁrm permit trading occurs if some
polluting units have permit surpluses, so that they can sell permits in the permit
markets. We ﬁnd that instrument choice is very sensitive to the fact whether intra-
ﬁrm permit trading occurs or not. More precisely, we ﬁnd that the volume effect is
very sensitive to the various assumptions about intra-ﬁrm permit trading. However,
our extended model at the end of Chapter 1 allows permit trades between different
technologies, so it promises an opportunity to study further this particular question.
Overall, we conclude that further research on the volume effect is evidently needed.
The second simplifying assumption in the thesis concerns the unit-level choices.
The choices are simple, since we only take the type of the technology as a choice
variable but omit the level of emissions.19 It is possible that our models may (again)
produce outcomes that may be too speciﬁc. In particular, the models may yield
more efﬁcient allocations than extended models would do.20 These extended mod-
els assume both discrete and continuous emission choices and they typically ﬁnd
that only zero subsidies are efﬁcient. However, it is important to note that we are
primarily interested not in efﬁcient but inefﬁcient outcomes, since we are interested
in instrument choices under inefﬁcient implementations. In fact, we show in many
occasions that an efﬁcient implementation produces the original comparative advan-
tage of Weitzman [84]. In addition, even though the extended models may offer a
more realistic view, they are more complex as well. The complexity accumulates as
we already study second-best outcomes in the thesis.21
We stress once more that the discrete emission reductions are the basis of the the-
sis. We see that the discrete choices are the major means in improving the quality
19In this context, we regard Amacher and Malik [2] as an example of an extended model.
20We base this view on our own calculations and in models like Spulber [71] and Kling and Zhao
[30].
21That is, the original Weitzman study [84] is a second-best study (Phaneuf and Requate [56]).
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of air, land, and water. In formulating this view, our models apply rather rude ap-
proximations as they simply ignore the continuous choices. In the future, we would
like to be more explicit about the modeling issue. We would like to evaluate the
error that the approximation induces. Furthermore, we could develop new approx-
imations where both continuous and discrete choices are included, the continuous
choices are of secondary importance, and the linear-quadratic framework of Weitz-
man [84] applies.
The extensions to our framework will surely expand our understanding of the
various effects in the implementation of subsidizedmarket-based instruments. How-
ever, the current study has notable merits, too. It provides the ﬁrst systematic frame-
work for the comparative study of subsidized market-based instruments. In partic-
ular, we like to note that we consider the main qualitative ﬁndings robust. That is,
even if we study discrete choices in an extended subsidized framework, the cost, the
volume, and the base effects will exist even though their mutual relations may be
affected.
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A INEFFICIENT SUBSIDIZATION
A.1 Expected Welfare Maximization
We start by deriving the optimal societal policy of Section 1.3.2.1. By deﬁnition, the
policy consists of an optimal emission price (τ) and sector speciﬁc thresholds (l0, l1).
The objective is as follows:
Max
τ,l0,l1
EW = E
∫ λ0(τ,l0,θ)
0
B0dλ+
∫ λ1(τ,l1,θ)
0
B1dλ

− ED(e(λ0(τ, l0,θ),λ1(τ, l1,θ))
such that
e = λ0(τ, l0,θ)α0+λ1(τ, l1,θ)α1.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
dEW
dτ
= E

B0(λ0(τ, l0,θ))−α0D ′(e

)
dλ0(τ, l0,θ)
dτ

(A.1)
+ E

B1(λ1(τ, l1,θ))−α1D ′(e

)
dλ1(τ, l1,θ)
dτ

= 0,
dEW
d l0
= E

B0(λ0(τ, l0,θ))−α0D ′(e

)
dλ0(τ, l0,θ)
d l0

= 0, (A.2)
and
dEW
d l1
= E

B1(λ1(τ, l1,θ))−α1D ′(e

)
dλ1(τ, l1,θ)
d l1

= 0. (A.3)
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In particular, by Equations (1.1) and (1.4) in the main text, we have
Bi (λi (τ, li ,θ)) = τ(αi − li ),
where i = 0,1. As far as dλ1(τ,l1,θ)dτ = 0, then (by Equations (A.2) and (A.3))
τ(αi − li )−α1E

D ′(e)

= 0,
where i = 0,1. Furthermore, Equation (A.1) can be rewritten as
E

τ(α0− l0)−α0D ′(e
−α0− l0
c0

+ E

τ(α1− l1)−α1D ′(e

α1

−α1− l1
c1

= E

−τ

(α0− l0)2
c0
+
(α0− l0)2
c0

+ E

α0
α0− l0
c0
+α1
α1− l1
c1

D ′(e)

= 0,
or, by the deﬁnitions in Equations (1.12) and (1.17), as
− τ
γ l
+
E

D ′(e)

γ L
= 0.
Note that we can also consider the tax rate as a redundant policy variable. That is,
if Equations (A.2) and (A.3) hold simultaneously, then Equation (A.1) holds as well.
At the implementation stage, the units should be charged payments equal to S0 and
S1 in sectors zero and one, respectively. These payments should satisfy S0 = α0D
′(e)
and S1 = α1D
′(e), i.e., they are equal to efﬁcient tax payments in a market-based
implementation.
A.2 Optimal Policies Yield Only Nominal Differences
We claim that the different optimal tax rates (introduced in Section 1.3.2.1) yield
identical level of emissions ex-post. To see this, write ﬁrst the emissions (Equation
(1.26)) as
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e(s ,θ) = α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1
c0c1
s
= α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− c1

α0−l0
α0

α20+ c0

α1−l1
α1

α21
c0c1
s ,
or, by the efﬁciency rule (Equation (1.24)), as
e(s ,θ) = α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

−ω c1α
2
0+ c0α
2
1
c0c1
s (A.4)
= α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

−ω s
γ
,
where γ is the slope of themarginal abatement function. In the ﬁrst implementation,
l0 = l1 = 0,ω = 1, and s = τ
0, so
e(τ0,θ) = α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− τ
0
γ
.
Alternatively, l0 > 0, l1 > 0, 0< ω < 1, and s = τ
e = τ
0
ω , so
e(τe ,θ) = α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

−ωτ
e
γ
= α0
b0
c0
+α1
b1
c1
− τ
0
γ
.
Clearly, e(τ0,θ) = e(τe ,θ).
A.3 Optimal Permit Policies
We study next implementations of the optimal societal policy by tradable permits
(see Section 1.3.2.2). Let us study ﬁrst the supply of aggregate permits (L) in the
sterilized system. By Equations (1.12) and (1.14), we write the price as
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pL =
c0c1
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

=
c0c1
c1

α0−l0
α0

α20+ c0

α1−l1
α1

α21

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

or, after incorporating the efﬁciency rule (Equation (1.24)), as
pL =
γ
ω

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

,
where is γ is the slope of the marginal abatement function. We set ﬁrst l0 = l1 = 0.
Asω = 1, we have
pL = p0 = γ

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

.
Alternatively, we set l0 > 0 and l1 > 0, so 0< ω < 1 and
pL = pe =
γ
ω

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

. (A.5)
It then holds that
pe =
p0
ω
.
Let us study next the supply of auctioned permits (l ) in the non-sterilized system.
Following the steps above (together with Equations (1.17) and (1.19)), we may write
the price as
p l =
γ
ω2

ω

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1

− l

. (A.6)
In particular, íf we set l0 = l1 = 0 and l = L, then
p l = p0 = γ

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

.
On the other hand, if l0 > 0 and l1 > 0, then 0<ω < 1. As optimality requires that
p l = τe , we incorporate condition l =ωL into Equation (A.6). Consequently,
p l = pe =
γ
ω

b0α0
c0
+
b1α1
c1
− L

.
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In summary, it holds between optimal implementations that l =ωL≤ L.
A.4 Characteristics of Optimal Policy
Regarding the second-best policy in Section 1.3.3, we state:
i. By assuming efﬁciency, the second-best price and quantity becomes ﬁrst-best.
ii. τ s > τ0.
ii. e s > e∗.
Proof:
i. We write that (see Equations (1.12) and (1.17))
γ l =
c0c1
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2 =
c0c1
c1

α0−l0
α0
2
(α0)
2+ c0

α1−l1
α1
2
(α1)
2
and
γ L =
c0c1
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1 =
c0c1
c1

α0−l0
α0

(α0)
2+ c0

α1−l1
α1

(α1)
2
,
or, after applying the efﬁciency condition
α0− l0
α0
≡ α1− l1
α1
≡ω,
we write that
γ l =
1
ω2
c0c1
c1 (α0)
2+ c0 (α1)
2 =
γ
ω2
and
γ L =
1
ω
c0c1
c1 (α0)
2+ c0 (α1)
2 =
γ
ω
.
Then, the second-best policy targets under efﬁciency become
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τ s =
dγ Lγ l
[γ L]2+ dγ l

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

=
d γω3
γ
ω2 +
d
ω2

α0

b0
c0

+α1

b1
c1

=
1
ω
dγ
γ + d

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

=
τ0
ω
= τe
and
e s =
 
γ L
2
[γ L]2+ dγ l

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

=
γ 2
ω2
γ 2
ω2 +
dγ
ω2

α0

b0
c0

+α1

b1
c1

=

γ
γ + d

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

= e∗.
ii. By Equations (1.36) and (1.38), we write the difference between tax rates as
τ s −τ0 =

dγ Lγ l
[γ L]2+ dγ l
− γd
γ + d

α0
b0
c0
+α1
b1
c1

= dγ

(FU −ρ)γ +(FU − 1)d
(γρ+ d ) (γ + d )

α0
b0
c0
+α1
b1
c1

,
where
FU =
γ L
γ
=
c1(α0)α0+ c0(α1)α1
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1 > 1
and
ρ=

γ L
2
γγ l
.
If we further denote
0< FM =
γ L
γ l
=
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1 < 1,
then it holds that
FU −ρ= FU (1− FM ) .
Consequently, we know that FU >ρ, so
τ−τ0 > 0.
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iii. By Equations (1.33) and (1.37), we write the difference between emissions as
e s − e∗ =
 
γ L
2
[γ L]2+ dγ l
− γ
γ + d

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

.
By further manipulations, it holds that
e s − e∗ = γ
l
γ l
⎛⎜⎝ γ [γ
L]2
γγ l
γ [γ
L]2
γγ l
+ d
− γ
γ + d
⎞⎟⎠α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

=

γρ
γρ+ d
− γ
γ + d

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

=

γρd − dγ
(γρ+ d ) (γ + d )

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

=
ρ− 1
(γρ+ d )
dγ
(γ + d )

α0b0
c0
+
α1b1
c1

.
We do not derive the magnitude of ρ here. However, it is shown (see Equation
(1.58) in the main text) that ρ> 1. It then holds that
e s − e∗ > 0.
A.5 Various Differences in Prices and Quantities
To understand better our upcoming results of comparative advantage, it is helpful
ﬁrst to study the various paths for the emissions and prices. Overall, we have three
separate system to study: taxes, sterilized permits, and non-sterilized permits.
A.5.1 Part I
In the ﬁrst part, we study how the different permit prices evolve as a function of
uncertainty. By using various deﬁnitions fromSection 1.4.1 (Equations (1.45), (1.46),
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and (1.47)), we calculate that
pL(θ) = pL+ γ L

α0
c0
+
α1
c1

θ
= pL+
c0c1
c1(α0− l0)α0+ c0(α1− l1)α1

c1α0+ c0α1
c0c1

θ
= pL+
c1α0
c1(α0− l0)α0
1+ c0α1c1α0
1+ c0(α1−l1)α1c1(α0−l0)α0
θ= pL+
1
(α0− l0)
1+ ua
1+ uka
θ
and
p l (θ) = p l + γ l

(α0− l0)
c0
+
(α1− l1)
c1

θ
= p l +

c0c1
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2

(α0− l0)
c0
+
(α1− l1)
c1

θ
= p l +

c1(α0− l0)+ (α1− l1)c0
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2

θ
= p l +
c1(α0− l0)
c1(α0− l0)2
⎛⎝ 1+ (α1−l1)c0c1(α0−l0)
1+ c0(α1−l1)2c1(α0−l0)2
⎞⎠θ= p l + 1
α0− l0
1+ uk
1+ uk2
θ.
By Section 1.3.3, it holds that
pL = E

pL(θ)

= p l = E
	
p l (θ)


= p,
so we further calculate that
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pL(θ)− p l (θ) (A.7)
=
1
(α0− l0)
1+ ua
1+ uka
θ− 1
(α0− l0)

1+ uk
1+ uk2

θ
=
θ
(α0− l0)

1+ ua
1+ uka
− 1+ uk
1+ uk2

=
θ
(α0− l0)

(1+ ua)

1+ uk2
− (1+ uka) (1+ uk)
(1+ uka) (1+ uk2)

=
θ
(α0− l0)
u (a− k) (1− k)
(1+ uka) (1+ uk2)
.
A.5.2 Part II
In this part, we concentrate on differences in emissions. We have
e(s ;θ) = α0
b0
c0
+α1
b1
c1
+
α0c1+α1c0
c0c1
θ− 1
γ L
s ,
so
e(pL(θ))− e(τ(θ)) =− 1
γ L

p + γ L

α0
c0
+
α1
c1

θ

+
p
γ L
=− c1α0+ c0α1
c1c0
θ.
Likewise,
e(p l (θ))− e(τ(θ)) =− p
γ L
+
p
γ L
− 1
γ L

c0c1
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2

α0− l0
c0
+
α1− l1
c1

θ
=− 1
γ L

c1(α0− l0)+ c0(α1− l1)
c1(α0− l0)2+ c0(α1− l1)2

θ
=− 1
γ L(α0− l0)
⎛⎝ 1+ c0(α1−l1)c1(α0−l0)
1+ c0(α1−l1)2c1(α0−l0)2
⎞⎠θ=− 1
γ L
1
(α0− l0)

1+ uk
1+ uk2

θ.
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Finally,
e(pL(θ))− e(p l (θ)) =− p
L(θ)
γ L
+
p l (θ)
γ L
=
1
γ L

p l (θ)− pL(θ) ,
or, by Equation (A.7) above,
e(pL(θ))− e(p l (θ)) = 1
γ L
(a− k) (k − 1)
α0− l0
u
(1+ uk2) (1+ uak)
θ.
A.5.3 Part III
Table A.1 depicts different types of emissions paths. It does that within sectors and
at industry level. In writing the table, we incorporate cut-off units λi (Equations
(1.4)) into Equation (1.5) that represents sector-speciﬁc emissions. Each category in
the table depicts the emissions in the tax regime, in the non-sterilized regime, and in
the sterilized regime, respectively. Note that we have incorporated the rule
E

e(pL(θ))

= E
	
e(p l (θ))


= E [e(τ)]
into the calculations. As a result, each instrument produces the same expected emis-
sions, both within sectors and across polluting industry.
Table A.1 Sector Speciﬁc Emissions and Aggregate Emissions Under Various Instruments
Sector 0 Emissions
e0(τ) = e0+
α0
c0
θ
e0(p
l ) = e0+
α0
c0
θ− α0c0 (α0− l0)
 [R0(c1α0θ)+R1(c0α1θ)]
c1(α0−l0)α0+c0(α1−l1)α1

e0(p
L) = e0+
α0
c0
θ− α0c0 (α0− l0)
 c1α0θ+c0α1θ
c1(α0−l0)α0+c0(α1−l1)α1

Sector 1 Emissions
e1(τ) = e1+
α1
c1
θ
e1(p
l ) = e1+
α1
c1
θ− α1c1 (α1− l1)
 R0(c1α0θ)+R1(c0α1θ)
c1(α0−l0)α0+c0(α1−l1)α1

e1(p
L) = e1+
α1
c1
θ− α1c1 (α1− l1)
 c1α0θ+c0α1θ
c1(α0−l0)α0+c0(α1−l1)α1

Industry Emissions
e(τ) = e + α0c0 θ+
a1
c1
θ
e(p l ) = e + α0c0 θ+
α1
c1
θ− R0 α0c0 θ+R1 α1c1 θ
e(pL) = e
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A.6 Comparative Advantage in Terms of Variances
In doing the analysis of comparative advantage, we sometimes operate in terms of
variances. This section derives the proper formula of comparative advantage in these
cases.
Write the expected beneﬁts in Equation (1.50) as
EB(s ) = E

(b0+θ)
2
2c0
+
(b1+θ)
2
2c1

− Var (s )
2γ l
− (E s )
2
2γ l
and the expected damages in Equation (1.51) as
ED(e(s )) =
d
2
(Var (e(s )))+
d
2
(Ee)2 .
We have
Δ(I , J ) = E [(B(I )−D(e(I )))− (B(J )−D(e(J )))]
= E [(B(I )−B(J ))− (D(e(I ))−D(e(J )))] .
As it holds that E(I ) = E(J ) and E [e(I )] = E [e(J )], it then follows that
Δ(I , J ) = E

−Var (I )
2γ l
−

−Var (J )
2γ l

−
d
2
Var (e(I ))− d
2
Var (e(J ))

=
Var (J )−Var (I )
2

1
γ l
− d

Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I )

.
A.7 Uncertain Marginal Damages
In choosing the best instrument, we repeatedly apply an assumption that only the
beneﬁts of emissions, not the damages, are uncertain. In this section, we brieﬂy dis-
cuss this assumption. In particular, we show that our assumption does not diminish
the generality of our results as long as the beneﬁt and damage uncertainties are inde-
pendent.
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To start with, we rewrite the emission damages as
D(e(s )) = de +
d
2
e2,
where  is a random variable that shifts the marginal damage curve and
E= 0.
We have
e(θ) = α0

b0+θ
c0

+α1

b1+θ
c1

− s (θ)
γ L
and (by Equation (1.44))
s (θ) = s + γ L

R0
α0
c0
+R1
α1
c1

θ.
Then
E [e] = E



s + γ L

R0
α0
c0
+R1
α1
c1

θ

= E [s]+ γ L

R0
α0
c0
+R1
α1
c1

E [θ]
= γ L

R0
α0
c0
+R1
α1
c1

E [θ] .
As (by assumption)
Eθ= 0,
then
E [e] = 0.
Consequently, it holds that
ED(e(s )) =
d
2
E

e2

.
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A.8 Characteristics of the Cost and Volume Effects
In discussing the cost effect and volume effect in Section 1.4.3, we claim:
i. Θ(I , J ) =Θ(J , I )≡Θ.
ii. The cost effect favors the instrument with the lower variance in price.
iii. Let Θ > 1 (Θ < 1). The volume effect favors the instrument with the higher
(lower) variance in price.
Proof:
i. By Equation (1.55), we have
Θ(I , J ) =

γ L
2 Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I ) ,
so
Θ(J , I ) =

γ L
2 Var (e(J ))−Var (e(I ))
Var (I )−Var (J ) .
Thus,
Θ(I , J )−Θ(J , I )
=

γ L
2Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I ) −
Var (e(J ))−Var (e(I ))
Var (I )−Var (J )

=

γ L
2 (Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))+Var (e(J ))−Var (e(I )))
Var (J )−Var (I ) = 0.
ii. By Equation (1.52), it holds that
Δ(I , J ) =
Var (J )−Var (I )
2

1
γ l
− d

Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I )

.
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We then calculate that
Δ(I , J ) =
Var (J )−Var (I )
2

1
γ l
− d

Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I )

(A.8)
=
− [Var (I )−Var (J )]
2

1
γ l
− d
− [Var (e(J ))−Var (e(I ))]
− [Var (I )−Var (J )]

=−Var (I )−Var (J )
2

1
γ l
− d

Var (e(J ))−Var (e(I ))
Var (I )−Var (J )

=−Δ(J , I ).
Alternatively, following the representation in Equation (1.54), we write the
comparative advantage as
Δ(I , J ) =Var (J )
1− v
2
ρ
(γ L)2

γ − Θ
ρ
d

.
We know that 0 < 1ρ < 1. Speciﬁcally, if 0 < v < 1, the cost effect favors
instrument I , the low-variance instrument. Let v > 1 instead. Using Equation
(A.8), we have that
Δ(J , I ) =−Δ(I , J ) =−

Var (J )
1− v
2
ρ
(γ L)2

γ − Θ
ρ
d

=Var (J )
v − 1
2
ρ
(γ L)2

γ − Θ
ρ
d

.
Now, the cost effect favors instrument J , the instrumentwith the lowvariance.
iii. The proofs follow the case i i above.
A.9 Cost and Volume Effect Combined
We say that volume effect dominates as long as the size of it exceeds the size of the cost
effect. We calculate here the domination region in terms of the model’s parameters.
We have the volume effect
Θ(τ, p l (θ)) = 2q − 1=

2
1+ uk2
1+ uak
1+ ua
1+ uk
− 1

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and the cost effect
ρ= 1+
u (k − a)2
(1+ uak)2
.
Calculate ﬁrst
ρ= 1+
u (k − a)2
(1+ uak)2
=
(1+ uak)2+ u (k − a)2
(1+ uak)2
(A.9)
=
1+ 2uak +(uak)2+ u

k2− 2ak + a2
(1+ uak)2
=
1+ uk2+ ua2

1+ uk2

(1+ uak)2
=

1+ uk2
 
1+ ua2

(1+ uak)2
.
Thus,
Θ(τ, p l (θ))−ρ
=

2
1+ uk2
1+ uak
1+ ua
1+ uk
− 1

−

1+ uk2
 
1+ ua2

(1+ uak)2

=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

2
1+ ua
1+ uk
− 1+ uka
1+ uk2
− 1+ ua
2
1+ uak

=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

1+ ua
1+ uk
− 1+ uka
1+ uk2

+

1+ ua
1+ uk
− 1+ ua
2
1+ uak

.
Furthermore,
Θ(τ, p l (θ))−ρ
=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

ua+ uk2− uka− uk
(1+ uk) (1+ uk2)
+
ua+ uak − uk − ua2
(1+ uk) (1+ uak)

=
1+ uk2
1+ uka
u
1+ uk

a(1− k)+ k (k − 1)
1+ uk2
+
a+ ak − k − a2
1+ uak

=
1+ uk2
1+ uka
u
1+ uk

(a− k) (1− k)
1+ uk2
+
(1− a) (a− k)
1+ uak

.
So, we may write that
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Θ(τ, p l (θ))−ρ= 1+ uk
2
1+ uka
u
1+ uk
(a− k)

1− k
1+ uk2
+
1− a
1+ uak

.
A.10 Quantities versus Quantities
Our analysis in Section 1.4.8 suggests that the quantity regime can be implemented
in two alternative ways. Furthermore, the choice between these implementations is
determined by the comparative advantage calculated in Equation (1.76). This mea-
sure requires the knowledge of the volume effect Θ and the variance factor v. This
section provides formulas for these factors.
In general (see Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3), it holds that
Δ(I , J ) =Var (J )
1− v
2
ρ
(γ L)2

γ − Θ(I , J )
ρ
d

, (A.10)
where
Θ(I , J ) =

γ L
2 Var (e(I ))−Var (e(J ))
Var (J )−Var (I )
and
v(I , J ) =
Var (I )
Var (J )
.
In Part I, we derive formula for the factor Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)), while in Part II, we cal-
culate formula for v(p l (θ), pL(θ)).
A.10.1 Part I
It holds that Var (e(pL(θ))) = 0, so
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =

γ L
2 Var (e(p l (θ))
Var (pL(θ))−Var (p l (θ)) .
Using the representations in Equations (1.59) and (1.60), we may write that
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =

γ L
2σ2 	(1−R0)α0c0 + (1−R1)α1c1 
2
(γ L)2σ2
	
α0
c0
+ α1c1

2− (γ L)2σ2 	R0(I )α0c0 +R1(I )α1c1 
2 .
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After arranging, it holds that
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =
	
(1−R0)α0c0 + (1−R1)
α1
c1

2
	
α0
c0
+ α1c1

2− 	R0(I )α0c0 +R1(I )α1c1 
2
=
	
(1−R0)α0c0 + (1−R1)
α1
c1

2
	
α0
c0
+ α1c1

2− 	α0c0 + α1c1 − (1−R0) α0c0 + (1−R1) α1c1 
2
=
1
2
	
(1−R0) α0c0 +(1−R1)
α1
c1

	 α0
c0
+ α1c1


	
(1−R0) α0c0 +(1−R1)
α1
c1

2 − 1
=
1
2
	 α0
c0
+ α1c1

	
(1−R0) α0c0 +(1−R1)
α1
c1

 − 1
.
Using the deﬁnitions of R0 and R1 (Equations (1.48)), the volume effect becomes
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =
1
2
α0
c0
+ α1c1
α0
c0
+ α1c1 −R0
 α0
c0
+ ka
α1
c1
 − 1
=
1
2 1
(1−R0)
α0
c0
+ ka
α1
c1
α0
c0
+
α1
c1
− 1.
or, by deﬁnitions of u, k and a (Equations (1.47)), it becomes
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =
1
2 1
1− 1+uka
1+uk2
1+ku
1+au
− 1.
Furthermore, by Equation (1.71), it holds that
q(k) =
1+ uk2
1+ uak
1+ ua
1+ uk
, (A.11)
so we may ﬁnally write that
Θ(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =
1
2 1
1− 1q
− 1 =
q − 1
2q − (q − 1) =
q − 1
q + 1
.
A.10.2 Part II
Using the same set of deﬁnitions as in Part I above, we calculate that
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v(p l (θ), pL(θ))
=
Var

p l (θ)

Var (pL(θ))
=
⎛⎝γ l  c1(α0−l0)+c0(α1−l1)c0c1 
γ L( c1α0+c0α1c0c1 )
⎞⎠2
=
 c0c1
c1(α0−l0)2+c0(α1−l1)2
c0c1
c1(α0−l0)α0+c0(α1−l1)α1

c1(α0− l0)+ c0 (α1− l1)
c1α0+ c0α1
2
=
⎛⎝ c1(α0− l0)α0
c1(α0− l0)2
1+ c0(α1−l1)α1c1(α0−l0)α0
1+ c0(α1−l1)2c1(α0−l0)2
c1(α0− l0)
c1α0
⎛⎝1+ c0(α1−l1)c1(α0−l0)
1+ c0α1c1α0
⎞⎠⎞⎠2
=
⎛⎝1+ c0(α1−l1)α1c1(α0−l0)α0
1+ c0(α1−l1)2c1(α0−l0)2
⎛⎝1+ c0(α1−l1)c1(α0−l0)
1+ c0α1c1α0
⎞⎠⎞⎠2 = 1+ uka
1+ uk2
1+ uk
1+ ua
2
.
So, by Equation (A.11), it holds that
v(p l (θ), pL(θ)) =

1
q
2
.
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B IMPERFECT PARTICIPATION
B.1 Social Welfares
This section discusses the general welfare properties of various regulatory regimes
where participation is either perfect or imperfect and the imperfect participation
either includes voluntary participation or does not include it. Under these various
regimes, we calculate expectedwelfare as the difference between beneﬁts and damages
of emissions. Furthermore, we will provide optimal regime speciﬁc policies, and
after inserting the policy variables into welfare functions, we end up with expected
maximum value functions.
In general, given an instrument s , we write the social welfare as
W (s ) = B (s )−D (e (s )) .
Speciﬁcally, in the various regimes to come, the policy will apply the tax rate as an
instrument.
B.1.1 Perfect Participation
We study ﬁrst perfect participation. After setting lA = l0 = l1 = 0, we insert the
various cut-offs from Equations (2.6), (2.8), and (2.9) into the deﬁnition of aggregate
beneﬁts (Equation (2.16)). We have
B(s ) =
(bA+θA)
2
2cA
− α
2
A
2cA
s2+
(Δb +Δθ)2
2Δc
− (Δa)
2
2Δc
s2+
(b0+θ0)
2
2c0
or
B(s ) = BU − Δc(αA)
2+ cA (Δa)
2
cAΔc
τ2
2
= BU − 12γ s
2, (B.1)
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where BU are counterfactual beneﬁts (Equation (2.18)), i.e., beneﬁts in the absence
of regulation. Next, we insert the cut-offs into Equations (2.12) and (2.13), so we
have total emissions
e(s ) = aA

bA+θA
cA

−ΔaΔb +Δθ
Δc
+ a0
b0+θ0
c0
− α
2
A
cA
s − Δa
2
Δc
s
or, after applying the deﬁnition of counterfactual emissions (Equation (2.19)), we
have total emissions
e(s ) = U − Δcα
2
A+ cAΔa
2
cAΔc
τ = U − 1
γ
s . (B.2)
Thus, we may write that
W (s ) = B (s )−D (e (s )) = BU − 12γ s
2− d
2

U − 1
γ
s
2
. (B.3)
We further decompose counterfactual emissions into deterministic and stochastic
parts. Then, we have
U = U +Φ, (B.4)
where U = EU and Φ= aA

θA
cA
−ΔaΔθΔc .
We denote the optimal tax by τ. It satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
E
dB
dτ
− dD
de
d e
dτ

= 0
or, by Equation (B.3), the condition
τ =
γd
γ + d
U . (B.5)
Speciﬁcally, if we insert the optimal tax in Equation (B.5) into welfare, we have
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Wτ = BU − 12γ

γd
γ + d
U
2
− d
2

U − 1
γ
γd
γ + d
U
2
= BU − 12γ

γd
γ + d
U
2
− d
2

Φ+

1− 1
γ
γd
γ + d

U
2
= BU − 12γ

γd
γ + d
U
2
− d
2

1− 1
γ
γd
γ + d

U
2
+Φ2+ 2Φ

1− 1
γ
γd
γ + d

U

.
As EΦ= 0, we write that
EWτ = EBU −

1
γ

γd
γ + d
2
+ d

1− 1
γ
γd
γ + d
2 U 2
2
− d
2
EΦ2.
Furthermore, as
1
γ

γd
γ + d
2
+ d

1− 1
γ
γd
γ + d
2
=
γd
γ + d
,
it holds that
EWτ = EBU − γdγ + d
U
2
2
− d
2
EΦ2.
By Equation (B.5), we may also write that
EWτ = EBU −τU2 −
d
2
EΦ2. (B.6)
B.1.2 Imperfect Participation without Voluntary Participation
Consider next the imperfect participation. Following the steps in the previous sec-
tion, we derive beneﬁts as
B(sa) =
(bA+θA)
2
2cA
− α
2
A
2cA
s2a +
(Δb +Δθ)2
2Δc
+
(b0+θ0)
2
2c0
= BU − s
2
a
2γa
(B.7)
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and emissions as
e(sa) = aA

bA+θA
cA

−ΔaΔb +Δθ
Δc
+ a0
b0+θ0
c0
− α
2
A
cA
sa = U − 1γa sa (B.8)
in terms of the unit price sa . We deﬁne the slope of the abatement cost function γa in
Equation (2.24). Beneﬁts and damages together will yield (a counterpart of Equation
(B.3))
Wτa = BU −
1
2γa
s2a − d2

U +Φ− 1
γa
sa
2
,
or, by using the optimal tax (sa = τa) in Equation (2.26), will yield
Wτa = BU −
1
2γa

γad
γa + d
2
− d
2

U +Φ− 1
γa
γad
γa + d
2
.
After taking the expected value, we may write that
EWτa = EBU −

1
γa

γad
γa + d
2
+ d

1− 1
γa
γad
γa + d
2 EU 2
2
− d
2
EΦ2
or, as the term inside the parenthesis equals τaEU , write that
EWτa = EBU −τa
U
2
− d
2
EΦ2. (B.9)
B.1.3 Voluntary Participation
As a third alternative, we consider expected social welfare under voluntary partic-
ipation. Insert the cut-offs from Equations (2.39) into the deﬁnition of aggregate
beneﬁts (Equation (2.16)). We have
B(sm) =
(bA+θA)
2
2cA
− α
2
A
2cA
s2m +
(Δb +Δθ)2
2Δc
+
(b0+θ0)
2
2c0
− ϕ
2
m
2Δc
s2m ,
or, by Equations (2.18) and (2.43), we have
B(sm) = BU − Δc(αA)
2+ cAϕ
2
m
cAΔc
s2m
2
= BU − 12γ lm s
2
m . (B.10)
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We calculate that
em =
∫ ηA
0
aAdλ+
∫ λ1m
0
a1dλ+
∫ λ00
λ1m
a0dλ (B.11)
= aA

bA+θA− smαA
cA

−ΔaΔb +Δθ+ smϕm
Δc
+ a0
b0+θ0
c0
= U − Δcα
2
A+ cAΔaϕm
cAΔc
sm = U − 1γ Lm sm .
Then, it holds that
W (sm) = B(sm)−D(e(sm)) = BU − 12γ lm s
2
m − d2

U − 1
γ Lm
sm
2
. (B.12)
Next, we calculate the optimal tax rate. Denote the optimal rate by τm . First
order condition states that
dE [B(τm)−D(e(τm))]
dτm
= E

− 1
γ lm
τm +
d
γ Lm

U − 1
γ Lm
τm

= 0.
By construction, BU and U are independent of τm . The ﬁrst-order condition can
also be written as 
− 1
γ lm
τm +
d
γ Lm

U − 1
γ Lm
τm

= 0,
where U denotes the expected counterfactual emissions. After arrangements, it
holds that
τm =

dγ lmγ Lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm

U . (B.13)
Furthermore, if we incorporate τm into the social welfare in Equation (B.12), we
may write the welfare as
Wτm = B(τm)−D(e(τm))
= BU − 12γ lm

dγ lmγ Lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
U
2
− d
2

U − 1
γ Lm

dγ lmγ Lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
U
22
.
We use Equation (B.4) and take the expected value. It then holds that
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EWτm = E [B(τm)−D(e(τm))]
= EBU − 12γ lm

dγ lmγ Lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
2
U
2− d
2
EΦ2− d
2

1− dγ
l
m
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm

U
2
= EBU − d2 EΦ
2
−

1
γ lm
(dγ lmγ Lm)
2+ d

(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm − dγ lm2 U 2
2

(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
2 .
After a few lines of manipulations, it holds that
EWτm = EBU −
d
2
EΦ2− d (γ Lm)2 U
2
2

(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm

or, by the second-best tax rate in Equation (B.13), it also holds that
EWτm ≡ E
	
Bτm −Dτm


= EBU − d2 EΦ
2− γ
L
m
γ lm
τm
U
2
. (B.14)
B.2 Characteristics of Optimal Policies
In this section, we prove claims that we make in the main text. More precisely,
we have three distinct topics in three separate parts. To some extent, every topic
compares implementations between different regulatory regimes.
B.2.1 Part I
In Section 2.2.3, we claim that τa > τ and E [e (τa)]> E [e (τ)]. To prove these, we
ﬁrst write the condition in Equation (B.5) as
τ =
γd
γ + d
EU ,
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where U is the counterfactual emissions deﬁned in Equation (2.19) and E is the ex-
pectation operator. Note also that
γa = nγ ,
where
n = 1+ ua2 > 1.
Then, using the tax rate τa fromEquation (2.26) in themain text, we have a difference
τa −τ = nγdnγ + d EU −
γd
γ + d
EU =
γd 2
(γ + d ) (nγ + d )
(n− 1)EU > 0. (B.15)
Furthermore, by Equations (B.2) and (B.8) above, we know that
e (τa) = U − τaγa and e (τ) = U −
τ
γ
, (B.16)
so we have
E [e (τa)]− E [e (τ)] = E

U − τa
nγ
− (U − τ
γ
)

(B.17)
= E

− 1
nγ

nγd
nγ + d

EU +
1
γ

γd
γ + d

EU

= γd

n− 1
(γ + d ) (nγ + d )

EU > 0.
B.2.2 Part II
We show next that the regulator prefers perfect to imperfect participation (a claim
made in Section 2.2.3). By Equations (B.6) and (B.9), we may conclude that
EWτa − EWτ = (τ−τa)
EU
2
.
We calculated above (Equation (B.15)) that τ−τa < 0. Thus, EWτ > EWτa .
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B.2.3 Part III
In this ﬁnal part, we provide a full description of optimal policies under various
regulatory regimes. Speciﬁcally, we study various optimal prices and quantities that
the optimal policies will induce.
We deﬁne in the main text that
km ≡ ϕmαA ≥ 0
and
a− km = Δα−ϕmαA ,
where ϕ1 = l1−α1 ≥ 0, ϕ2 ≡Δα−Δl ≥ 0 and m = 1,2. We calculate in Equation
(B.11) that the emissions under voluntary participation are
em = U − 1γ Lm τm
and in Equation (B.13) that the optimal tax rate is
τm =
dγ lmγ Lm
(γ Lm)
2+ dγ lm
EU . (B.18)
We also calculate τ (Equation (B.5)), τa (Equation (2.26)), E [e (τ)] and E [e (τa)]
(Equations (B.16)).
We calculate next differences between various policy variables. Instead of report-
ing the tedious but straightforward calculations, we write down the various results
in Table B.1.
Table B.1 Various Differences under Tax Policies
τm −τ = γd

γ (F−ρ)+d (F−1)
(γ+d )(γρ+d )

EU
τm −τa = γd

nγ (F−ρ)+d (F−n)
(nγ+d )(γρ+d )

EU
E [e (τm)]− E [e (τ)] = γd

ρ−1
(γ+d )(γρ+d )

EU
E [e (τm)]− E [e (τa)] = γd

ρ−n
(γρ+d )(nγ+d )

EU
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In Table B.1, we have
F =
γ Lm
γ
=
1+ ua2
1+ uakm
(B.19)
and
ρ=
(γ Lm)
2
γγ lm
=

1+ uk2m
 
1+ ua2

(1+ uakm)
2 = 1+
u (km − a)2
(1+ uakm)
2 (B.20)
so that
F
ρ
=
1+ uakm
1+ uk2m
.
Furthermore, as
n = 1+ ua2,
(see Equation (2.28) in the main text), then
n
F
= 1+ uakm
and
n
ρ
=
(1+ uakm)
2
1+ uk2m
. (B.21)
Note that ua > 0 and ρ≡ ρm .
Overall, we have either k1 =
l1−α1
αA
≥ 0 or k2 = (l1−α1)−(l0−α0)αA ≥ 0. Furthermore,
we have either a−k1 = α0−l1αA or a−k2 ≡
Δl
αA
. The zero voluntary participationmeans
km = 0 and km > 0 means strictly positive voluntary participation among ﬁrms in
green technology. Let km > 0. Then, by the efﬁciency conditions calculated in the
main text (Equations (2.37) and (2.38)), the condition a−km = 0 refers to an efﬁcient
implementation and the condition a− km = 0 to an inefﬁcient one.
Now, based on Table B.1, we may write:
i. τm − τ = 0 under efﬁciency. As long as a = km > 0, we have F = ρ = 1.
However, if a = km , then the sign of τm −τ is ambiguous.
ii. If no ﬁrm participates, then τm = τa . We have km = 0, so F = ρ = n. How-
ever, if km > 0, then the sign of τm −τa is ambiguous.
iii. E [e (τm)] = E [e (τ)] under efﬁciency. This follows as the condition a = km >
0 implies that ρ= 1. If a = km , instead, then ρ> 1 and E [e (τm)]> E [e (τ)].
iv. If km = 0, then ρ = n and E [e (τm)] = E [e (τa)]. However, E [e (τm)] <
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E [e (τa)] only if n >ρ.
B.3 Combined Cost-Scale-Volume Effect
This section derives a magnitude for the total effect that the voluntary participation
has on instrument choice. This means that we combine the inﬂuences of cost, scale
and volume effects to see whether voluntary participation favors prices or quantities.
In Part I, we ignore the scale effect, while in Part II, the scale effect is wholly included
into the total effect.
In our derivations, we will employ the scale effect
n = 1+ ua2
(see Equation (2.28) in the main text) and the cost effect
ρ=

1+ uk2
 
1+ ua2

(1+ uak)2
(see Equation (A.9) in appendix A.9). Furthermore, the volume effect is
Θ ≡Θ(τ, p) = 2q − 1,
where
q =
1+ uk2
1+ uka
1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
(see Equations (2.68) and (2.70) in the main text).
B.3.1 Part I
It holds that
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Θ(τ, p)−ρ= 2q − 1−ρ=
= 2

1+ uk2
1+ uka
1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2

− 1−

1+ uk2
 
1+ ua2

(1+ uak)2
=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

2
1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
− 1+ uka
1+ uk2
+− 1+ ua
2
1+ uka

.
By straightforward calculations, it also holds that
Θ(τ, p)−ρ
=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
− 1+ uka
1+ uk2

+

1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
− 1+ ua
2
1+ uka

=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

1+ u2ka
 
1+ uk2
− 1+ u2k2 (1+ uka)
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uk2)

+
1+ uk2
1+ uka

1+ u2ka

(1+ uka)− 1+ u2k2 1+ ua2
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uka)

= uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka
⎡⎣ ua+ k − uk − a
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uk2)

+
⎛⎝ ua+ a− uk − a2k
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uka)
⎞⎠⎤⎦
= uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka
(a− k)

u − 1
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uk2)

+

u +

1− ak
 a
a−k
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uka)

= uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka
(a− k)
(1+ u2k2)

u − 1
(1+ uk2)

+

u − ak
(1+ uka)

.
B.3.2 Part II
We have
Θ− ρ
n
= 2q − 1− ρ
n
,
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or in terms of u, k, and a,
Θ− ρ
n
= 2

1+ uk2
1+ uka
1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2

− 1−

1+ uk2

(1+ uak)2
=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

2
1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
− 1+ uka
1+ uk2
− 1
1+ uka

.
Then, we calculate that
Θ− ρ
n
=
1+ uk2
1+ uka

1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
− 1+ uka
1+ uk2

+

1+ u2ka
1+ u2k2
− 1
1+ uka

= uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka

ua+ k − uk − a
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uk2)

+

ua+ a+ u2k2a2− uk
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uka)

= uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka

u (a− k)− (a− k)
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uk2)

+

u (a− k)+ a 1+ u2k2a
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uka)

= uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka

u (a− k)− (a− k)
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uk2)

+ uk
1+ uk2
1+ uka

u (a− k)+ a+ k − k + u2k2a2
(1+ u2k2) (1+ uka)

= uk
(a− k)
(1+ u2k2)
1+ uk2
1+ uka
⎡⎢⎣ u − 1
(1+ uk2)

+
⎛⎜⎝ u + 1+ k(1+ku
2a2)
(a−k)
(1+ uka)
⎞⎟⎠
⎤⎥⎦ .
B.4 A General Representation
Section 2.3.7.1 in the main text presents a general formula for instrument choice. It
applies in both prices versus quantities and in quantities versus quantities compar-
isons. We will derive the formula here.
Our writing proceeds in parts. Within the different phases, we will apply deﬁni-
tions:
q(s ) =
R0(s )

αA
cA
2
+R1(s )

Δα
Δc
2
(R0(s ))
2

αA
cA
2
+(R1(s ))
2

Δα
Δc
2 (B.22)
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and
v = v(I , J ) =
Var (I )
Var (J )
. (B.23)
Calculate then
Var (e(I )−Var (e(J )
Var (J )−Var (I ) =−
[Var (e(J )−Var (e(I )]
Var (J )−Var (I ) ,
where (by Equations (2.81) and (2.82) in the main text)
Var (I ) =

γ L
2
σ2

R0(I )
αA
cA
2
+

R1(I )
Δα
Δc
2
and
Var (e(I )) = σ2

(1−R0(I ))αAcA
2
+

(1−R1(I ))ΔαΔc
2
.
We manipulate ﬁrst the numerator. We write it as
Var (e(J )−Var (e(I ) = 2

R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
Δc
Δθ
2
− 2

R0(I )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(I )

Δα
Δc
Δθ
2
− Var (J )−Var (I )
γ Lm
2
or, after taking R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2
as a common factor, as
Var (e(J )−Var (e(I ) = 2

R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
Δc
Δθ
2
⎛⎝1− R0(I )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(I )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2
R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2
⎞⎠− Var (J )−Var (I )
γ Lm
2 .
By application of Equation (B.22), it holds that
Var (J )
Var (J )

R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
Δc
Δθ
2
=
Var (J )
γ Lm
2 (q(J )) .
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Furthermore, by applications of Equations (B.22) and (B.23), it also holds that
R0(I )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(I )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2
R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2
=

R0(I )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(I )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2 (R0(I ))2 αAcA θA2+(R1(I ))2ΔαΔc Δθ2
(R0(I ))
2

αA
cA
θA
2
+(R1(I ))
2

Δα
Δc Δθ
2

R0(J )

αA
cA
θA
2
+R1(J )

Δα
ΔcΔθ
2 (R0(J ))2 αAcA θA2+(R1(J ))2ΔαΔc Δθ2
(R0(J ))
2

αA
cA
θA
2
+(R1(J ))
2

Δα
Δc Δθ
2
= v
q(I )
q(J )
.
Now, we may write that
Var (e(J )−Var (e(I ) = 2Var (J )
γ Lm
2 (q(J ))1− v q(I )q(J )

− Var (J )−Var (I )
γ Lm
2
=
Var (J )
γ Lm
2 2 (q(J ))1− v q(I )q(J )

− (1− v)

.
As
Var (J )−Var (I ) =Var (J )(1− v),
we may ﬁnally write that
Var (e(I )−Var (e(J )
Var (J )−Var (I ) =
Var (J )
(γ Lm)2

2 (q(J ))

1− v q(I )q(J )
− (1− v)
Var (J )(1− v)
=
1
γ Lm
2
⎛⎝2 (q(J ))

1− v q(I )q(J )

(1− v) − 1
⎞⎠ .
B.5 The Relation between Quantity and Price Variances
We want to link price and quantity variations to each other. By Equation (2.82), it
holds that
Var (e(s )) = σ2

(1−R0(s ))αAcA
2
+

(1−R1(s ))ΔαΔc
2
.
Expand it to get
232
Var (e(s )) = σ2(1− 2R0(I )+R0(I ))2)

αA
cA
2
+σ2

1− 2R1(I )+R1(I ))2
Δα
Δc
2
.
After arranging,
Var (e(s )) = σ2

αA
cA
2
+

Δα
Δc
2
+σ2R0(s ))
2

αA
cA
2⎛⎜⎝1− 2

R0(s ))

αA
cA
2
+R1(s )

Δα
Δc
2
R0(s ))2

αA
cA
2
+R1(s ))2

Δα
Δc
2
⎞⎟⎠
+σ2R1(s ))
2

Δα
Δc
2⎛⎜⎝1− 2

R0(s ))

αA
cA
2
+R1(s )

Δα
Δc
2
R0(s ))2

αA
cA
2
+R1(s ))2

Δα
Δc
2
⎞⎟⎠ .
We introduce the counterfactual emissions U in Equation (2.19), q(s ) in Equation
(2.76), and Var (s ) in Equation (2.81), so we may further write that
Var (e(s )) =Var (U )−Var (s )2q(s )− 1
(γ L)2
.
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C MULTIPLE EXTERNALITIES
C.1 Generalized Linear Externality Effect
We present here a generalized linear externality effect. Let
F ki =φ
kk
i j λ
k
j +φ
kk
i i λ
k
i +φ
k l
i j λ
l
j +φ
k l
i i λ
l
i , (C.1)
where i , j = 0,1, i = j , k , l = g , r and k = l . For example, λlj is the number of ﬁrms
in sector l that use technology j , while the co-efﬁcient φk li j indicates the inﬂuence
that the use of technology j in sector l has on the proﬁtability of technology i in
sector k. As Equation (C.1) shows, the externalities can ﬂow between and within
the technologies and sectors. Within a sector, the externality can prosper within the
same technology (φkki i λ
k
i ) or between the technologies (φ
kk
i j λ
k
j ). The ﬂow between
industries may occur among the technologies (φk li i λ
l
i ) or between them (φ
k l
i j λ
l
j ).
We substantially restrict the externality ﬂows in themodel of themain text. First,
we assume no externalities between the technologies. In other words, we set φkki j =
φk li j = 0. Second, based on close inspection of the beneﬁts, the effects φ
kk
i i λ
k
i and
φki λ
k
i both depend on unit λ
k
i , so we effectively have a combined factor equal to
cki +φ
kk
i i

λki in the beneﬁts. In this particular case, wemay say that the sector is able
to internalize the externality. Thus, without loss of generality, we may set φkki i = 0,
as well. Third, we assume that φk l00 = 0. That is, within the use of technology zero,
there exists no externalities. Finally, we restrict the direction of the externality ﬂow.
We assume that sector g is an externality generator while sector r is an externality
recipient, so φg r11 = 0 while φ
r g
11 = 0. In summary, given the diversity of plausible
externality ﬂows, we will concentrate on only one of them. We denote φ=φr g11 .
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C.2 Augmented Abatement Cost Function
In reducing the total emissions, we refer to abatement costs function as theminimum
cost function. In the present context, the abatement cost function is not standard
mainly because of the positive externality in production. We provide here the proper
marginal abatement cost function, which turns out to be linear in emissions.
We write the efﬁcient units (Equations (3.18) and (3.19)) as
λge =
Δc r (Δb g −Δθ g )+φ (Δb r −Δθr )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +μ
Δαrφ+ΔαgΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 (C.2)
=Ag (θ)+C gμ
and
λre =
φ (Δb g −Δθ g )+Δc g (Δb r −Δθr )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +μ
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 (C.3)
=Ar (θ)+C rμ.
Next, we incorporate these units into emission constraint (Equation (3.16)). This
will yield
e = λg+0 α
g
0 −Δαgλg1 +λr+0 αr0 −Δαrλr1 = e0−Δαgλg1 −Δαrλr1
= e0−Δαg (Ag (θ)+C gμ)−Δαr (Ar (θ)+C rμ) ,
or, after arrangements, it will yield
e = e0−ΔαgAg (θ)−ΔαrAr (θ)+ (ΔαgC g +ΔαrC r )μ.
By using deﬁnitions in Equations (C.2) and (C.3), we calculate that
ΔαgC g +ΔαrC r =Δαg

Δαrφ+ΔαgΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2

+Δαr

ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

=
(Δαg )2Δc r + 2ΔαgΔαr1φ+ (Δα
r )2Δc g
Δc gΔc r −φ2 =
1
c
and
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− (ΔαgAg (θ)+ΔαrAr (θ)) =−Δαg

Δc r (Δb g −Δθ g )+φ (Δb r −Δθr )
Δc gΔc r −φ2

−Δαr

φ (Δb g −Δθ g )+Δc g (Δb r −Δθr )
Δc gΔc r −φ2

= e00+Δαg

Δc rΔθ g +φΔθr
Δc gΔc r −φ2

+Δαr

φΔθ g +Δc gΔθr
Δc gΔc r −φ2

= e00+

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

Δθ g +

ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

Δθr ,
where c is deﬁned in Equation (3.20). Using these (and letting A= e0+ e00), we may
write that
e(μ;Δθ g ,Δθr ) =A+

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

Δθ g +

ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

Δθr − μ
c
and
μ(e ;Δθ g ,Δθr ) = cA−Ce (C.4)
+c

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

Δθ g +

ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2

Δθr

.
In particular, by settingΔθ g =Δθr = 0, we have
e(μ) =A− μ
c
and
μ(e) = cA− c e .
C.3 Efﬁcient Subsidy Rule
In this section, we discuss the implementation of the efﬁcient policy (Section 3.2.4).
First order conditions for an efﬁcient solution are⎧⎨⎩ Δb
g −Δc gλge +φλre +μΔαg = 0
Δb r −Δc rλre +φλge +μΔαr = 0
,
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while the market choices λg1 and λ
r
1 satisfy⎧⎨⎩ Δb
g −Δc gλg1 + sΔαg +ΔS g = 0
Δb r −Δc rλr1 +φλg1 + sΔαr +ΔS r = 0
or, equivalently, satisfy⎧⎨⎩ Δb
g −Δc gλg1 +φλr1 −φλr1 + sΔαg +ΔS g = 0
Δb r −Δc rλr∗1 +φλg1 + sΔαr +ΔS r = 0
(see Equations (3.17) and (3.21)). The efﬁcient implementation requires that λge = λ
g
1
and λre = λ
r
1 . Therefore, by the conditions above, it must hold that⎧⎨⎩ μΔα
g =−φλr1 + sΔαg +ΔS g
μΔαr = sΔαr +ΔS r
(C.5)
or that −φλr1 + sΔαg +ΔS g
Δαg
=
sΔαr +ΔS r
Δαr
.
In speciﬁc, as for the relationship between the payment rules, we arrange the previ-
ous equation to get
ΔS g =
Δαg
Δαr
ΔS r +φλr1 .
Furthermore, by Equation (C.5), it holds between μ and s that
μ= s +
ΔS r
Δαr
in the efﬁcient allocation.
C.4 Social Welfare Maximization
We will describe next the optimal societal policy (Section 3.3.1). The policy will
maximize the difference between beneﬁts and damages of emissions and is imple-
mented by simultaneous use of emission price and sector speciﬁc thresholds.
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C.4.1 Part I
We will solve the following problem:
Max
τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r
EW = E
⎡⎣∫ λg1
0
B g1 dλ
g +
∫ λg+0
λg1
B g0 dλ
g +
∫ λr1
0
B r1 dλ
r +
∫ λr+0
λr1
B r0 dλ
r
⎤⎦
− E D(e(λg1 ,λr1 ) ,
where
λg1 = λ
g
1 (τ,ΔS
g ) =
Δb g −Δθ g +τΔαg +ΔS g
Δc g
(C.6)
and
λr1 = λ
r
1 (τ,ΔS
g ,ΔS r ) =
Δb r −Δθr +τΔαr +ΔS r +φλg1 (τ,ΔS g )
Δc r
(C.7)
=
Δb r −Δθr
Δc r
+
(φΔαg +Δc gΔαr )
Δc gΔc r
τ+
Δc gΔS r +φΔS g
Δc gΔc r
are the sector-speciﬁc responses calculated in Equations (3.5), (3.13), and (3.14), re-
spectively. We may also write the beneﬁts as
B(λg1 ,λ
r
1 ) =
∫ λg1
0

b g1 +θ
g
1 − c g1 λg

dλg +
∫ λg+0
λg1

b g0 +θ
g
0 − c g0 λg

dλg
+
∫ λr1
0

b r1 +θ
r
1 − c r1 λr +φλg1

dλr +
∫ λr+0
λr1
(b r0 +θ
r
0 − c r0 λr )dλr
and the emissions as
e =
∫ λg1
0
αg1 dλ+
∫ λg+0
λg1
αg0 dλ+
∫ λr1
0
αr1 dλ+
∫ λr+0
λr1
αr0 dλ
= λg+0 α
g
0 −Δαgλg1 +λr+0 αr0 −Δαrλr1 .
First order conditions are
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dEW
dτ
= E

(B g1 (λ
g
1 )−B g0 (λg1 )+φλr1 +Δαg D ′(e))
dλg1
dτ

(C.8)
+ E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))
dλr1
dτ

= E

(B g1 (λ
g
1 )−B g0 (λg1 )+φλr1 +Δαg D ′(e))
 dλg1
dτ
+ E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))
 dλr1
dτ
= 0,
dEW
dΔS g
= E

(B g1 (λ
g
1 )−B g0 (λg1 )+φλr1 +Δαg D ′(e))
dλg1
ΔS g

(C.9)
+ E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))
dλr1
ΔS g

= E

(B g1 (λ
g
1 )−B g0 (λg1 )+φλr1 +Δαg D ′(e))
 dλg1
ΔS g
+ E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))
 dλr1
ΔS g
= 0,
and
dEW
dΔS r
= E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))
dλr1
dΔS r

(C.10)
= E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))
 dλr1
dΔS r
= 0.
Note that these conditions reduces to two conditions
E

(B g1 (λ
g
1 )−B g0 (λg1 )+φλr1 +Δαg D ′(e))

= 0 (C.11)
and
E

(B r1 (λ
r
1 )−B r0 (λr1 )+Δαr D ′(e))

= 0. (C.12)
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Next, we calculate (by using responses in Equations (C.6) and (C.7)) that
B g1 (λ
g
1 (τ,ΔS
g ))−B g0 (λg1 (τ,ΔS g ))
= b g1 +θ
g
1 − c g1 λg1 (τ,ΔS g )−

b g0 +θ
g
0 − c g0 λg1 (τ,ΔS g )

=Δb g −Δθ g −Δc gλg1 (τ,ΔS g )
=Δb g −Δθ g −Δc g

Δb g −Δθ g +τΔαg +ΔS g
Δc g

=− (τΔαg +ΔS g )
and
B r1 (λ
r
1 (τ,ΔS
g ,ΔS r ))−B r0 (λr1 (τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r ))
= b r1 +θ
r
1 − c r1 λr1λr1 (τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r )+φλg1 (τ,ΔS g )
=Δb r −Δθr −Δc gλr1 (τ,ΔS g ,ΔS r )+φλg1 (τ,ΔS g )
=Δb r −Δθr +φλg1 (τ,ΔS g )
−Δc r

Δb r −Δθr +τΔαr +ΔS r +φλg1 (τ,ΔS g )
Δc r

=− (τΔαr +ΔS r ) .
Then, condition in Equation (C.12) can be written as
E

(− (τΔαr +ΔS r )+Δαr D ′(e))= 0
or as
τ− ED ′(e) =−ΔS
r
Δαr
.
Second, the condition in Equation (C.11) becomes
E
− (τΔαg + S g )+φEλr1 +Δαg D ′(e)= 0
so that
τ− ED ′(e) = −S
g +φEλr1 (τ,Δθ
r )
Δαg
.
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Speciﬁcally, it holds that
ΔS g =
Δαg
Δαr
ΔS r −φEλr1 (θ)
at the optimum.
We make the same comment here as we did earlier in Chapter 1, appendix A.1.
The tax rate is not a compulsory part in the implementation of the optimal policy.
As long as conditions in Equations (C.9) and (C.10) are satisﬁed, then the condition
in Equation (C.8) automatically holds. In other words, it must only hold that
ΔS r =Δαr D ′(e)
and
ΔS g =Δαg D ′(e)−φλr1
at the optimum. In this solution, the payments reﬂect the type of the externality.
The paymentsΔαr D ′(e) andΔαg D ′(e) are related to the negative externality while
the payment φλr1 is related to the positive externality. In the absence of positive
externalities, only the partsΔαr D ′(e) andΔαg D ′(e) survive.
However, the agency has no reason to dismiss themarket-based instruments from
the outset. The reason is that the abandonment will automatically ﬁx the payments.
Later on, when we study the instrument choice, the ﬂuctuating payments (provided
by permit trading) may well yield higher expected welfare than the ﬁxed payments.
C.4.2 Part II
We note that the conditions in Equations (C.11) and (C.12) can also be written as⎧⎨⎩ E

Δb g −Δθ g −Δc gλgo +φλr +D ′(e)Δαg = 0
E

Δb r −Δθr −Δc rλro +φλg +D ′(e)Δαr

= 0
,
where λgo and λro stand for optimal choices. Then,
Eλgo =
Δc rΔb g +φΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +
Δαr1φ+Δα
gΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 ED
′(e)
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and
Eλro =
φΔb g +Δc gΔb r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +μ
ΔαrΔc g +Δαgφ
Δc gΔc r −φ2 ED
′(e). (C.13)
C.5 The Representation
This section presents a thorough analysis of beneﬁts and damages under multiple
externalities. In parts one to three, we concentrate on beneﬁts. We start by incorpo-
rating the sector speciﬁc responses (so called cut-off units) into beneﬁt function. This
amounts to beneﬁts that depend on the policy instruments: on the price of emissions
and on the subsidy thresholds. In addition, we draw a distinction between stochastic
and non-stochastic terms in the beneﬁt function. The non-stochastic part is written
in Part I, while Part III explains the functional form of the stochastic part. Part II
incorporates efﬁcient subsidy rule into non-stochastic part of the beneﬁt function.
This leaves us beneﬁts that depends solely on the price of emissions.
In Part IV, we derive a formula for emissions. We follow the steps already familiar
from the beneﬁt calculations. This leaves us an emission formula that is divided into
stochastic and non-stochastic parts and that depends only on the price of emissions.
C.5.1 Part I
We have
B(s , S(s ),θ) = Ψ1(s , S(s ))+Ψ2(s , S(s ),θ), (C.14)
where Ψ1 is totally independent of the uncertainties while Ψ2 is not. In deriving this
representation, we ﬁnd it convenient to write the cut-off units as
λg1 (θ) =
Δb g + S(s )
Δc g
− Δθ
g
Δc g
+
Δαg
Δc g
s =Ωg − Δθ
g
Δc g
+ zg s (C.15)
and
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λr1 (θ) =
Δb r −Δθr + sΔαr +φλg∗1 (θ)
Δc r
(C.16)
=
Δb rΔc g +φΔb g +φS(s )
Δc rΔc g
− Δc
gΔθr +φΔθ g
Δc rΔc g
+
(φΔαg +Δc gΔαr )
Δc gΔc r
s
=Ωr −

Δθr
Δc r
+
φΔθ g
Δc rΔc g

+ zr s .
We start by deriving the deterministic part of the beneﬁts, Ψ1. By expanding the
beneﬁts, we have (after setting all the uncertainty variables in beneﬁts equal to zero)
Ψ1(s ) = z(S(s ))+ z1 s + z2(S(s ))s − z32 s
2, (C.17)
where
z(S(s )) =Δb gΩg − Δc
g
2

Ωg
2
+Δb rΩr − Δc
r
2
(Ωr )
2+φΩgΩr ,
z1 =Δb
g zg +Δb
r zr ,
z2(S(s )) =

φzr −Δc g zg

Ωg +

φzg −Δc r zr

Ωr ,
and
z3 =Δc
r (zr )
2− 2φzg zr +Δc g

zg
2
. (C.18)
After inserting Ωg (S(s )) and Ωr (S(s )), it holds that
z(S(s )) = Z +
1
Δc rΔc g
1
Δc g

Δb rΔc gφ+Δb gφ2

S(s )
− 1
Δc rΔc g
1
Δc g

Δc rΔc g −φ2 (S(s ))2
2

= Z +Z ′S(s )−Z ′′ (S(s ))
2
2
,
where Z is independent of S and s . It also holds that
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z2(S(s )) =−Δαg Δb
g
Δc g
−Δαr

Δb rΔc g +Δb gφ
Δc rΔc g

+φzr
Δb g
Δc g
−

Δαg
Δc g
+
Δαrφ
Δc gΔc r
− φ
Δc g
zr

S(s ) = Z2−Z ′2S(s ).
Next, we calculate that
dΨ1(s )
d s
=
d z
dS
dS
d s
+ (z1+ z2(S(s )))+
d z2
dS
dS
d s
s − z3 s .
By using the deﬁnitions from above, we may also write
dΨ1(s )
d s
=

Z ′ −Z ′′S(s ) dS
d s
+ (z1+ z2(S(s )))−Z ′2 dSd s s − z3 s . (C.19)
Remember that (by Equations (C.15) and (C.16))
zg =
Δαg
Δc g
(C.20)
and
zr =
ΔαrΔc g +φΔαg
Δc rΔc g
, (C.21)
so we may (for future needs) calculate that
z1+Z2 =
φ
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g
(Δb gφ+Δb rΔc g )
and
Z ′2 =
1
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g

Δc gΔc r −φ2 .
C.5.2 Part II
We will next incorporate efﬁciency rule into subsidization. We explain in the main
text (see Equation (3.28)) that we will apply a linear subsidy rule equal to
S(s ) = Γ + Γs s =
φ (Δb rΔc g +Δb gφ)
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s . (C.22)
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This means that
dS
d s
= Γs =
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 .
Now, we write Equation (C.19) as
dΨ1(s )
d s
=

Z ′ dS
d s
+ z1+Z2

−

Z ′′ dS
d s
+Z ′2

S(s )−

Z ′2
dS
d s
+ z3

s
or as
dΨ1(s )
d s
= Ψ0−Ψ1S(s )−Ψ2 s .
Using various deﬁnitions and calculations from above, we calculate
Ψ0 = Z
′ dS
d s
+ z1+Z2
=
1
Δc rΔc g
1
Δc g

Δb rΔc gφ+Δb gφ2
 φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2
+
φ
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g
(Δb gφ+Δb rΔc g ) ,
Ψ1 = Z
′′ dS
d s
+Z ′2
=

Δc rΔc g −φ2
Δc rΔc g
1
Δc g
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +
1
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g

Δc gΔc r −φ2
=
1
Δc g
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc rΔc g
+
1
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g

Δc gΔc r −φ2
=
1
Δc g
1
Δc gΔc r
(φΔc gΔαr +Δαg (Δc gΔc r )) =
φΔαr +ΔαgΔc r
Δc gΔc r
,
and
Ψ2 = Z
′
2
dS
d s
+ z3 =
1
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )+ z3.
After simplifying, we can write
Ψ0 =
Δb rΔc gφ+Δb gφ2
Δc rΔc g
φΔαr +ΔαgΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 .
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As for the factorΨ2, we insert zg and zr (Equations (C.20) and (C.21)) into the factor
z3 (Equation (C.18)), so that
z3 =Δc
r (zr )
2− 2φzg zr +Δc g

zg
2
=
1
Δc gΔc r

Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2− φ
2
Δc g
(Δαg )2

.
Thus,
Ψ2 =
1
Δc gΔc r
Δαg
Δc g
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
+
1
Δc gΔc r

Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2− φ
2
Δc g
(Δαg )2

=
1
Δc gΔc r

φΔαgΔαr +Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2

.
Next, we insert the rule S(s ) (Equation (C.22)) into dΨ
1(s )
d s . It now holds that
Ψ0−Ψ1S(s )
=
Δb rΔc gφ+Δb gφ2
Δc rΔc g
φΔαr +ΔαgΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2
− φΔα
r +ΔαgΔc r
Δc gΔc r

φ (Δb rΔc g +Δb gφ)
Δc gΔc r −φ2 +
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s

=−φΔα
r +ΔαgΔc r
Δc rΔc g

φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s

.
Furthermore, if we write
Ψ2 ≡ Ψ2Δc
gΔc r −Ψ2φ2
Δc gΔc r −φ2 ,
then
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Ψ0−Ψ1S(s )−Ψ2 s =−
(φΔαr +ΔαgΔc r )

φΔc gΔαr +φ2Δαg

(Δc rΔc g ) (Δc gΔc r −φ2) s
+
φ2

φΔαgΔαr +Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2

(Δc rΔc g ) (Δc gΔc r −φ2) s
− Δc
gΔc r

φΔαgΔαr +Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2

(Δc rΔc g ) (Δc gΔc r −φ2) s .
After simplifying, we have
Ψ0−Ψ1S(s )−Ψ2 s =−

Δc g (Δαr )2+ 2φΔαgΔαr +Δc r (Δαg )2
Δc gΔc r −φ2

s =− s
c
,
(C.23)
where the parameter c is deﬁned in the main text (Equation (3.20)). We may then
write
Ψ1(s ) = Ψ
1− 1
2c
s2. (C.24)
C.5.3 Part III
In this part, we derive a representation for Ψ2(s ,θ) in Equation (C.14). To begin
with, we collect all the beneﬁt-related factors that are not included in Ψ1(s ). We
write these as
Ψ2(θ) =Δb g

−Δθ
g
Δc g

+Δb r

− 1
Δc r
Δθr − φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

− Δc
g
2

Δθ g
Δc g
2
− Δc
r
2

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g
2
+φ

Δθ g
Δc g

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

+
(Δθ g )2
Δc g
+Δθr

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

,
so Ψ2(θ) include factors in Ψ2(s ,θ) that do not contain the price s . Then,
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Ψ2(s ,θ) = Ψ2(θ)+

Δc g
Δθ g
Δc g
−φ

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

−Δθ g

Ωg
+

Δc r

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

−φ

Δθ g
Δc g

−Δθr

Ωr
+

Δc g
Δθ g
Δc g
zg s +

Δθr +
φ
Δc g
Δθ g

zr

s
−

φ

zr
Δθ g
Δc g
+ zg

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

−Δθ g zg −Δθr zr

s .
Actually, many factors will cancel out, so we have
Ψ2(s ,θ) = Ψ2(θ)−φ

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

Δb g
Δc g
+
S
Δc g

−φ

zg s

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

s .
Denote
y(θ) = Ψ2(θ)−φ

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

Δb g
Δc g
,
so
Ψ2(s ,θ) = y(θ)−φ

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g
 S
Δc g

−φ

zg

1
Δc r
Δθr +
φ
Δc rΔc g
Δθ g

s .
Remember that
zg =
Δαg
Δc g
,
so
Ψ2(s ,θ) = y(θ)− φ
Δc gΔc r

Δθr +
φ
Δc g
Δθ g

(S +Δαg s ) .
If we further let
y1(θ) =
φ
Δc gΔc r

Δθr +
φ
Δc g
Δθ g

, (C.25)
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then
Ψ2(s ,θ) = y(θ)− y1(θ) (S(s )+Δαg s ) . (C.26)
C.5.4 Part IV
Before concluding, we derive the emissions under efﬁcient subsidization. The level
of emissions is (by Equation 3.16)
e = λg+0 α
g
0 −Δαgλg1 +λr+0 αr0 −Δαrλr1 .
We incorporate the units λg1 and λ
r
1 from Equations (3.30) and (3.31) into the for-
mula, so
e(s ,θ) = x +

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

Δθ g +
Δαr
Δc r
Δθr (C.27)
−

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

S(s )− zrΔαr +Δαg zg  s
= x + x(θ)− x1S(s )− x2 s .
The factor x includes terms that does not contain price or uncertainty variables.
Next, we incorporate the rule S(s ) (Equation (C.22)) into emissions. In particu-
lar, we have
x1S(s ) = x1

Γ +
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s

=
= x1Γ +

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s .
Furthermore, as
x2 = zrΔα
r +Δαg zg =

Δc gΔαr +φΔαg
Δc gΔc r

Δαr +Δαg
Δαg
Δc g
=
Δc g (Δαr )2+φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2
Δc gΔc r
,
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we have
e(s ,θ) =X + x(θ)−

ΔαgΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g

φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s
− Δc
g (Δαr )2+φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2
Δc gΔc r
s ,
where
X = x − x1Γ
is a constant. We write that
x2 =
Δc gΔc r x2−φ2x2
Δc gΔc r −φ2 ,
so
e(s ,θ) =X + x(θ)− Δα
gΔc r +Δαrφ
Δc rΔc g
φ (Δc gΔαr +φΔαg )
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s
− Δc
gΔc r

Δc g (Δαr )2+φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2

Δc gΔc r (Δc gΔc r −φ2) s
+
φ2

Δc g (Δαr )2+φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2

Δc gΔc r (Δc gΔc r −φ2) s .
Many factors will cancel out, so we ﬁnally have
e(s ,θ) =X + x(θ)+
Δc g (Δαr )2+ 2φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2
Δc gΔc r −φ2 s (C.28)
=X + x(θ)+
s
c
,
where the factor c is deﬁned in Equation (3.20) in the main text.
C.6 Proof of Lemma 3
We claim in Lemma 3 (Section 3.4.6) that r1 =
w2
c cs b
> 1. As for the proof, note ﬁrst
that
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w =
Δc gΔc r
Δc g (Δαr )2+φΔαrΔαg +Δc r (Δαg )2
, (C.29)
c =
Δc gΔc r −φ2
Δc r (Δαg )2+ 2φΔαgΔαr +Δc g (Δαr )2
, (C.30)
and
cs b =
Δc gΔc r
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2− φ2Δc g (Δαg )2
.
It holds that
1
c
1
cs b
=
Δc r (Δαg )2+Δc g (Δαr )2+ 2φΔαgΔαr
(Δc gΔc r )2
Δc g (Δαr )2+

1− φ2Δc gΔc r

Δc r (Δαg )2
1− φ2Δc gΔc r
.
Thus,
r1 =
w2
c cs b
=
Δc r (Δαg )2+Δc g (Δαr )2+ 2φΔαgΔαr
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg
Δc g (Δαr )2+

1− φ2Δc gΔc r

Δc r (Δαg )2
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg
1
1− φ2Δc gΔc r
 .
After some straightforward manipulations, we may write that
r1 =

1+
φΔαgΔαr
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg


1− φΔα
rΔαg − (h − 1)Δc g (Δαr )2
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg

,
where
h =
1
1− φ2Δc gΔc r
=
Δc gΔc r
Δc gΔc r −φ2 > 1.
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We further deﬁne
h1 =
φΔαgΔαr
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg
> 0
and
h2 =
(h − 1)Δc g (Δαr )2
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg
> 0,
so that
r1 = (1+ h1) (1− h1+ h2) .
Speciﬁcally, as long as
(1+ h1) (1− h1+ h2)> 1,
then r1 > 1. Consequently, as long as
h2 >
(h1)
2
1+ h1
,
then r1 > 1. We calculate that
h2− (h1)
2
1+ h1
=
φ2
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg
Δc g (Δαr )2
Δc gΔc r −φ2 −
(ΔαgΔαr )2
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2

,
or, after some manipulations, we may write that
h2− (h1)
2
1+ h1
=
φ2 (Δαr )2
Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2+φΔαrΔαg
(Δc gΔαr )2+φ2 (Δαg )2
(Δc gΔc r −φ2) Δc g (Δαr )2+Δc r (Δαg )2 ,
which is clearly strictly larger than zero. We conclude that r1 > 1.
253



